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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines Muslim cultural adaptation to French culture. 
Specifically, this project asserts the Muslim symbol hijab, or headscarf, is a 
religious and cultural symbol of Islam that is in direct clash with the French 
concept of secularism. In 2004 the French government passed a resolution 
forbidding the wearing of the hijab in French public schools. In response to this 
resolution Muslim men and women protested and have begun to argue for the 
establishment of a French-Muslim identity. Thus, this analysis closely examined 
the 2004 law in regard to how it has potentially impacted Muslim cultural 
adaptation into French culture. 
The results of this study reveal cultural adaptation has failed in France, the 
Muslim and non-Muslim French populations are in an identity crisis and that in 
response to mounting pressures to assimilate, the French-Muslim community 
(ummah) has responded by closing its doors to outside influence. Moreover, this 
examination reveals how Islam is in a transformation stage, from a magic/mythic 
religion into a more perspectival religion. Ultimately, this analysis calls for a 
communicative society, one where all members of the culture will meet together 
and discuss the issue of Muslim immigration and French integration practices.   
1CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The co-existence between Muslims and non-Muslims in France has always 
been a precarious relationship (Silverstein, 2004). From the time of the Algerian 
conflict to protests at the end of the Algerian conflict, and also in the riots of 1968, 
race and religion have been key factors of contention. In 2005 this precarious 
relationship exploded in weeks of rioting and violence that gripped the French nation, 
causing the French government to issue a state of emergency, a provision allowed 
under an amendment to the French Constitution in 1958, and nationwide curfews 
(Rotella, 2005). The following picture shows the violence and destruction in Clichy-
sous-Bois.
QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (LZW) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
 
The proximate cause of these riots in October 2005 in the Paris suburb of 
Clichy-sous-Bois was the electrocution of two Muslim youth who were hiding from 
police (Graff, 2005). Their deaths started riots in the town, and those riots later 
escalated when police fired tear gas into a mosque. This act sparked more than two 
weeks of rioting, car burning and violence throughout French suburbs, cities and in 
the countryside. The French government had to declare a state of emergency, a 
2provision added to the French Constitution in 1958 during the war between France 
and Algeria. This state of emergency was the first since 1968 when student riots 
gripped more than 300 towns across France (Mulrine, 2005). The purpose of the state 
of emergency in both 1968 and 2005 was to bring immediate stability to the cities and 
countryside. 
While the 2005 state of emergency did put out the flames of violence and 
quell the rioting (at least temporarily), the underlying problems causing the uprising 
were not addressed. French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin said the root of the 
problem underlying the rioting and violence is more than the recent rioting, but the 
result of France's failure to provide hope to thousands of young people, most of them 
French citizens, the children of Muslim immigrants from northern Africa (Keaten, 
2005).  This includes the hope of getting a decent paying job, and being considered 
part of the French state. In December 2005 de Villepin proposed a plan to provide 
more job training and opportunities to youngsters living in suburbs, generally ethnic 
enclaves (Fontanaud, 2005). While these measures intend to address economic 
differences in France, the much larger issue of integration remains unaddressed by the 
de Villepin government.
De Villepin has stated the Republic, and its model of integration, which was 
founded on the equal recognition of all citizens is also at the root of the current 
violence and uprisings because the model does not specifically allow immigrants to 
have a co-cultural existence (Graff, 2005). His sentiments were echoed by Muslims in 
France who argue they want to be considered “French,” while at the same time, these 
Muslims want to maintain aspects of their Muslim heritage (Mulrine, 2005). The 
3balancing act between being French and Muslim is where most of the tensions stem 
from (Geary & Graff, 2005). 
France does not keep official statistics of ethnicity or religious affiliation, due 
to the principle of laïcité and the 1905 law mandating the separation of church and 
state. Because of this 1905 mandate, and because of the rising sense of urgency for a 
unified national French identity in France (Flynn, 1995) the state does not provide or 
recognize religious or ethnic communities and groups as entities separate from the 
general population (Hargreaves, 2000). Therefore, estimates of the Muslim 
population in France are just that, estimates. The International Helsinki Federation 
(2005) estimates between 4-5 million Muslims reside in France, roughly 7-8 percent 
of the total population (Dilanian, 2005) Moreover, the Muslim population is reported 
to be the fastest growing ethnic group in France (Roy, 2005). The overwhelming 
majority of these Muslims live in suburbs near large metropolitan areas such as Paris, 
Lille, and Marseille (Islamic Institute for Human Rights, 2004; International Helsinki 
Federation, 2005). 
Thus, as the Muslim population continues to grow and as tensions continue to 
mount, both Muslims and non-Muslims in France have said something needs to be 
done to ease the tension and to create a more cohesive, yet diverse French state. The 
French government has recently announced its solution to mounting ethnic tensions, 
and to bring the integration problems under control. The executive plan has many 
facets. De Villepin in November 2005 announced the plan would tighten immigration 
regulations (Fontanaud, 2005). The plan also involves extending the waiting period 
for citizenship to immigrants who marry French citizens, tougher selection 
4procedures for international students wanting to study in France, and decreased 
immigrant quotas from nations outside the European Union. The purpose of this 
legislation is to quell the violence by initiating “selective immigration.” Furthermore, 
the Lower House passed an anti-terror bill in November 2005, and this bill has 
clauses that pertain to surveillance in Mosques and other civic organizations (Picot, 
2005). 
In essence the French government appears to be taking measures similar to 
Foucault’s metaphor of the Panopticon, a state/prison in which it is virtually 
impossible to exist without the eye of the state watching (Foucault, 1975). The 
increased surveillance and heightened governmental powers are a threat to civil 
liberties in France (Schuck, 2005) and are further defining the divide between Muslim 
and non-Muslim France as ethnic, and economic and or political. Unfortunately, the 
steps by the French government in the wake of the November riots are indicative of 
rising racism and anti- Islamic fundamentalist fears in France.
Clearly, intolerance and problems with integration of Muslims have been 
issues in France for more than a century. While Muslims have been part of the French 
state for more than a century, intolerance against Muslims in France has been on the 
rise in recent years (Gaspard, 1995; Islamic Institute for Human Rights, 2004); 
Jelloun, 1999). Specifically, rising intolerance and violence against Muslims in 
France has been linked to anti-Muslim sentiments in a post September 11 world and a 
post riot France (Graff, 2005; International Helsinki Federation, 2005). 
Not only have the anti-terror legislation and executive decrees been regarded 
as attacks on Muslim identity, but many Muslims in France assert the 2004 passage of 
5a law prohibiting “conspicuous” religious symbols in public schools, Law 2004-228, 
is a direct state sponsored attack against Muslim identity and religion (Islamic 
Institute for Human Rights, 2004). The law reads as follows: “Dans les écoles, les 
collèges et les lycées publics, le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les élèves 
manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse est interdit” or “In public 
school, colleges and universities, the wearing of signs or behaviors by which pupils 
express openly a religious membership is prohibited” (LegiFrance, 2005). 
The French state argues such a ban on the wearing of religious symbols in 
public domains like schools is a defense of the French concept of laïcité, or separation 
of church and state (International Helsinki Federation, 2005). The French 
Organization against Islamophobia (CCIF) states the Muslim hijab, or headscarf is a 
target of anti-Muslim sentiment, hatred and fear (2005), and the ban on religious 
symbols in the public domain is a racist attempt by the French government 
(Bramham, 2004) to eliminate the formation of a Muslim identity in France, and 
instead encourage Muslims in France to adapt to French culture and adopt a solely 
“French” identity (Ganley, 2004). 
The French government in response to protests against the 2004 law, and 
previous suspensions of young girls in French school for wearing the hijab, 
specifically in 1989 and 1994, has asserted steps to remove religious symbols from 
schools serve two purposes. First, bans on “conspicuous” religious symbols preserves 
the French ideal of laïcité in the French public school system and protects democracy 
(Feldman, 2003; Gaspard, 1995; Jeffries, 2005). Moreover, this kind of law is 
interpreted as a remedy to a growing question among many French citizens, “is 
6France still France” (Kuisel, 1995). Second, the ban is seen as a step toward 
integrating Muslims into the French culture. However, Muslims in France question 
these goals, and many Muslims in France assert the ban, and successive expulsions
from school for young girls who defy the law (Bennhold, 2004) promote integration, 
but also the elimination of their religious identity.
While the struggles with integrating ethnic minorities is not a new problem to 
modern nation states and regions, such as Europe (Ahmed, 1992; Boulle, 2003; 
McGeary, 2005; Sepinwall, 2003; Stovall, 2003), the controversy surrounding the veil 
has spread outside of France, and other European states have begun to pass laws 
banning religious paraphernalia in public places. Within two months of the passage of 
the ban the cities of Berlin, Frankfurt, Moscow and Brussels, along with other states 
and cities proposed similar legislation (Jeffries, 2005). A German court in October 
2004 ruled nuns could no longer wear the habits when teaching in public schools 
(Brahman, 2004). Bavaria, a southern state in Germany banned religious insignia in 
schools in November 2004 (Agence France Presse, 2004). In Denmark, the Supreme 
Court ruled in January 2005 that supermarkets could terminate the employment of 
women who refuse to remove their Muslim veil or other religious symbols (Agence 
France Presse, 2005). In states such as Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and 
Luxembourg, Christian Europe has responded to the influx of Muslim immigrants and 
Muslim religious symbols by supporting such initiatives (Salhani, 2004). Such 
legislation represents the growing conflict between Christianity and Islam (Fetzer & 
Soper, 2005; Gaspard, 1995). In all of these cases, parties in support of such bans 
have used the French state and its current ban as justification for new measures 
7against religious symbols. Moreover, in the wake of the November rioting, nations 
such as Germany and Belgium have further asserted bans on the wearing of religious 
symbols in public schools and in government buildings are protections against 
violence and rioting (Croucher, 2005). It is ironic that the French government in 
particular has banned a garment that closely resembles the bonnet phrygien worn by 
Marianne, a prolific and powerful symbol of the French Republic.
Therefore, to better understand the current situation in France surrounding the 
banning of religious symbols in public schools, namely the Muslim veil or hijab, the 
following analysis addresses the following research questions:
Research Questions
RQ1: What does the hijab mean to Muslims in France?
RQ2: Has the meaning of the hijab changed for Muslim wearers and Muslim non-
wearers of the hijab since the French ban was approved?
RQ3: Do Muslim wearers and Muslim non-wearers of the hijab deem the hijab to be a 
representation of their self-identity?
RQ4: Do Muslim immigrants in France believe the hijab can co-exist with the French 
concept of laïcité?
RQ5: What reasons do Muslims and non-Muslims attribute to the passage of law 
2004-228?
RQ6: Do the majority of Muslims successfully culturally adapt to the French culture?
To answer these questions, this dissertation is divided into the following 
chapters. The second chapter provides a review of literature discussing the French 
state and its cultural symbols and cultural systems, and the historical and present 
8status and intersection between Islam and French culture. The third chapter describes 
the method of data collection proposed for this analysis. The fourth chapter reviews 
literature on cultural adaptation theory and offers results and analysis about the 
cultural adaptation of Muslims in France. The fifth chapter reviews literature 
addressing identity negotiation theory. This chapter concludes with results and 
analysis examining the salience and tedious nature of Muslim-French identity. The 
sixth chapter asserts the failure of Muslims to successfully culturally adapt to French 
culture is partially due to sociological and linguistic ideologies at work both within 
the Muslim ummah (community) and outside of the ummah. This chapter’s analysis 
also provides a model explaining the current state of the Muslim ummah in the wake 
of Law 2004-228 and increased Muslim immigration to France. The seventh chapter 
discusses the limitations, areas of future research and draws final conclusions from 
this project’s analysis.
9CHAPTER 2
The following chapter provides a review of pertinent literature on French 
cultural symbols and systems, and on Islam within France. Specifically, this section 
first discusses French cultural symbols and systems by describing Marianne, and the 
significance of this French cultural icon. Second, this section analyzes the 
significance of the tri-color flag. Third, the concept of secularism will be applied to 
the French state. Fourth, the republican school system and its importance are 
analyzed. 
This chapter’s second main focus is on Islam in the French state. In particular, 
the Algerian conflict will first be examined. Second, the status of Muslims in France 
will be explained. Third, an analysis of the Muslim veil or hijab is offered.
French cultural symbols and systems
Marianne and laîcité
The most significant symbol of power emerging from the remnants of 
Revolutionary period to the subsequent republics is Marianne. During the French 
Revolution personifications of liberty and reason appeared throughout France. These 
two personifications merged into one female figure. There are conflicting stories of 
how this new symbol earned her name. One legend attributes her naming to Barras, a 
member of the Directoire. It is believed he devised the name Marianne for the new 
French symbol one evening at Reubell’s. His hostess that evening was named Marie-
Anne, and Barras said, it is a short simple name which befits the Republic just as 
much as yourself, Madame (Ozouf & Ozouf, 1997).  Other more common stories of 
the naming of Marianne link her naming to codes used by secret societies under the 
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Second Empire, particularly one group whose members swore to overthrow the 
tyrannical regime of Napoleon III (Castelot, 1962). Throughout the years following 
the revolution until the present day, Marianne has in many ways embodied the spirit 
of the French Revolution, and represented the struggles and triumphs of revolutionary 
leaders. 
The monarchy and aristocracy dominated French politics until the end of the 
1780s. In 1788 Louis XVI called the Estates General in order to consult with the 
nation about France’s rising debt and tumbling economy. On June 20, 1789 the Third 
Estate held a public meeting. The meeting held on the tennis court at Versailles 
symbolized the unification of the Three Orders and the writing of the new French 
constitution. Specifically, the new assembly vowed to remain intact until a new 
Constitution was established guaranteeing equal rights to all of France (Jones, 1994). 
The New Constitutional Assembly, primarily middle-class intellectuals and clergy 
demanded recognition of the French commoner, as “everything” within the French 
state. The Constitutional Assembly, and its revolutionary outlook brought new 
meaning to the words “citizen” and “nation.” This meeting became known as the 
Tennis Court Oath, and symbolizes the coming of age of the French nation, and the 
beginning of the French Revolution. 
While the French Revolution was about the peasant class, the bourgeoisie, and 
the monarchy, it was also about words and symbols, which saturated the daily life of 
French citizens. The old feudal system that controlled France for centuries was 
eroding under the pressure of a new revolutionary collection of words including: 
“citizen,” “nation,” and “liberty, equality, and fraternity” (Jones, 1994). 
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Before the calling of the Estates General in 1788, the word “citizen” did not 
carry much prominence, or significant connotations in the minds of most French men 
and women (Castelot, 1962). The new constitutional body empowered many French 
people. These same empowered individuals began to demand recognition, civil rights 
and protection under the law. Furthermore, the concepts of liberté, équalité and
fraternité gained significance during, and after the French Revolution.
Liberté, or liberty was one of the paramount social values pontificated by the 
Revolution and its leaders. No longer were individuals to be subjects of the king, 
instead all French citizens were to have freedom from tyranny. The concept of 
égalité, or equality was also of significant importance since it assured all French 
citizens, regardless of social class would be treated as equals. This philosophy was a 
direct contradiction to the years of luxury enjoyed by the monarchy, aristocracy and 
clergy.  Fraternité, or brotherhood is the third ideal expounded in the phrase liberté, 
équalité, and fraternité. Brotherhood was of importance to the founders of the 
Constitutional Assembly because it further demonstrated the egalitarian nature of the 
new French nation. Many members of the clergy wished to see this term raised to 
heightened status, before liberté or equalité, because it represented the twelve 
disciples and their brotherhood with Jesus Christ. However, with the increased 
emphasis on secularism, such an idea was counter to the secular ideals of the 
revolution. 
After the initial foundation of the constitution, a coup d’état brought to power 
Napoleon Bonaparte in 1799. The Corsican mercenary and adventurer ruled as 
consulate until 1804 when he crowned himself emperor. During his 15-year rule over 
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the First Empire, Napoleon restored social harmony lost during the Revolution, took 
steps to reconcile differences between the Catholic Church and France by signing the 
Concordat, developed the Napoleonic code, and developed secondary schooling. 
Unfortunately, Napoleon’s military campaigns cost the nation an immense amount of 
economic power, and as European resentment mounted Napoleon was deposed in 
1814, only to return a year later for 100 days before a later expulsion. During his 
reign Marianne was still not a visible, named symbol, but the principles that brought 
her to fruition under the Third Republic were further solidified in the French culture, 
liberté, égalité and fraternité.
After the fall of Napoleon III in 1871, the Third Republic came to power in 
France. Under the Third Republic, Revolutionary symbols were glorified to solidify 
the Republic. In 1880 July 14, or Bastille Day (the destruction day of the Bastille, a 
bastion of tyranny destroyed during the Revolution in 1789) was declared a national 
holiday. In 1792 the “Marseillaise” became the national anthem and “the town halls 
of France were equipped with busts of Marianne, a symbol of the republic since the 
1790s which emphasized unity rather than division” (Jones, 1994, p. 222). Gildea 
(2002) also emphasized the significance of Marianne as not only a symbol of 
optimism and strength, but also as a symbol of French unity.
In the eyes of Third Republic France, Marianne was the representation of 
simplicity, optimism, strength, and political power (Agulhon, 1989). In all municipal 
offices and in many commercial businesses, Marianne served as a beacon for French 
identity. She symbolized the triumph of the Republic. Hence beginning in the Third 
Republic, Marianne became a rallying point for the French people in times of national 
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peril (world wars, occupations, economic crisis), or in times of personal achievement 
and loss (weddings, graduations, funerals, court proceedings). 
The 1894 trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the French Army 
accused of spying for Germany brought Marianne into the political and religious 
limelight even further. Dreyfus was found guilty, with forged evidence and testimony 
forming the basis of the prosecution’s case (Kidd, 2000). He was retired in 1899 and 
pardoned by the French president in 1906 after all charges were found to be erroneous 
and false. During his trial, busts and images of Marianne were used in rallies in 
support of Dreyfus, because his trial was viewed by many as a religious attack, and in 
a secular state with liberté, égalité, and fraternité such discrimination should not exist 
(Hargreaves, 1999).    
Normally, Marianne is presented with pride by the French citizenry, but this 
symbol of the Republic came under attack during the Vichy government. Gildea 
(2002) explains how during the Vichy regime Marianne was placed in chains, 
metaphorically of course. Pétain, and one of his deputy mayors Pierre Laval, ordered 
all busts of Marianne removed from town halls and schools to ensure citizen loyalty 
to the Vichy government. Marianne was viewed by the fascist regime as a Republican 
symbol, and a counter force to Vichy. In fact, Pétain had busts of himself produced, 
which were to take the place of Marianne as the uniting symbol of the “French State” 
(Jones, 1994).
Since the fall of the Vichy regime, Agulhon (1989) states: “le buste de la 
République ou de Marianne, installé dans la mairie, est aujourd’hui la plus connue 
des représentations de l’État”  “the bust of the Republic or Marianne, installed in the 
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town hall is today the most known representation of the state” (p. 37). Marianne is 
ever-present watching over her citizens (Jones, 1994). In fact, her profile is on the 
official seal of the nation, engraved on coins, and drawn on stamps. However, she 
watches over the Republic in an unofficial manner, similar to the utilization of Ché 
Guevara as a symbol of struggle and perseverance in communist Cuba, or the bald 
eagle in the United States. In Cuba, Ché is a secular symbol, a symbol of a 
revolutionary mind, shown separate from any religious iconography. However, the 
bald eagle, which adorns US currency, postage stamps, and many other American 
icons, is regularly shown next to the phrase “In God we trust.” The juxtaposition of 
the bald eagle and Biblical references in the United States reveals the religious nature 
of the American nation’s founding.
While Marianne is the common emblem of France, she does not have official 
status. The tricolor flag of France is the only official emblem of the Republic 
described in Article 2 of the French constitution. Her status as a guardian of the 
people of France and an unofficial protector of liberty started around 1850 (Agulhon, 
1989), and since then she has gained constitutionally unofficial status, but official 
preference within French cities and territories.
Since the 1790s Marianne has gone through many different incarnations, and 
there is no standard Marianne (Agulhon & Bonke, 1962). Dependent upon the city, 
municipal leaders, and the time period, Marianne is portrayed as a warrior, mother 
figure, Athena the Greek goddess of war and wisdom, a beacon of freedom like the 
Statue of Liberty in the United States, or a beautiful princess in one municipal office 
in Lille (Larkin, 1997). In his 1830 painting “The 28th July” Liberty Leading the 
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People” Eugène Delacroix depicted Marianne as a bare-chested female waving the 
tricolor flag, and wearing a red bonnet phrygien amidst a battle for liberty. This 
depiction of Liberty leading the people is one of the most well known renderings of 
Marianne, a commoner fighting for the French people. Her bonnet phrygien is an 
important symbol in French history, and to the nation state itself. The following is a 
picture of Delacroix’s painting.
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The bonnet phrygien is a garment worn on the head that dates back to ancient 
Greece and Rome. During that time, freed slaves would wear the bonnet, and later 
their children would become citizens of Rome or Greece. Later sailors from the 
Mediterranean brought the bonnets to Paris. The red cap or bonnet phrygien gained 
popularity during the French "revolt of red caps," riots occurring in Brittany in 1675 
against the taxes imposed by Colbert (the red cap was the ordinary cap of the farmers 
of Central Brittany), and its use in convict prisons, which had replaced the galleys, as 
a mark of infamy. Later during the French Revolution, the bonnet phrygien was still 
called the red cap. In 1789 the bonnet phrygien was initially used to cover the head of 
the goddesses Liberty and Nation, and became quickly the emblem of Liberty, and 
then the emblem of men and women who wanted to be citizens instead of subjects. In 
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1792, it was a normal part of the uniform of the sans-culottes, or street radicals. 
On 20 June 1792, King Louis XVI was forced to wear the liberty cap by the 
crowd who invaded the palace of the Tuileries. After the fall of monarchy, the bonnet 
phrygien became ubiquitous, and was used on the representations of sitting or 
standing Liberty, pikes and flags as finial, Liberty trees, fasces of Unity, triangle of 
Equity and beams of the scales of Justice. All official documents included it, usually 
associated with the tricolor cockade. In 1793, wearing the Liberty cap was mandatory 
in the Assemblies of the sections of Paris.
As Marianne became an ever more emergent symbol of the Revolutionary 
nature and way of life, she continually wears the bonnet phrygien to symbolize the 
freeing of the people by the French Revolutions of 1789, 1830, 1848 and 1871, and to 
honor those lost in the battles for liberty, equality and fraternity. 
During the 1960s Marianne gained pop culture status, as the Fifth Republic 
sought to modernize this Republican symbol. In 1968 Brigitte Bardot became the first 
known Marianne, then Mireille Mathieu, the singer/actress in 1978, Catherine 
Deneuve, the actress in 1985 and most recently Laetitia Casta, a Corsican born 
fashion model, in 2000. The 82nd Congress of Mayors of France chose Laetitia as the 
Marianne of the year 2000 to represent a modern and beautiful France. The selection 
of Laetitia is symbolic because she is Corsican, and choosing a Corsican as a new 
Marianne represents French control over the island of Corsica. Shortly after being 
chosen Laetitia relocated her residency to London, which caused a scandal in France 
over the departure of its new Marianne.  After Laetitia, Evelyne Thomas, a talk show 
host, was chosen as the new Marianne in 2003. 
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French tri-color flag
The tri-color flag of France was developed in the July 1789 during the French 
Revolution. There are conflicting accounts as to the choice of the three colors (blue, 
white and red). One account asserts the flag was a combination of the colors of the 
Paris coat of arms (red and blue) and the royal color (white) (Jones 1994, p. 201). 
However, since the colors of Paris were no longer in use during the French 
Revolution, the Marquis de Lafayette may have adopted the three colors based on the 
flag of the United States (Ozouf & Ozouf, 1997). During the First Republic the flag 
was adopted as the official ensign of the state on February 15, 1794. Up until 
Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in 1815, the tricolore was the official flag of France. 
With the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1815 the royal white flag with the 
fleur-de-lis replaced the tricolore. However, in 1830 Louis-Philippe, the Citizen King 
ascended to power and designated the tricolore once again to be the official flag of 
France (Agulhon, 1987). The following is a picture of the tricolore flag.
QuickTime™ and a
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During the Third Republic, in fact from the 1880s onward the presentation of 
the tricolore has represented patriotic fervor (Chagny, 1988). The tricolore is flown 
over all municipal buildings in France, like the American flag. The French 
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constitutions of both 1946 and 1958, under the Fifth Republic, mandated (elevated) 
the tricolore to the national emblem of the Republic. Desecration of the flag, similar 
to desecration of the American flag is considered a taboo, and against the law in some 
cases. If the tricolore touches the ground, it is to be ritually destroyed. Whenever the 
president, or members of government make addresses to the people, the tricolore, like 
the American flag is the backdrop to represent unity and patriotism. In essence, to 
many French citizens, like some “patriotic” American citizens, the national flag has 
reached a magical status (Gebser, 1984). The flag is more than a symbol, it 
epitomizes and it is the French state, thus desecration or disrespect to the tricolore is 
desecration or disrespect to France directly. At least this is the case with those 
individuals who are patriotic or have a strong sense of history and cultural 
understanding. For other individuals, the American flag or the tricolore are impo rtant 
symbols, but not direct representations of the nation, mythic status (Gebser, 1984).
Secularism
During the French Revolution of 1789 the connection between the Catholic 
Church and the monarchy came under question by a large portion of the population. 
People saw the Church as being too powerful, having too many privileges, having too 
many political connections, and as too wealthy (Vovelle, 1998). The monarchy was 
also regarded as too strongly connected to the Church, especially after Louis XIV 
declared “l’état, c’est moi” [I am the state]. Thus, the concept of laïcité or a formal 
separation between church and state emerged as a fundamental principle of the 
Revolution to prevent privileged orders from controlling the people. In principle, this 
19
concept insures the neutrality of the state towards religious affairs, and the neutrality 
of the church in political/economic affairs. 
The importance of secularism was emphasized by various acts carried out by 
Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary leaders.  In particular, four acts by Revolution 
leaders reveal the desire for secularism: the privatization of Church lands, the Oath of 
Allegiance, the creation of a new calendar and the acceptance of “The Marseillaise” 
as the French national anthem.
In 1789 the state nationalized Church property, approximately 6 to 10 percent 
of cultivable land in France. After being confiscated from the Church, these lands 
were sold to the bourgeoisie and wealthier members of the peasantry (Jones, 1994). 
This act not only generated a great deal of revenue for the floundering French 
economy, it was a highly symbolic act. The state taking over Church owned lands 
was seen by the Church as an attack against Christianity, while at the same time the 
newly liberated French people saw it as throwing aside the Church’s economic and 
political power (Vovelle, 1998). 
The confiscation of church lands was the first in a series of events aimed at 
decreasing the power of the church. In 1790 the Civil Constitution of the Clergy 
served as an oath of allegiance to the state, not to religious hierarchy. Religious 
figures, priests, monks, nuns, etc,  were required to either sign the oath and support 
the state over the Church, or refuse to sign the oath, support the Church and be exiled 
from France. Approximately half of the clergy signed the oath, and were later 
excommunicated by the Catholic Church. Many Church leaders signed the oath after 
receiving pressure from their parishioners who wished to avoid conflict with the state 
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in their provinces (Carlyle, 2002). This oath was highly detested by the Papacy, who 
viewed it as its clergy being forced to choose between Christ and a false, secular 
deity, the new French Constitution. Those who refused to sign the oath were deemed 
enemies of the French state, counter revolutionaries who were a threat to the newly 
formed constitutional nation. Most of the clergy who refused to sign the oath lived in 
the north or west of France (Jones, 1994).
While privatizing Church land and requiring an oath of allegiance to the state 
were actions taken directly against religious figures and institutions, the creation of a 
new calendar and the adoption of “The Marseillaise” as the national anthem were 
more symbolic actions against the concept of religion. In 1793 Louis Lafitte created 
his Revolutionary calendar. The calendar did not include any references to Christian 
doctrine, such as the days of the saints. The first day of the year became September 
21, 1792, the day the Republic was named. Instead of including month names from 
the previous calendar, new names for months were devised, which were more closely 
related to nature. For example, late January to late February became “Pluviose,” in 
reference to pluie, or rain. This act symbolized the Revolutionary desire to throw off 
any and all connections with Christianity and its traditions. 
The French anthem is also void of any religious references. “The 
Marseillaise” retells the glorious victory of French troops who deposed the French 
king and later marched to victory against Austrian and Prussian soldiers. In 1795 the 
anthem written by Rouget de l’Isle became the official anthem of the French people. 
It was later dropped in 1815 by Napoleon and readopted later in 1879. To this day the 
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symbolism of “The Marseillaise” is undeniable, it is a republican symbol of 
secularism and nationhood (Carlyle, 2000).
Probably the most significant or recognizable representation of religion in 
France is the cathedral of Notre Dame. This cathedral dating from the 1160s has 
served as a symbol of not only Gothic architecture, but also of religious power and 
prevalence in French culture. This symbol proved not to be an exception to the 
violence and vandalism that gripped France during the French Revolution. In fact the 
first reference to the word “vandalism” was in 1794 by Henri Gregoire, a priest who 
used the word to describe actions taken out at Notre Dame. In 1793 rioters converted 
Notre Dame into a “Temple of Reason” and destroyed sculptures on the west façade. 
The cathedral was raided once again in 1831, this time rioters broke and burned 
everything in the archbishop’s residence on the premises. Since 1831 the cathedral 
has served as more of a representation of French ingenuity and history, and less of a 
religious symbol in the minds of the French people. The ransacking of Notre Dame in 
its past does, however, represent a direct attack against the Church and everything it 
stood for in the eyes of the French people, pomp, indulgence and power.
After the Revolution, secularism did not lose any ground in France. In 1905, 
France passed a law mandating the separation of the Church and State. After the 
passage of the law, the state is now forbidden from funding religious activities, but 
funds some private religious schools as long as the schools teach the national 
curriculum. Moreover, religion cannot serve as grounds for governmental 
discrimination, since all religions are beneath the state, and religious motivations are 
generally kept out of the political process. This law serves as more than a ban on the 
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union of Church and State, it is a symbolic representation of France’s desire to foster 
secularism over religious doctrine. However members of religions other than 
Catholicism argue “the neutrality of the state towards different religious faiths, while 
in practice tends to favour the Catholic Church” (Kidd, 2000, p. 95).
The sentiments voiced in the 1905 separation of church and state law were 
also behind the formation of the French Republican school system in the 1880s. 
Therefore, the following section outlines the formation of the French Republican 
school system, discusses the current system, and discusses the purpose of the 
education system and reviews recent controversies and ethnic conflicts within the 
school system.
Republican School System
In the 1880s the French Republic set forth upon the formation of a school 
system to facilitate the expansion of ideals expounded by the Revolution. Jules Ferry, 
the minister of education passed educational reforms mandating a teacher in every 
French town, village or city to provide free education to French children. Under 
Ferry’s initiatives children were to be educated in more than reading, writing and 
arithmetic, but also on citizenship, and particular emphasis was placed on teaching 
standardized French to all school children (Kidd, 2000). The newly formed 
Republican school system served as a catalyst for linguistic proliferation across 
France and its colonies, and fostered a sense of national identity in French youth. 
Two essential features rooted in the system since the 1880s form the 
foundation of the modern French educational system, and still serve as the basis of 
the Republican school system: lay schooling and linguistic uniformity. The first is 
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reflected in recurrent references to l’école laïque et républicaine, [lay schooling in 
accordance with the ideals of the French Republic]. This concept encapsulates the 
democratic ideal of equal access to education for all French citizens. School serves as 
a ground to build la citoyenneté, good citizenship. Thus, civic education classes, 
language classes and cultural courses attended by all French children help them 
embrace the ideals of social integration. This contrasts with the United States, where 
civic education is not as prominent, and language classes teach pass on grammatical 
structure without ideological undertones (Jones, 1994).  
The French government after the Revolution needed uniformity to govern 
properly and linguistic uniformity aided in bringing the nation state together. 
Moreover, politics also played a role in the decision to adopt a national language. 
Regional dialects, and non-French languages were seen as sources of counter-
Revolutionary ideas, and therefore forbidden by the new Republic. Therefore, to 
spread the French language, communes in many different departments were formed 
around France. The purpose of such communes was, and still is to teach the French 
language, and instruct the population in the principles of the Revolution. 
The purpose of the education is to equip the population linguistically to 
approach texts which are religious not in the conventional sense but in the 
original sense of the word “religion” (binding together), texts which somehow 
define and constitute the group identity in which all share. The legacy of the 
Revolution, then, was to place the French language at the very core of the 
national identity; language became inextricably linked both to the values on 
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which the republic was founded and to one of the key institutions of the 
republic, l’école (Kidd, 2000, p. 131).
The Republican school system also enlisted the help of “Le Tour de la France 
par deux enfants” [the tour of France by two children] to spread French culture and 
language. The text first published in 1877 told the story of two boys on a journey to 
find their family. Through the story André and his brother Juilien introduce the reader 
to what is French. The book argues there are no differences in France, since all of 
France is the same. While the text does admit regional differences exist, proper 
educational training will assist these differences to slowly vanish over time into the 
French landscape (Ozouf & Ozouf, 1997). 
These principles have carried forth into the modern French school system. 
Since the 1960s French children have gone through four educational phases: école 
maternelle, école primaire, collège, and lycée. Typically children from ages 2-5 
attend nursery school or école maternelle. After completion of nursery school, 
students attend école primaire, or primary school. Upon completion of primary school 
students need to have passed national standards in French, mathematics, history, 
geography and civics. If their marks are satisfactory the student attends college, or the 
first stage of secondary education. At this time, (Auduc, 1998; Kidd, 2000) students 
are filtered into courses similar to advanced placement courses in the United States. 
The last step in the Republican school system is for students to complete training at a 
lycée. In their last year of high school, students embark upon the baccalauréat, an 
exam intended to determine whether students attend a university, or are more apt to 
participate in a community or technical training program. 
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The requirement that all school children learn French, and not a regional 
dialect of French has been challenged repeatedly in Brittany. Bretons, who speak a 
dialect of French, Breton, have argued they have a right to speak and maintain their 
language, even though the French state asserts such requests are counter to 
Revolutionary ideals and will not be tolerated (Nicolas, 2000). The Council of Europe 
enacted the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages in 1992 to assist 
the Bretons in France, and other groups in Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
All of these nations including Cyprus abstained from voting on the Charter. The 
choice of the French government not to support the Charter has been an issue of 
dispute between Bretons and the French state since 1992, and remains a rallying cry 
for Breton self-reliance and identity against the Republican School System and 
Revolutionary ideals. 
Furthermore, the placement system for French students has also come under 
fire by many immigrants and ethnic minorities in France as being discriminatory and 
outside their reach. The primary group claiming to be discriminated against by the 
French school system and the French government is the Muslim population. Muslims 
claim the French Republican school system does not allow their children to maintain 
their ethnic identity because that identity is not French (Limage, 2000). Two main 
instances of conflict have stemmed from the apparent refusal to accommodate 
Muslim children in French schools and the refusal of Muslim children to adjust to 
French Republican school ideals: the 1989 veil affair and the 2004 ban on religious 
symbols in French schools.
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France and Islam
Algeria
In the eleventh century Arab invaders brought Islam to Algeria, a land of 
Berber tribes. Knauss (1987) states “the gradual Islamicization of the Berber peoples 
took place in a social context that was tribal” (p. 4). When the Moors were pushed out 
of Spain in 1492 the retreating Moorish tribes and armies moved eastward toward 
Algeria. The Ottoman sultan, at the insistence of the Algerian elders, dispatched 
infantry and artillery to Algeria, thus beginning approximately 300 years of Ottoman 
rule (Ciment, 1997). Under Ottoman rule Algeria was dominated by an urban elite 
who saw themselves as a separate race above the commoners in Algeria. Furthermore, 
this group of elites were involved in failed economic/trade negotiations before the 
French invasion of Algeria between 1830 and 1837. Before the invasion many French 
business leaders attempted to negotiate contracts with Algerian nobles, and these 
negotiations resulted in French offers being turned down by the Algerian upper class. 
During this invasion the French government sought to protect its economic interests, 
and “quiet its critics with a foreign venture” (Ciment, 1997, p. 30). The Algerian 
population saw the military invasion in different ways. The business elite in Algeria
saw the invasion as an economic benefit, while the common Algerian saw the 
invasion as a violent assault. 
After the invasion many Algerian tribes were relegated to reservations, similar 
to those of Native Americans in the United States. Businesses and lands were 
confiscated from Muslims. The Grand Mosque in Algiers was transformed into the 
cathedral of Saint-Phillipe, a move that the archbishop of Algiers hoped would 
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convert Muslim barbarians into Christians (Laffont, 2004). The Muslim population of 
Algeria, like most other Muslim cultures coming into conflict with European powers, 
was deemed an Oriental culture (Said, 1979). In this sense, the actions of the Muslims 
were regarded as exotic, and in many cases barbaric. The Orientalization of Algeria 
brought French business and colonists to the land to experience life in a different 
culture, but with the same amenities of France being developed on a daily basis with 
rigorous urban and rural development programs (Silverstein, 2004). Ultimately the 
purpose of land confiscation, employment regulations, and religious discrimination 
revealed Muslim culture as being “relegated to gradual extinction” (Ciment, 1997, p. 
31). 
Over the next 80 years French rule continued in Algeria while Algerian 
nationalism rose. After World War I the Islamic Reform Movement gained 
momentum in its demands for Algerians to return to the roots of Islam, and to combat 
the rising influence of Western modernism (Ahmed, 1992). The movement 
emphasized the innate Islamic nature of Algerian culture and society. This movement 
along with the actions of the National Liberation Front (FLN) culminated in 
November of 1954 with the outbreak of war in Algeria. During the next eight years 
between 200,000 and 1,000,000 Algerians died (Silverstein, 2004). Not only was the 
war hard-fought militarily, it was also a political/ideological war. The FLN used 
Islam as a weapon against the French. Ben Bella, founder of the Special Organization, 
a guerilla group, and later Algerian president urged Algerians to have national pride 
in not only Algeria, but also in Islam. He stated: 
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It’s an error to believe that our nationalism is the nationalism of the French 
Revolution. Ours is a nationalism fertilized by Islam…All of our political 
formulation is a Koranic formulation. Thus Algerian nationalism and Arab 
nationalism is a cultural nationalism essentially based on Islam. (Knauss, 
1987, p. 74)
In March 1962 France granted Algerian independence and the war was over. 
While the war was over, the conflict did not end entirely. Since Algerian 
independence citizenship conflicts, racism, violence, political tensions and economic 
hardships have encapsulated French-Algerian relations (Mercier, 2003).  Since France 
considered Algeria to be more than a colony, but part of France proper, Algerian 
nationals have historically been granted full French citizenship. However after the 
war many French citizens no longer supported this practice. Algerian citizenship and 
political rights came under attack during the 1960s and 1970s as racism and 
discrimination against Algerians increased (Wall, 2001). The loss of Algeria, and of 
approximately 25,000 French troops in the conflict left scars difficult to heal 
(Silverstein, 2004). Algerian nationals who were born and raised in France were no 
longer considered French by many of their fellow Frenchmen because of their 
ethnicity and religion. 
This xenophobia against Algerians and other North African peoples continued 
to grow, especially with the rise of the National Front in the 1980s and 1990s. As Le 
Pen’s party, a right-wing party, which advocates a return to “classical” French 
conservatism and a decrease in immigration among many other things, gained 
political influence in France, the rise in anti-immigrant rhetoric increased 
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dramatically and attacks against North African immigrants almost tripled between the 
1980s and 2002 (Silverstein, 2004). Derogatory statements such as “there are one 
million unemployed and two million immigrants” are common in political debates 
and discussions. 
Muslims in France
Between 1915 and 1918 France recruited approximately 150,000 laborers 
from its colonies in North Africa. These laborers were transported to France as 
workers, and were later granted citizenship under French law (Fetzer, 2000). Along 
with North African workers, most of which were Muslim, Spaniards, Poles, Italians 
and Portugese immigrants were recruited for work. During the Second World War 
many immigrants to France returned to their native country, especially North 
Africans. Yet after the war, the North African population in France skyrocketed, as 
France suffered a labor shortage due to an economic boom. 
From 1946 to 1974 France was in a period known as the Trente Glorieuses. 
Most of the labor at this time was drawn from Italy, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Spain 
and Portugal. Approximately two million workers were brought to France and 
employed in rebuilding the war-torn French infrastructure (Togman, 2002). Many of 
the North African men, (typically only men recruited for such work), established their 
own lives, then many called upon their families to join them in France. It is those who 
immigrated to France during this period who now make up the majority of second and 
third generation North African immigrants currently residing in France (Favell, 
2001). 
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Today North Africans make up the largest ethnic group in France and Islam is 
the second, and fastest growing religion (Levine, 2004). The rapid growth of Islam in 
France has led to ethnic tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims. Tensions have 
revolved around demands for Muslim recognition, economic opportunities and 
educational opportunities.     
As previously mentioned France is a secular state, with a clear distinction 
between the state and religion. Islam poses a dilemma for many individuals within the 
French government and with many of the French people because adherents of Islam 
do not normally recognize the complete separation of church and state, since within 
the Muslim faith a state should initiate policy to follow the basic tenets of the Koran 
(Ahmed, 1992). Furthermore, the growth of Islam in France also poses difficulty for 
France because the overwhelming majority of the Muslim population in France is not 
Caucasian, and thus are generally more physically identifiable than Christians in 
France. The observance of Muslim holy days is one issue that causes recognition 
arguments between Muslims and the French state. Muslim holy days are not 
recognized by the French state as official holidays, or as days of religious observance. 
Thus, Muslims are permitted to take the day off during Ramadan but are not protected 
from employer retribution in the form of lost wages (Derderian, 2004). Christians, on 
the other hand, have recognized holidays such as Christmas, Easter and Good Friday, 
in which they are permitted to take time off without lost wages. This is just one 
example of ethnic tension between Muslims and the French state. The following are 
examples of other tensions.  
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One, during the 1970s economic difficulties hit the French economy. 
Unemployment increased, inflation increased and the value of the French franc 
decreased (Togman, 2002). To protect France from rising unemployment and rising 
prices, the government passed a ban on immigration in 1974. While this ban remains 
in place, it has become more symbolic in its power and enforcement. Since the end of 
the Trente Glorieuses North Africans have composed the largest group of 
unemployed workers in France (approximately 15%), and made up the lowest paid 
class in France (Hargreaves, & Soper, 2004).  
Two, since so many North Africans make up the lowest echelon of the French 
economy, the quality of their health care has been brought into question. Many North 
African Muslims assert they are discriminated against in hospitals (Silverstein, 2004) 
and unable to achieve medical equality to “Christian-French men and women” 
(Silverstein, 2004). 
Three, aside from economic and medical opportunities an issue garnering a lot 
of attention over the past 15 years has been Muslim access and opportunities within 
the French education system. Specifically, conflicts over the wearing of the Muslim 
veil have encapsulated the French populace and signified the growing tensions 
between the secular French state and Islam. The first Muslim veil affair took place in 
1989. In Creil, a suburb of Paris three school girls (two Moroccans and one Tunisian) 
were expelled from school for refusing to remove their hijabs, veils that cover the 
head and hair, but not the face (Kidd, 2000). The girls argued wearing the hijab was 
in observance of their religion, and the headmaster of the school claimed the wearing 
of religious clothing was incompatible with the French concept of laïcité (Gaspard, 
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1995). The parents of the girls appealed to the federal government and eventually the 
Council d’Etat ruled the girls were within their rights to wear religious attire. The 
justices claimed since Catholic school children had always been allowed to wear 
crucifixes, and Jewish boys had always been allowed to wear yarmulkas (Gaspard, 
1995) that Muslim girls should also be allowed to practice their religion and its 
customs freely without state interference. Ultimately the decision of the Council 
d’Etat reinforced laïcité by reasserting the role of the state as an entity that will not 
control religion. 
Later in 1994 Françoise Bayrou, the Minister of Education attempted to ban 
the wearing of veils in schools. His regulation banning “ostentatious” religious 
symbols was widely challenged since this new law still directly challenged the 
religious freedom of Muslims, and not other religions, even though a small vocal 
Jewish population also voiced concern over this legislation (Gaspard, 1995). 
In 2004 this issue resurfaced with the French government passing a ban on all 
overtly religious symbols in France. The new law passed in March 2004 forbids 
school children from wearing religious symbols such as hijabs, yarmulkas, and large 
crucifixes in public schools. Muslim groups view this new law as not directed toward 
Catholics or Jews, but as a carte blanche way of banning the Muslim faith from public 
schools through equal legal restrictions (Gentleman, 2004). 
Since the passage of the law Muslim groups have been divided on how to 
respond. Some members of the Muslim community have argued the veil ban is an 
attack on Islam and prevents Muslim women from freely expressing their religious 
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beliefs. Other Muslim groups have asserted the ban frees Muslim women from 
tyrannical Muslim doctrine that objectifies women. 
The Muslim veil
Veils in History
The word hijab according to Al-Munajeed (1997) comes from the Arabic 
word hijaba, which means to shield or make invisible by using a shield. However, the 
practice of veiling women pre-dates the formation of Islam as a religious faith. The 
veil is actually a product of Judaism, as women in ancient Judea were required to 
wear a veil over their heads when praying to God, or Jehovah. Men, on the other 
hand, in Judea could worship without a veil, since man was created in the image of 
God (Parshall & Parshall, 2002). This practice coincided with the belief in 
Christianity and Judaism that women are incomplete, not being created in the image 
of God, and only completed with a veil, or by a husband who accompanies her to 
worship, justifying many acts of oppression against women (Saadawi, 1980). Even 
the Virgin Mary, the mother of Jesus Christ, the savior in the Christian faith, in all 
depictions, wears a veil over her hair. The tradition of Christian women wearing the 
veil carried forth into modern times as female monarchs and leaders of nations who 
visit the Vatican are also required by Catholic doctrine to wear veils in the presence 
of the pope. 
Furthermore, before the establishment of Islam, and the writing of the Koran 
in the early seventh century, men and women in numerous Nomadic tribes in the 
Middle East, and communities in other parts of the world including China and parts 
of Africa wore various kinds of veils. Ironically it was the men of the Tuareg, a 
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nomadic tribe of the Niger and Algerian desert in Africa, who wore and still wear a 
veil over their faces after reaching puberty, while women go barefaced. Brooks 
(1995) conducted interviews with this group, who are now practicing Muslims, and 
these individuals assert men wear the veil so enemies cannot see their face, which can 
give an advantage in battle. Women on the other hand have nothing to hide in battle 
or life, especially their sexuality, which is free. In Arabic, Tuareg comes from “the 
abandoned of God,” showing the discontent many Muslims have for this ancient 
group.
In antiquity numerous examples of veiled women exist. Ancient Assyrian 
kings introduced the seclusion of women into the royal harem, and also brought into 
fashion the wearing of the veil for women in the royal harem. Slaves and prostitutes 
were forbidden from wearing any kinds of veils, since veils were seen as a mark of 
royalty and class. Women in ancient Greece wore linen veils over the back of their 
heads. Roman women wore a palliolum, a veil that covers the hair and is draped over 
the shoulders. During the reign of Elizabeth I in England, white bridal veils, similar to 
the head covering worn by the Virgin Mary and other Christian women, became 
popular (Ahmed, 1992). 
In Spain, the mantilla, usually black or white, is worn by women on their 
head. It drapes onto the shoulders like the palliolum of ancient Rome. However, it is 
in the Muslim faith that the practice of veiling became institutionalized by religious 
practice, and some would argue, by religious doctrine in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. The following pictures illustrate different kinds of veils worn in the Muslim 
world.
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Sexuality and Fitna in Islam
The following section examines the Islamic veil as it has been defined over 
the past two hundred years. Specifically, this section first discusses how sexuality is 
defined in Islam. A definition of sexuality in Islam is offered because the wearing of a 
veil is an issue intrinsically linked to sexuality (Roald, 2001). Second, this section 
explains the different terms used to define the act of veiling. Various terms exist in 
various languages to describe the act of veiling, and the different kinds of veils worn 
by Muslim women. Third, this section addresses the argument whether there is 
Koranic justification for the veil. Scholars are divided on whether the Koran calls for 
women to be veiled, or if Koranic verses are interpreted in a fashion to favor male 
hegemonic norms. Last, this section elaborates on the significance of the veil in 
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modern culture and examines the religious and political significance of the veil is 
addressed. 
In the Christian faith, and in other Western religions, man and woman are torn 
between good and evil, between heaven and hell. However, in the Muslim faith this is 
not the case; instead individuals are torn between raw instincts that are neither good 
nor bad (Mernissi, 1985). Whether instincts are good or bad is dependent upon the 
social context and shari’a, or religious law. If an act is within the demands of 
religious law, then the act is permitted. However, when individual acts, especially 
sexual acts, are counter to shari’a, fitna can occur. Fitna is disorder, chaos, or a 
beautiful woman, hence the French term femme fatale who makes man lose self-
control. 
Fitna is to be avoided at all costs in the Muslim world. Thus, seclusion of 
women by the wearing of a headscarf, or hijab (something that separates one thing 
from another) argues Amin (1928) and Roald (2001) is the best way to protect society 
from fitna, which is normally initiated by women:
If what men fear is that women might succumb to their masculine attraction, 
why did they not institute veils for themselves? Did men think that their 
ability to fight temptation was weaker than women’s? are men considered less 
able than women to control themselves and resist their sexual 
impulse?…Preventing women from showing themselves unveiled expresses 
men’s fear of losing control over their minds, falling prey to fitna whenever 
they are confronted with a non-veiled woman. The implications of such as 
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institution lead us to think that women are believed to be better equipped in 
this respect than men. (Roald, 2001, p. 65) 
The Muslim Veil and Koranic Verse
There are numerous arguments both favoring and opposing the wearing of 
hijab. Both sides claim the Koran and the words of Muhammad (Hadiths) support 
their arguments. Perhaps this debate is because there are few Koranic verses that 
directly address the wearing of the veil. The scripture most often quoted on the 
subject of the veil is Surah 24:31: 
And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and be modest, and to 
display of their adornment only that which is apparent, and to draw their veils 
over their bosoms, and not to reveal their adornment save to their own 
husbands or fathers or husbands’ fathers, or their sons or their husbands’ sons, 
or their brothers or their brothers’ sons or sisters’ sons, or their women, or 
their slaves, or male attendants who lack vigour, or children who know naught 
of women’s nakedness. And let them not stamp their feet so as to reveal what 
they hide of their adornment.
The main emphasis of this verse is to advocate female modesty (El-Saadawi, 
1980; Hawking, 2003). This verse is regularly cited as the main support for hijab 
(Mernissi, 1975; 1987; Parshall & Parshall, 2001; Roald, 2001). However, Abul A’la 
Maududi (1993), a Muslim theologian asserts the Koran only addresses the need for 
desire, but does not impose hijab on women. 
A person who considers carefully the words of the Quaranic verse, their well-
known and generally accepted meaning and the practice during the time of the 
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Holy Prophet, cannot dare deny the fact that the Islamic Shari’ah [religious 
law] enjoins on the woman to hide her face from the other people, and this has 
been the practice of the Muslim women ever since the time of the Holy 
Prophet himself. Though the veil has not been specified in the Quran, it is 
Quaranic in spirit. The Muslim women living at the time of the Holy Prophet 
to whom the Quran was revealed had made it a regular part of their dress 
outside the house. (Maududi, 1993, p. 194-195)
This verse has been used to support the enforcement of veiling in nations such 
as Iran, Afghanistan and Oman. However, Islamic historians like Mernissi (1975, 
1987) and Lewis (2003) assert this verse is open to interpretation since it is not 
specific in its prescription for women, nor does it specifically explain why women 
during the day of Muhammad wore veils. In fact, in the time of the Holy Prophet, 
Muhammad, his wives wore veils less for religious purposes, and more for practical 
purposes. His wives were expected to display pure behavior, and avoid worldliness, 
since worldliness would decrease the promise of eternal life (Mernissi, 1987; Parshall 
& Parshall, 2001). Thus, the wearing of a veil for the wives of Muhammad was an 
attempt to protect them from being portrayed by the public as less than pure. 
Moreover, the wives of Muhammad wore veils to protect them from potential 
abduction or molestation in public (Lewis,1998; Mernissi, 1987). 
While there is no concrete Koranic edict mandating the veil for women 
millions of Muslim women still wear the hijab (Croucher, 2005; Lewis, 2003). To 
address the various reasons as to why Muslim women and in particular converts to 
Islam choose to veil (without sound Koranic justification) Zuhr (1992) conducted 
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surveys among women in Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan and the United States. Her 
research found numerous reasons as to why women continue to wear the veil. She 
found nine categories that help illuminate reasons as to why women hijab: religious, 
psychological, political, revolutionary, economic, cultural, demographic, practical 
and domestic (p. 105).
Ultimately, this chapter offered a brief discussion of French cultural history 
and policy, (in France and in Algeria) and examined Islamic history and tradition. 
The main purpose of both of those discussions was to explicate two of the most-
prominent issues underlying French-Muslim cultural adaptation and the controversy 
over the Islamic hijab. An understanding of these issues sets the backdrop for the 
remainder of this analysis. 
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CHAPTER 3
The following chapter describes the data collection procedures used in this 
study. Specifically, this chapter first discusses a semiotic analysis conducted to 
ascertain the various interpretations of the Muslim veil, in both Muslim and non-
Muslim populations. Second, this chapter will discuss the location/setting in which 
interviews took place. Third, the participants will be described. Fourth, the interview 
protocol is discussed. Fifth, transcription and translation procedures are defined. 
Sixth, grounded theory is defined, since the researcher allowed the transcripts to 
dictate the conclusions drawn within this analysis. Seventh, the coding procedure for 
analyzing the interviews is explained. 
Semiotic Analysis of the Muslim Veil
To facilitate a greater understanding of the Koranic meaning of the veil, and 
the perceived Muslim perceptions of the veil, I conducted a semiotic analysis of one 
kind of veil, a veil made to look like the French tri-color flag, one is pictured below.
QuickTime™ and aTIFF (LZW) decompressorare needed to see this picture.
 
Noth (1990) asserts “the core of non-verbal communication is the semiotic 
function of the human body in time and space” (p. 387). In defining non-verbal 
communication as semiotics, Noth says non-verbal communication is the use of the 
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human body as a signifier. Moreover, non-verbal communication is also considered 
by Noth (1990) and Harrison (1974) to be communication minus language. The study 
of non-verbal communication is not limited to a single discipline, and can be studied 
from numerous research perspectives. The earliest analyses of non-verbal 
communication come from studies of theater, rhetoric, anthropology, biology, and 
cultural history. In more modern research, non-verbal communication is studied 
primarily from a sociological, or psychological perspective. Noth (1990), Goffman 
(1963) and Harrison (1974) all assert the wearing of clothing is a significant semiotic 
process. 
Furthermore, the validity of semiotic analyses stems from the examination of 
the overriding context surrounding a visual sign. As Barthes (1974) discusses, visual 
signs are more than the signs themselves, the sign is composed of the historical and 
cultural context defining the sign. Barthes provides the example of a black soldier 
saluting the French tricolor flag. He asserts the image is more than a simple display of 
“patriotism,” since there are many other issues involved in the picture that are not 
evident to the viewer. For example, the soldier’s personal story, or the country in 
which he lives, as well as the importance of the tricolor flag needs to be understood 
by a viewer. Ultimately, this image as well as any other image needs to be analyzed 
and understood within the context in which it is presented. Therefore, the use of 
semiotics as a tool of analysis is appropriate for analyzing the veil because this 
analysis will outline and analyze the importance of the overarching societal, cultural, 
political and economic contexts.
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While generating my interview protocol, I conducted a semiotic analysis to 
address the research questions posed earlier. This analysis not only revealed that 
many Muslims and non-Muslims regard the veil as a different kind of symbol, but 
also illustrates how conflict can arise because of what Gebser (1984) calls magic, 
mythic and perspectival cultures.  When I was conducting preliminary analysis and 
interviews over the flag veil, I learned a lot about how people regard the veil as a 
symbol, specifically how significantly individuals regard the veil as a part of their 
cultural heritage and livelihood. The following excerpts from interviews conducted in 
both the United States (with French Muslim students) and France on the wearing of 
the tri-color flag veil provided a foundation for my analysis of the veil as a cultural 
symbol of Islam, and facilitated the formation of open-ended interview questions. 
One interviewee who lives in Lille, near the Belgian border in the north of 
France, asserted she is consistently faced with pressures to look and act like a typical 
French woman, and this role includes the removal of her veil. She also described how 
she wears her flag-veil in the privacy of her home. (For future reference all interviews 
conducted in French will first be provided in French verbatim, and italicized. The 
French transcript will be followed by an English translation. If an interview was 
conducted in English it will be provided verbatim, and no efforts will be taken to 
correct grammar; the interviews are left in their original form to protect the integrity 
of exactly what the interviewees said during the interview.) 
I work in a school her in Lille. I do not teach, but work in main office. I not 
allowed to wear any veil at work. I was told when I got job I must act more 
French, and was told to act like other people in office. All other people in 
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office are white, I not white. Because of work, when I go home I wear my flag 
veil, I protest when protest happens, and wear my flag veil to be Muslim and 
French.  
A college student in the United States said, “I feel power when I wear and 
have my tri-color hijab. I smile when I wear it.”  Another interviewee expressed how 
her wearing of a flag-veil gives her agency. She said “I feel like I has a choice when I 
made my tri-color veil. I changing French culture with my way I think and with the 
words I use.”
Ultimately these three women, along with the others I spoke with before I 
finalized my interview questions all pointed to a few key issues: cultural isolation, 
social and face identity, adaptation, and agency. These concepts served as the 
foundation for my research and interview questions. 
Setting
Interviews were conducted in May and June 2005. The interviews took place 
in the following French cities: Lille, Lyon, Bordeaux, Clichy-sous-Bois (where the 
November 2005 riots began) and Paris. These cities were chosen for three reasons. 
First, the cities represent different geographic regions of France, from Lille in the 
Northwest to Lyon in the Southeast, to Bordeaux on the Atlantic coast. Second, these 
cities have a varied number of Muslim inhabitants. Cities such as Paris, Clichy-sous-
Bois, and Lille have high concentrations of Muslims. While cities such as Bordeaux 
and Lyon have small but growing Muslim populations. The third reason these cities 
were chosen is because of a contact in each city. 
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Before research began a representative from the Islamic Human Rights 
Commission was contacted, and this representative brought me together with four 
imams throughout France. I met each of these imams individually in their respective 
city. Our initial meetings involved me describing my research, explaining the 
research procedure and answering any other questions they might have had. These 
meetings typically took place in an office within a Mosque or in the imam’s personal 
office at their home/apartment. 
The importance of these imams in this project cannot be underestimated. In 
the Islamic religion and Muslim culture an imam is a religious teacher, a position 
similar to a Jewish rabbi. Furthermore, an imam serves as the prayer leader at a 
Mosque. These individuals, all men, are believed to be divinely chosen and appointed 
by Muhammad. Traditionally, imams were only teachers and served as counsel for 
Muslims, but in Western Europe and in the United States, the role of an imam is 
shifting. Roy (2005) explains how imams are taking on more and more political and 
leadership roles in the emerging Muslim community or umma. These men now carry 
political influence, and are beginning to serve as intermediaries between the Muslim 
faithful and God. In essence, as the power and purpose of an imam changes, it 
changes with the development of structured Muslim communities. 
Until recently, Muslim communities, or ummahs, were more of a metaphor, 
and less of a physical/geographic entity. However, as more and more Muslims in 
predominantly non-Muslim nations begin to unite for political, economic and social 
stability, ummahs are becoming more pronounced and visible, while maintaining 
some metaphorical elements. It is now common to see a quasi-Muslim part of town in 
45
many French, German, British and American cities. These newly emerging ummahs 
afford the imams and the Muslim community more religious, political, economic and 
social influence (Roy, 2005). 
During this research, the imams I met with, located in the aforementioned 
cities, served as intermediaries between the interviewees and me. Since each imam is 
the prayer leader in a respective mosque in each city these imams were in direct 
contact on a daily and/or weekly basis with local Muslim men and women.  
Having these imams as contacts was vital to the success of this research. Not 
only did the imams put me in contact with interview participants, but they also 
assured these participants, and their male family members that I was respectful and 
would not harm their family. In some cases participants told me they only met with 
me because an imam said it would be alright (religiously acceptable and not 
politically or economically dangerous), and that I would not disrespect them in 
anyway. When I met with participants they all commented on the words of their 
imam and said he told them to be honest and sincere with me, and that I would be the 
same. Therefore, whenever I met a participant I was considered an acceptable person, 
“someone to trust” as one participant put it. In essence, these imams opened the door 
for me into this community, and as Philipsen (1992) and Anderson (1991) both assert, 
gaining access to a community can often times be the hardest part of data collection.  
Without these imams telling their fellow Muslims community members that I was 
approved by the Mosque, and respectable to Islam, I probably would not have been 
able to conduct as many interviews as I did, or the interviews might have been less 
open and developed. Furthermore, I learned in conversations with several imams that 
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an open-ended interview is an acceptable and appropriate way to conduct research on 
the Muslim population. Several of the imams told me it would be disrespectful to 
appear in an ummah with a survey, since as the imams said, putting a feeling into a
number is not possible and shows disrespect for the heart and for emotions.
My interviews began in Lille, a city near the Belgian border in the northern 
part of France. This city is primarily an industrial city, which until the 18th century 
was occupied by France and the Netherlands at differing times. It was not until before 
the Revolution that the city became and remained a French city. The overall 
population according to 2000 census reports is approximately 1.7 million inhabitants, 
including the city of Lille and its surrounding area, making it one of France’s five 
largest cities. The city has a relatively large Muslim population, approximately 7-10 
percent of the city of Lille and the surrounding community. While the Muslim 
population continues to grow in Lille, racial tensions are relatively low, even though 
there have been a few incidents of discrimination against veiled Muslim women 
(Fontaunad, 2005).
After Lille, interviews took place in the Paris suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois. 
This suburb is composed of primarily lower-class working class immigrants, most of 
African or Southeast Asian descent. The majority of the residents live in apartment 
complexes, which resemble the American projects of Philadelphia, Detroit or New 
York City. Unemployment is greater than 15 percent (Mulrine, 2005). The suburb has 
a high crime rate, almost double the French average, and in November 2005 this city 
was the starting location for a series of riots that gripped the entire French nation.
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Lyon was the third city I traveled to for interviews. Lyon is located in 
Southeast France, in the Rhone region, not far geographically from the French and 
Swiss Alps. Lyon is the second largest metropolitan area in France. The city has been 
part of France for approximately 1000 years. Lyon is known for its cuisine, literature 
and vineyards. While the city has a history of immigrants coming to it for work, the 
city has a relatively low number of Muslim inhabitants, less than five percent 
(Kedward, 2006).
The fourth city was Bordeaux. Bordeaux is located in Southern France on the 
Atlantic coast. The city has been a cultural hub of French society since the 15th
century. The region is known for its vineyards, architecture, fishing and textiles. The 
majority of its immigrant population traces its heritage to either France or Portugal 
(Jones, 2004). The population of the city and its surrounding area is approximately 
950,000, of which around 100,000 are students. The city is known as a center of 
education in France. The Muslim population in Bordeaux is small, with less than an 
estimated 5 percent of the population claiming the Muslim culture. 
The final city in which interviews were collected was Paris, the capital of 
France. Paris is France’s largest city, with an estimated 12 million people in the 
metropolitan area, with more than 85% of the population living in Parisian suburbs. 
The city dates back to the days of ancient Rome, Gaul and the Franks. Since then 
Paris has served as the capital and cultural center of the French state. Throughout 
history, and even today Paris has been a multi-cultural city, a 1999 census estimated 
19% of the city population to be foreign born (LegiFrance, 2005). The city is the 
economic, political, and cultural center of modern-day France.  
48
Participants
Muslim Participants
Forty-two Muslims were interviewed for this study, including 27 women and 
15 men. For a table providing the demographic information and pseudonyms of all 
interviewees see Appendix A. All participants were of North African descent. All 
interviewees were either first or second-generation Algerian (17), Tunisian (10), 
Moroccan (7), Libyan (2) immigrants to France, or born in France (5). Participants’ 
ages ranged from 18 to 57. Of the 27 women, 20 wore a hijab in one form or another, 
six were completely veiled, while the remaining 14 wore a headscarf that only 
covered their hair. The remaining seven women said they chose not to veil for various 
reasons, which will be detailed later in this analysis. 
The primary language of the majority of the participants (35) was French, 
while the remaining participants’ (7) primary language was Arabic. All of the 
participants were versed in a second language, 25 in English and 17 in French. 
Interviews were conducted in the interviewees’ language of choice, out of the 42 
interviews 27 requested English and 15 requested French as the interview language. It 
is interesting that so many of the native-French speakers chose English for their 
interviews. This choice intrigued me when I was doing my research, and I eventually 
asked a few respondents why they chose English and not French, considering French 
was their native language and I speak both French and English. They said they 
wanted to practice their English with a native-English speaker. After encountering 
this phenomena a few times I consulted with two academic contacts about this 
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phenomenon. Both individuals told me it is common for individuals to want to 
practice a foreign language with an individual from that foreign nation. 
Of the 42 interviewees, 15 (10 men, 5 women) held degrees from French 2 or 
4-year universities: 10 (5 men and 5 women) held the equivalent of a high school 
diploma, and 17 (all women) had not completed high school. The discrepancy in the 
number of males versus the number of females who have completed high school or 
have advanced degrees is commensurate with the national average for Muslims and 
other ethnic minorities in France (Venner, 2005).
Non-Muslim Participants
An additional twenty-three non-Muslim men and women were interviewed for 
this study including, 13 men and 10 women. All of these participants were born in 
France. Their ages ranged from 19 to 63.  The primary language of all of these 
participants was French.  Twenty of the interviews were conducted in both English 
and French; for example the participant would use a French phrase when he/she did 
not know the English equivalent. The remaining three interviews were conducted 
solely in French. Fifteen of the participants were practicing Catholics, four were 
Jewish and the remaining four were non-practicing Protestants.  
Interview Protocol
Interviews are often used in intercultural communication research to gain an 
understanding of cultural and linguistic difference, and interviews have been used by 
numerous scholars in investigations of intercultural phenomena (Briggs, 1986; 
Croucher, 2003; Giles, Bourhis & Taylor, 1977; Hall, 1989; Miller et al., 1997). 
Patton (1990) asserts open-ended interviews are the basic form of interviewing. There 
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are three approaches to open-ended interviews: informal conversational interviews, 
general interviews and standard open-ended interviews. This project utilizes standard 
open-ended interviews, which are “arranged with the intention of taking each 
respondent through the same sequence and asking each respondent the same 
questions” (Patton, 1990, p. 280). When the same general questions are asked of each 
interviewee, Bernard (1999) argues the researcher is able to reduce interviewer effects 
and the researcher can develop consistency across each interview, which makes 
analysis easier and more reliable. Moreover, Briggs (1986) argues an interview 
should be adapted to local communicative norms, and analyzed as a meta-
communicative event. Standard open-ended interviews allow the researcher to 
slightly modify questions after conducting interviews, to better match the questions 
with what has been discovered in previous interviews. Thus, interview questions may 
change slightly to further understand newly emerged phenomena within the setting. 
Such interviews can produce rich or thick descriptions of ethnic or communal groups 
(Anderson, 1991; Philipsen, 1992; Spradley & McCurdy, 1972). It is up to the 
researcher thus to learn from interviews and from contacts in order to better formulate 
future interactions and to analyze the meta-communicative events taking place. In this 
study, I learned from the imams that interview questions were acceptable, instead of a 
survey. I also learned to let the participants speak on subjects that were important to 
them, and to not pigeonhole them into a non-negotiable question and answer session.  
The interview questions were divided into five thematic sets, demographic, 
definition of veil, justification for the veil, the 2004 ban on religious symbols in 
French schools, and the veil and oppression. These six sets of questions were 
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included for a couple of reasons. First, research conducted by various scholars on the 
hijab (Gaspard, 1995; Mernissi, 1975, 1987; Parshall & Parshall, 2002) assert 
justification for the hijab is questionable, how the veil is defined is not consistent and 
the veil is deemed as both oppressive and liberating. Second, since law 2004-228 was 
just passed in 2004 no research had yet been conducted on the public’s perceptions of 
this ban, therefore questions about the ban itself were essential.
Interview Questions
A. Demographic Questions
1. How long have you been living in France?
2. Where did you live before France, if you are an immigrant?
3. Does your entire family live in France?
B. Varying Definitions of the Veil
1. Do the women in your family wear the veil/hijab?
2. Why do they wear the veil?
3. Why do they not wear the veil?
4. What does the veil mean to you?
5. What does the veil mean to your elders (parents and grandparents)?
6. What does the veil mean to the younger generation?
7. Do women view the veil differently than men?
8. Why or why not do men and women view the veil differently?
9. Please describe how it feels to wear the veil? Or to see a women wearing the veil?
10. How do you feel about Muslim women who do not wear the veil?
11. Does the veil give women a sense of identity? Why or why not?
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C. The Veil and the Koran
1. Please explain what the Koran says about wearing the veil.
D. The Veil and Law 2004- 228
1. Have you noticed more or less people wearing the veil since France passed the ban 
on the veil in 2004?
2. What is your impression of this ban on the veil?
3. Why do you think the ban was proposed and passed by the government?
4. Do you think the ban is right? Why or Why not?
E. The Veil and Oppression
1. Is the veil a form of oppression? Why or why not?
2. Is the ban on the veil an attempt by the government to make Muslims be more 
French? Why or why not?
F. The veil, Islam and Identity
1. Do you have an identity or ethnicity?
2. What is your identity or ethnicity?
3. Do you have a different identity at home and in public?
4. Can your identity change?
5. Has your identity changed at all since you came to France?
6. Has your identity changed since the passage of the veil ban?
7. Is there a French identity? Can you explain it?
While these questions served as the foundation of my interviews (see 
Appendix B for a copy of the French interview protocol), after conducting interviews 
I began to learn even further what participants thought about the veil in France. This 
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new information slightly altered some of my questions in later interviews. For 
example, after three participants told me they were afraid to speak out against the ban 
I began to probe this issue more in further interviews. Also, four Muslim women told 
me to not only ask if the ban is right, but to ask if it is right, moral or even justified. 
Thus, my interview protocol changed to meet developing needs and to satisfy 
developing questions. Moreover, as each participant spoke with me I modified my 
interview questions to better relate to what the participants wanted to talk about. If a 
participant wanted to talk about the veil and their sense of self, I asked more 
questions about identity, and less about adaptation. This practice, modifying the 
protocol to better communicate with participants is standard in interviewing (Bernard, 
1999; Patton, 1990; Philipsen, 1992). 
Each interview by with me meeting a participant at a pre-determined location; 
the majority of these locations were public squares or cafés, while some interviews 
took place in private residences. The participant was allowed to choose the location; 
this choice was made to allow the participants a say in the interview process, and to 
allow the participant to choose a location where they would be the most comfortable. 
The interviews in public squares generally took place on a park bench, with the 
participant and me seated close to each other. When an interview took place at a café, 
the setting was in some cases very similar to what Americans see on television about 
French street cafés, where small tables are set outside, with 2-4 chairs. Generally, the 
cafés were located on the sides of busy pedestrian streets in  major cities. In Lille, all 
of the café interviews took place at a café overlooking the Museum of the Hospice 
Comtesse, in the center of Lille. In Paris, café interviews took place in Montparnasse 
54
and Montmarte. One café interview took place in Bordeaux, and it was held in a 
café/bar overlooking the opera. 
No café interviews took place in Lyon or Clichy-sous-Bois Bois. In Lyon the 
interviews took place in the public square outside one of the mosques in the city. In 
Clichy-sous-Bois the interviews took place in the imam’s home. This location was 
chosen because of the economic condition of the suburb, and the lack of personal 
safety at outside eateries. There are few outside eateries and the suburb of Clichy-
sous-Bois Bois is an economically poor area; thus participants felt more comfortable 
speaking in a home. Moreover, since the majority of my participants in this city were 
women, the women chose the imam’s home to avoid any perceptions of impropriety 
on their part; being seen in public with a strange man without a family member 
present can be viewed by some Muslim men and women as problematic. In the 
imam’s apartment, which was in the main city plaza, the interview took place in the 
dining room, which is adjacent to the kitchen. The participant and I occupied the 
table; the imam or another individual was never in the same room during an 
interview. 
Interviews lasted between 20 and 45 minutes. During the interviews I took 
notes in a field journal and used two digital recording devices, which facilitates the 
transcription and translation stage, which occurred later.
Transcription and Translation of Interviews
Out of the 42 interviews, 25 were initially chosen for full transcription. 
Twenty-two of these interviews were in English and the remaining three were in 
French. Each interview was transcribed verbatim from its original language(s). The 
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French interviews were also translated into English from the verbatim transcript. All 
French to English translations were double checked for accuracy by another French-
English bilingual. Upon completion of the interview transcriptions, the interviews 
were analyzed using grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). All interviews were 
analyzed in their original language(s) before translation took place.  
Data Analysis-Grounded Theory
Glaser and Strauss (1967) define the four-part inductive grounded theory 
process or open coding as “the process of breaking down, examining, comparing, 
conceptualizing and categorizing data” (p. 61). Through the process of inductive 
coding themes or “salient categories of information supported by the text” (p. 22) 
emerge from the analysis of texts, instead of being pre-chosen by researchers. Glaser 
and Strauss (1967) claim the researcher conducting a grounded theory analysis should 
observe the following four steps: (1) collects data from participants (in this case 
interviews), (2) takes copious notes during each interaction, (3) codes (writes) in the 
margins of transcripts the central theme or purpose of each line of an interview 
transcript, and (4) memoing, or the writing of generalized theoretical links between 
what is coded and established theory. 
After these four stages are completed, which in some cases happens 
simultaneously, the researcher will sort all of the memos into broad theoretical 
categories, which Strauss and Corbin (1991) claim facilitates the researcher in making 
theoretical arguments and conclusions. Sorting was conducted after the coding and 
memoing of 25 of the interviews with Muslims conducted for this analysis, and 10 of 
the interviews from non-Muslims. 
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The sorting revealed three broad theoretical categories that the majority of the 
interviewees had in common when talking about the veil. First, the overwhelming 
majority of the respondents spoke of feelings of forced and failed cultural adaptation 
in France. Second, many of the participants voiced concern for their personal identity 
formation and negotiation. Third, many of the respondents described a “growing 
silence” over the veil ban, which is similar to the theory of spiral of silence (Noelle-
Neumann, 1970) in regard to the reluctance of many Muslims to protest the French
government’s passage of the ban on the wearing of religious symbols in public 
schools. Fourth, interviewees described how the veil as a symbol of Islam is in the 
midst of a shift in meaning, where its significance and meaning in both the Muslim 
and non-Muslim world are changing. The following four chapters will discuss these 
themes as they emerged from the data. They will also discuss how these issues are 
linked to and explained by theoretical perspectives as cultural adaptation, spiral of 
silence, face negotiation and social identity theory, and language ideology. 
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CHAPTER 4
Cultural Adaptation 
This chapter outlines and defines cultural adaptation theory. First, a brief 
overview of cultural adaptation within the social sciences is provided. Second, 
cultural adaptation theory is defined. Third, interview transcripts are used to illustrate 
the different aspects of cultural adaptation’s theoretical framework. Fourth, interview 
transcripts are analyzed to argue Muslims in France regard French linguistic, cultural, 
economic and political regulations, such as the law against the wearing of the veil in 
public schools as forms of forcing the Muslim population to culturally adapt to 
French culture, a form of forced compliance. Fifth, forced compliance as discussed by 
Festinger is briefly discussed. Sixth, interview excerpts are used to illustrate the 
forced adaptation of Muslims taking place in France.
Cultural Adaptation within the Social Sciences
Since the conception of colonial expansion in the times of Ancient Rome and 
Greece to the Spanish and English colonial powers, how people from various 
cultures, from many lands, occupations, religions and environments could be melded 
together into one culture, one nationality, one identity, has been in dispute in many 
parts of the world such as Quebec (Croucher, 2003; Dickinson & Young, 2003), 
Southeast Asia (Gudykunst, 2001), Europe (Hooghe & Marks, 2001), and the United 
States (Buenker & Ratner, 1992, Jacoby, 2004). To attempt to answer these questions 
surrounding the new colonial identities, politicians, scientists and scholars have posed 
various theoretical models and explanations. 
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In the 1880s Herbert Spencer urged conformity to Victorian England. In the 
United States, President Theodore Roosevelt argued Anglo-conformity was the ideal 
toward which we should strive. Anglo-conformity means conforming to the Anglo 
culture and institutions, the dominant and standard way of American life (Yang, 
2000). Roosevelt’s call for Anglo-conformity was repeated after World War I and 
again after World War II when assimilation became synonymous with cultural 
adaptation, or in the German state where assimilation became synonymous with the 
elimination of millions of Jews, Poles, gypsies, homosexuals, and other non-Aryan 
citizens of Germany and surrounding countries. Even after the fall of the Third Reich, 
the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan, and the fight for Civil Rights in the 
United States, pressure from American politicians for assimilationist immigration 
policies flourished. In the 1960s US Senator Alan Simpson said:
if immigration is continued at a high level and yet a substantial portion of the 
newcomers and their descendants do not assimilate, they may create in 
America some of the same social, political and economic problems which 
existed in the country which they have chosen to depart (Hing, 1997, p. 161).  
Intercultural communication scholars, primarily American, have taken a keen 
interest in studying the foundations and future directions of assimilation, as it is a 
descriptive process of cultural outsiders abandoning their cultural identities to better 
communicate with individuals in a dominant culture, normally that of the United 
States (Buenker & Ratner, 1992; Chun & Choi, 2003; Conklin & Lourie, 1983; 
Gudykunst & Kim, 2003; Kramer, 2003; Oh, Koeske & Sales, 2002).
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Assimilation patterns of foreign immigrants into American society have been 
studied over the past one hundred years in the fields of anthropology, sociology, 
psychology, and communication.  Cooley (1909) recognized the importance of 
communication in cultural adaptation as “the mechanism through which human 
relations exist and develop all of the symptoms of the mind together with the means 
of conveying them through and preserving them in time (p. 61). The department of 
sociology at the University of Chicago defined cultural adaptation/assimilation 
theory, whereby immigrants lose their ethnic culture and merge into the dominant 
culture. The Penguin dictionary of sociology defined assimilation as “a 
unidimensional, one-way process, by which outsiders relinquished their own culture 
in favor of that of the dominant society” (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1984, p. 22). 
The process of culturally adapting was regarded by the sociological community as 
Social-Darwinism (Kramer, 2004). Within this context, Park, a sociologist at the 
University of Chicago developed his race relations cycle, an explanation of how 
immigrant groups can effectively conform or assimilate. Park’s theory is the 
foundation of modern assimilation theory within the social sciences. In the first phase, 
immigrants encounter the new, dominant, surrounding culture. In the second phase, 
competition develops between the immigrant groups and the dominant culture over 
resources. An accommodation phase follows the competition. Last, the weaker 
group’s culture, the immigrant culture, is assimilated into the dominant culture (Park, 
1937). 
In the study of immigrant adaptation to a host culture, the terms assimilation, 
cultural adaptation and acculturation are often used interchangeably. Redfield (1936) 
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published the first definition of acculturation as a part of cultural adaptation. He 
defined acculturation as: 
Acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of 
individuals having different cultures come into continuous first hand contacts, 
with subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both 
groups (p. 149).
Redfield’s definition serves as a general outline for early 20th century 
anthropological studies. Researchers in other disciplines expanded upon this 
definition. In the field of sociology Gordon (1964) proposed a seven-dimension 
assimilation process or continuum including: cultural assimilation, structural 
assimilation, marital assimilation, identification assimilation, attitudinal receptional 
assimilation, behavioral assimilation and civic assimilation. Gordon stated, “once 
structural assimilation has occurred, either simultaneously with or subsequent to 
acculturation, all of the other types of assimilation will naturally follow” (p. 37). Yet 
Gordon did note individuals could stop with the first stage in the continuum. Gordon, 
and others before him all based their ideas of assimilation on the predication that it 
was a linear, one-way process or continuum, where the host culture did not gain 
anything from the immigrant group.
Beal (1974) on the other hand, recognized the effect of the immigrant group 
on the host culture. He expanded assimilation defining it as “the process by which 
groups with diverse thinking, feeling, and acting are absorbed into the dominant 
group or cultures, forming a social unity and a common culture” (p. 22). The process 
of assimilation was a combination of three processes: acculturation, social integration, 
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and amalgamation. Acculturation “may be accomplished through one group 
completely taking over the culture of another and relinquishing its own,” social 
integration “involves a fusion of groups in the sense that social integration is no 
longer predicated on social or ethnic identity,” and amalgamation is a biological 
process where distinct racial and ethnic groups fuse together (Beal, 1974, p. 23-4). 
Social integration in Beal’s process allowed and predicted host culture/immigrant 
group integration, not total absorption of immigrant culture.
The field of interpersonal communication, and later intercultural 
communication took assimilation theory and modified it during the 1970s and 80s 
with the work of Kim, and later Gudykunst. Kim (1976) used a path model to 
determine the degree of immigrant adjustment to a new culture. By studying 
immigrant’s interpersonal relationships with the host society by the immigrant’s 
amount of social interactions with the host culture and membership in specific 
organizations, Kim argued immigrants who participate more in ethnic communication 
practices and ethnic organizations are less assimilated than those immigrants who 
regularly interact with the host culture. From this study, Kim developed specific 
relationships between interpersonal communication and “assimilation” (Gudykunst & 
Kim, 2003, p. 360). 
Assimilation theory, as posited by Gudykunst and Kim (1997; 2003) has been 
extensively tested in the United States and Canada. Most of these tests have entailed 
examining newcomer groups from Southeast Asia, African-Americans and Native-
Americans. The following list is an example of such studies, which focus solely on 
the US and Canada (Ansari, 1991; Bernam, et al., 1987; Berry & Kim, 1987; Berry & 
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Sam, 1997; Broom & Kitsuse, 1955; Eichhoff, 1989; Garcia, 1995; Kim, 1976; 
Kunjara, 1982; Murphy & Esposito, 2003; Oh, et. al, 2002; Sakdisubha, 1987; Teske 
& Nelson, 1974; Ward & Kennedy, 1994). While these studies have focused entirely 
on the US and Canada, Gudykunst and Kim (1997; 2003) assert this theory is 
appropriate for analyzing groups outside of the United States. Kramer (2003) and 
Croucher (2003; 2005) argue the theory should be tested for validity outside of the 
United States. Thus, since this cultural adaptation theory has been shown to be a 
descriptive theory of cultural adaptation, and its validity has yet to be thoroughly 
tested outside of North America, it is appropriate to use this theory as a lens through 
which to analyze the adaptation process of Muslim in France, and to evaluate the 
theory’s validity and reliability.
Kim (1977) asserted:
Interpersonal communication is one of the key elements of social 
communication, along with observation of one’s environment including mass 
media content. Interpersonal communication is generally considered more 
intense, direct, and has a detailed influence on the immigrant’s adaptation to 
the host socio-cultural system (p. 57).
Kim further argued functional interpersonal communication is an important 
channel through which immigrants learn about the dominant host culture. The 
culmination of this study, and later work after 1976 was the development of 
Gudykunst and Kim’s theory of assimilation/cultural adaptation. Gudykunst and Kim 
(2003) define assimilation as a “convergence of strangers’ internal conditions with 
those of the native and a minimum maintenance of the original cultural habits” (p. 
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360). The convergence of strangers around an internal condition of the native culture 
emphasizes the immigrant’s responsibility to find a way to function in their new 
environment. Gudykunst and Kim (1997) define functional fit as “the operational (or 
behavioral) capacity that enables a person to carry out behaviors externally in 
accordance with the host cultural patterns” (p. 342). 
The attempt to mimic surrounding cultural norms and function “properly” in 
society creates flexible, passive and advanced immigrants (Gudykunst & Kim 1997). 
Kramer (2003) in his critique, equates these flexible, passive and advanced 
immigrants to “being user-friendly, easily reprogrammable, to being able and willing 
to deculturize, disintegrate, and unlearn one’s cognitive affective and operational 
self” (p. 16). 
Happiness is another logical principle of assimilation advocated by Gudykunst 
and Kim (2003). They argue the only way for an individual to effectively overcome 
differences and be satisfied in their new culture is to abandon their previous cultural 
identity to facilitate overall cultural happiness and satisfaction (Gudykunst & Kim, 
2003). They further asserted every “stranger” or newcomer to a culture must find 
ways to function in a new environment. Complete cultural adaptation is the ultimate, 
lifetime goal of assimilation (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997; 2003). 
According to Kim’s cultural adaptation framework, or assimilation theory, 
individuals go through three (sociologically based) stages on their way to total 
assimilation: enculturation, deculturation and acculturation. At any one time, 
individuals are in only one of the following three stages, and the individual can go 
back and forth between stages, but the stages do not generally overlap. Kim presents 
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the three stages as variables. She asserts one acculturates only to the extent that they 
can deculturate, a zero-sum mentality (Croucher, 2005; Kramer, 2003). All in all, 
Kim sets up a continuum upon which individuals move from one stage to the other. 
Enculturation
Enculturation is the adoption of the behavioral patterns of the surrounding 
culture. Kelvin (1970) describes the enculturation process as the socialization process 
of children and newcomers to the norms of their cultural milieu. Enculturation stems 
from sociological and educational research, examining the learning and 
developmental patterns of children. Gudykunst and Kim (2003) expand the concept of 
enculturation to include not only socialization but also communicative response, 
“socialization provides children with an understanding of their world and culturally 
patterned modes of responding to it” (p. 359). 
The Muslim community in France described in different meetings and in 
different cities how they as children, and their children all go through a period of 
learning about their Muslim cultural heritage. Interviewee A, a 29-year old Muslim 
woman born in Algeria, now living in Lille, discussed how she was taught to respect 
the traditions of Islam above all other traditions as a child, and that she passes these 
ideas onto her young daughter and nieces. She said:
When I young girl I learn Islam and Islamic law [pause] I learn about Koran. I 
learn from mother and from father what it mean to be Muslim woman. 
Muslim woman follow Koran and do what it say to do in Koran. If women not 
do what Koran say they not follow word of Prophet and live a good Muslim 
life [pause] and not have good life after death. I now teach daughter and 
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nieces [pause] I teach them they need be good Muslim women [pause] they uh 
need to know Koran and follow Koran [pause] and hijab.
Another participant echoed these sentiments. Interviewee F, a 36-year old 
Algerian born Muslim woman living in Lyon, described how when she was a young 
girl she was taught by her mother, grandmother and sisters the importance of the hijab 
as a part of Muslim culture, she continues this teaching with her daughters. She said:
Les femmes dans la famille m'enseignent au hijab. Ils enseignent cette pièce de 
hijab de pièce de l'Islam [pause] de ma culture. J'apprends alors ce qui il 
moyen d'être les femmes musulmanes, le bon hijab musulman de femme et 
[pause] la mauvaise femme musulmane non pauvre qui pas hijab. Aussi 
j'apprends comment agir avec les hommes et comment enseigner mes enfants à 
être de bons musulmans et à n’aime pas les mauvais musulmans. Il ma 
responsabilité d'enseigner des filles à être de bons musulmans [pause] sûr elles 
comprennent Koran.
Women in family teach me to hijab. They teach that hijab part of Islam 
[pause] part of my culture. I learn then what it mean to be Muslim women, 
good Muslim woman hijab and not poor [pause] bad Muslim woman who not 
hijab. I also learn how to act with men and how to teach my children to be 
good Muslims and not like the bad Muslims. It my responsibility to teach 
daughters to be good Muslims [pause] sure they understand Koran.
A 47-year old Muslim woman, Interviewee Q who was born in Algeria but 
lives in Paris further discussed how she learned a good Muslim woman is a Muslim 
woman who wears a hijab and does not show her entire face or hair. She said, “my 
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mother say good Muslim girls hijab [pause] and girls who do not hijab are not good 
Muslim girls. I tell daughter and granddaughter that now.” These women were not 
only taught by the women in her family the meaning of a Muslim, but they were also 
socialized into the societal differences and stereotypes between those Muslim women 
who do and those Muslim women who do not hijab. Moreover, they are taking their 
learned cultural norms and passing those onto their daughters, which is a classical 
element of the enculturation process; someone is socialized into a culture and passes 
that culture onto a younger generation.
Muslim men are also enculturated into the Muslim culture, specifically into 
the importance of the hijab as a representation of a “good” Muslim woman. 
Interviewee L, a 29-year old Algerian born Muslim male in Paris discussed how when 
he was a child in Algiers he learned from his father and mother the importance of 
marrying a Muslim women who wears a veil. They told him only “good” Muslim 
women veil, and women who don’t veil are therefore “bad” or “unholy” Muslim 
women.
My father say to me I need marry good woman who hijab. Woman who not 
hijab [pause] that uh not good Muslim woman. Koran say women need to 
hijab [pause] and I learn as child that women need to hijab. I teach my two 
sons that today [pause] they need find Muslim woman who hijab for wife 
when older [pause] other women not holy or traditional.
Aside from being enculturated into their original or native culture, Gudykunst 
and Kim (1997) assert that as immigrants enter a new culture they are confronted with 
new cultural practices, these practices in some cases may run counter to the 
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newcomer’s original cultural identity. Numerous participants vividly described this 
confrontation. Interviewee B, a 32-year old Muslims women born in France who lives 
in Bordeaux discussed how when her mother came to visit her in France from Tunisia 
her mother was shocked at not only the language difference, and the abundance of 
media, but also at the ways Muslims read the Koran. She explained:
My mother not think it possible to read Koran in language that [pause] not 
Arabic. In France that true a lot. Many people not read Arabic [pause] and are 
Muslim. This [pause] confuse my mother a lot [pause] she uh not know what 
to think about these [pause] Muslims who speak French and watch French 
television and read French books.
Interviewee D, a 57-year old Muslim woman born in Algeria who lived in 
Paris described how when she immigrated to France when she was 20 years old, she 
encountered numerous cultural practices that were different from her own. 
Quand je viens en France je voir [pause] beaucoup de gens qui agissent 
différentes que moi. Ces personnes [pause] ils tous parlent une langue 
différente [pause] et la plupart d'entre elles pas hijab. Il était…peu commun 
de voir des femmes sans hijab [pause]je [pause] uh [pause] ne vois pas qu'en 
Algérie [pause]  tout le hijab de femmes puis en Algérie. Je vois même les 
musulmans en France sans le hijab [pause] en France [pause] je ne pas 
la comprendre [pause]  ellle m'a confondu. Je dois changer pour être comme 
eux. 
When I come to France I see [pause] many people who act different than me. 
These people [pause] they all speak different language [pause] and most of 
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them not hijab. It was [pause] unusual to see women without hijab [pause] I 
not see that in Algeria [pause] all women hijab then in Algeria. I even see 
Muslims who not hijab [pause] in France [pause] I not understand it [pause] it 
confused me.  I must change to be like them.
This cultural confusion is common when a newcomer encounters new cultural 
practices. In fact, Gudykunst and Kim (1997) argue when a newcomer encounters 
situations counter to what they are used to, the newcomer will become confused and 
then attempt to learn a new culture to replace their “less developed” culture in order 
to become a “universal person” with a “transcultural identity” (p. 364). Some of the 
participants in this project explained how they began to rapidly learn French culture 
after emigrating from another country. 
Interviewee J, a 39-year old Muslim woman born in Tunisia explained how 
she had to quickly learn French culture when she immigrated to Lille. “I learn I must 
speak French [pause] I take French lessons. I learn people like women with perfume 
[pause] I buy perfume. I begin to act more French.” Her experience represents the 
transition from the enculturation to deculturation phase of cultural adaptation, in 
which a newcomer will begin to question cultural practices.  
Deculturation
Deculturation describes the process individuals go through when losing their 
socialized cultural identity. According to Brim and Wheeler (1966), during 
deculturation, individuals learn new cultural habits from the host culture, and in turn 
as individuals realize certain behaviors are more acceptable in the host culture, the 
individuals question/unlearn their native cultural behaviors. In order to lose a 
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socialized identity an individual must unlearn the culture they were socialized into, 
inherently deeming their original culture as less worthy or important than the new 
surrounding culture (Kramer, 2003).
One participant, Interviewee R, a 29-year old Muslim male born in Morocco 
and living in Lille described when he first realized his cultural behaviors, specifically 
his choice of food, were not as acceptable as other behaviors (foods) in France. He 
stated:
When I come here [pause] I not think I have to be different. I use my language 
[pause] I eat my food [pause] but my food [pause] people not like my food 
[pause] they say my food not good [pause] they how you say [pause] odor 
[pause] smell my food on my skin and say I need to eat different food.
Another participant further elaborated on how when he first immigrated to 
France he was informed by his French neighbor that it was not acceptable for him to 
prevent his wife from attaining a part-time job. Interviewee W, a 62-year old Muslim 
male from Tunisia said:
Mon voisin [pause] il [pause] uh me disent je ne suis pas bon pour maintenir 
l'épouse à la maison [pause] mais [pause] uh cet [pause] uh ce qui je pense 
bon [pause] pourquoi il non bon je demande? Je maintiens l'épouse sûre dans 
la maison [pause]  elle [pause]  uh [pause] avec la famille [pause]  elle [pause] 
travail du besoin d'uh pas dehors. Il le disent non français [pause]  il n’est pas 
normal.
My neighbor [pause] he [pause] uh tell me I not good to keep wife home 
[pause] but uh that uh what I think good [pause] why it not good I ask? I keep 
70
wife safe in home [pause] she [pause] uh with family [pause] she [pause] uh 
not need work outside. He say it not French [pause] it not normal. 
Newcomers to a culture are also sometimes forced to question their behaviors 
for fear of not receiving a position or social benefit. Interviewee J, who does not 
directly deal with any customers, described how her employer told her that if she did 
not stop wearing native earrings (two inch silver loops with Arabic writing that stated 
“God be with you”) and other jewelry (a ring with the aforementioned phrase) that 
she would be fired and lose all of her benefits and salary. She said:
He say I uh must uh [pause] not wear my jewelry [pause] but it not big [pause] 
it only two Earrings [pause] the earrings African [pause] not bad. I start think 
[pause] what bad with my Earrings [pause] what bad about me? Why he say I 
change to have job? I have Family [pause] I need job [pause] I need change to 
have job and money.
If these kinds of cultural behaviors or artifacts such as food or jewelry are 
deemed foreign, or non-functional within the dominant culture, many immigrants or 
newcomers will simply abandon the practices in favor of mimicking the dominant 
culture (Kramer, 2003) and enter Kim’s third and final stage of cultural adaptation, 
acculturation.  Various scholars deem this process of deculturation leading to eventual 
acculturation as inevitable and beneficial (Brim & Wheeler, 1966; Deutsch & Won, 
1963; Goffman, 1961; Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, 2003; Lysgaard, 1955). While others 
regard the process of acculturation as prescribed by Kim as limiting and failing to 
adequately take cultural factors under consideration (Chun & Choi, 2003; Croucher, 
2005; Kramer, 2003; Murphy & Esposito, 2003).   
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Acculturation
When individuals abandon their previous cultural habits (deculturation) and 
adopt the behaviors of the host culture, the individuals are engaged in the final 
resocialization process of cultural adaptation known as acculturation. Acculturation is 
the final stage in the process of cultural change resulting from contact between groups 
with distinctive cultures (Oh, Koeske & Sales, 2002). Kim (2003) defined 
acculturation as the process when strangers “become acquainted with and adopt some 
of the norms and values of salient reference groups in the host society” (p. 359). 
Acculturative change is achieved slowly over time, since the majority of 
individuals inherently want to retain some of their “foreign” cultural practices. 
Individuals must also use their former cultural skills, which they were supposed to 
unlearn during deculturation in order to integrate new information and integrate the 
new cultural repertoire into their lives (Kramer, 2003).  Furthermore, researchers have 
demonstrated this process to become easier and quicker for newcomers in a host 
culture over generations, first, second to third, and so on (Buenker & Ratner, 1992; 
Conklin & Lourie, 1983; Oh, Koeske & Sales, 2002).
Countless examples abound in the interview transcripts demonstrating how 
many Muslim immigrants have acculturated to a certain point into the more dominant 
French culture. Numerous immigrants discussed how they first began to adopt 
“French” behaviors. Most of their adopting of French behaviors can be grouped into 
five categories: altering their language use, food selection, media usage, parenting 
and marriage practices, and clothing choices.
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Altering of Language Use
Many of the participants in this study discussed how after they immigrated to 
France they began to realize the imperative nature of being fluent in French. An 
understanding of French is necessary for attaining decent paying, or long-term 
employment in France (Reynolds & Kidd, 2003). One participant, Interviewee F, an 
Algerian immigrant to France discussed how she was taught basic French in school, 
but did not speak it at home and thus her French ability was greatly hindered when 
she first moved to France. She said:
Je viens en France et je ne parle pas français très bien. J'ai parlé l'arabe et 
anglais à la maison. Ma mère était une professeur anglais et mon père a 
travaillait dans l'usine. Après que je vienne en France qu'il était difficile de 
trouver un bon travail, parce que je n'ai pas parlé français. J'ai pris des 
leçons françaises à une école musulmane locale, et ai appris à parler 
français. Aujourd'hui ce mieux pour moi maintenant que je parle français 
[pause] maintenant que j'ai le meilleur travail et moi suis personne mieux 
française.
I come to France and not speak French very well. I spoke Arabic and English 
at home. My mother was English teacher and father work in factory. After I 
come to France it was difficult to find a good job, because I did not speak 
French. I took French lessons at a local Muslim school, and learned to speak 
French. Today it better for me now that I speak French [pause] Now I have 
better job and I am better French person.
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Another interviewee, Interviewee D, who was born in Algeria and immigrated 
to France 37 years ago described how she suffered discrimination because she did not 
speak French properly, and only spoke Arabic. She said the only job she could find 
was as a maid and she received a poor salary. After she learned French this situation 
changed.
Quand je viens d'abord ici je travaillez en tant que bonne [pause]  qui était le 
seul travail que je pourrais trouver. Je n'ai pas fait beaucoup d'argent. Après 
que j'apprenne le français et parle un certain français [pause]  les gens me 
donnent le meilleur travail. Maintenant je travaille en tant que bonne dans 
trois maisons françaises [pause] et je fais plus d'argent. Le Français d'étude 
m'a donné pour avoir le bon travail.
When I first come here I work as a maid [pause] that was the only job I could 
find. I did not make much money. After I learn French and speak some French 
[pause] people give me better job. I now work as a maid in three French 
homes [pause] and I make more money. Learning French gave me chance to 
have good job. 
Overall, while native Arabic speakers assert they were better off economically 
after learning French, they also argue they are more accepted in social circles after 
learning French. Interviewee X, a 47-year old Libyan born Muslim woman said, 
“après j'ai appris le français il était plus facile de faire des amis en France. 
Maintenant, j'ai beaucoup d'amis qui sont libyens et aussi français”  “after I learn 
French it easier to make friends in France. I now have many friends who are Libyan 
and who are also French.” 
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Muslim males and females also assert they have an easier time assimilating to 
their social and work environments. Interviewee R, a 29-year old Muslim male from 
Morocco said “after I learn French and English it better for me at work. I have more 
friends at work and I understand my work more.” Interviewee U, a 39-year old 
Muslim woman from Egypt said, “quand j'apprends à parler français les français 
m'acceptent plus au travail et quand je marche,” “when I learn to speak French the 
French people accept me more at work and when I go outside to shop or walk”
Not only do Arabic speaking Muslim immigrants interviewed for this research 
describe their need to learn French, but one also discussed how when she (a native 
English speaker) moved from the United Kingdom she needed to learn French as 
well. Interviewee H described how she took a pay cut to work in a French bank, and 
did not receive appropriate pay in her opinion until she gained some fluency in 
French. She stated:
I worked in an English bank for three years and then applied for a job in a 
French bank. I came here and had to learn French because I was working in a
French bank [pause] it’s that simple [pause] if you work here you need to 
speak the language. I think it is virtually that way in every society today, if 
you can’t speak the language your opportunities are limited. It was the same 
when I was in England, if you did not speak English you couldn’t even get a 
job cleaning the floors.  
Food Selection
Aside from the need to learn the French language, participants described how 
they had to adapt to the French food, and in many cases had to abandon their 
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traditional/native foods because their native foods were considered too exotic and 
they were unable to find the appropriate products. As Jandt (2004) states, food 
represents a powerful and resonant cultural artifact, and when a newcomer alters their 
eating behavior this change can be a very difficult and depressing decision. The 
overwhelming majority of the participants voiced the same sentiments in regard to 
adopting French food and abandoning their native foods. Interviewee A, an Algerian 
born Muslim woman commented on the difficulty of attaining the appropriate 
cooking materials. She said, “it is hard to buy many things that I need here in France 
to cook traditional foods [pause] or uh the foods are very expensive. So I have to eat 
more French foods, not choice [pause] I must buy French food.” 
Interviewee Z, a 39 year-old Muslim male from Tunisia discussed how his 
neighbors and landlord all say his food has too strong of an odor, and thus he is not 
allowed to cook many native dishes. He equated their (French) perceptions of his 
native food to racism against Muslims and Tunisians. He said:
Mes voisins dans mon bâtiment, ils disent ma nourriture a une mauvaise 
odeur [pause] que mon propriétaire a dite que je ne peux pas la faire cuire 
parce que l'odeur fait l'appartement sentir mal. Je ne pense pas qui est vrai 
[pause] ma nourriture différente [pause]  il n’est pas mauvais. Mais ils le 
disent il est mauvais, je ne le font pas cuire souvent maintenant. Maintenant, 
je le manque. Les gens ici sont racistes en France et n'aiment pas des 
Tunisiens ou Musulmans, il sont simples.
My neighbors in my building, they say my food has a bad odor [pause] my 
landlord said I couldn’t cook it because the odor makes the apartment smell 
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badly. I do not think that is true [pause] my food different [pause] it not bad. 
But they say it is bad, I do not cook it often now. Now I miss it. People here in 
France are racist and do not like Tunisians or Muslims, it is simple.
French Media Usage
Aside from their selection of foods and their language usage, many 
participants described how the longer they live in France, the more French media they 
consume. Many other participants discussed the opposite, usage of fewer French 
media outlets, the sentiments of these participants will be presented and analyzed in 
the end of this chapter, and also in the sixth chapter of this dissertation. 
Numerous participants explained how when they first moved to France they 
did not read a lot of French newspapers or magazines, but as their time in France 
increased, so did their usage of French media. The participants stated their usage of 
French media increased over time for two reasons, they gained an understanding (or 
better grasp) of the French language and they wanted to learn about news and events 
in their region or in France proper.
“I learn English and French [pause] and now I like to read French newspapers 
and watch television. I read and watch about news, sports and other things. It easy 
also to find things in paper [pause] uh [pause]  like [pause] uh jobs or things to buy” 
said Interviewee S, a 37-year old Muslim male born in Libya who lives in Lyon. 
Another participant said she enjoys watching French television because she 
thinks she is more French when she watches French television. “J’aime la télévision 
française, quand j’observe [pause] je suis français [pause] j'écoute en français 
et j'aime des expositions françaises,” “I like French television, when I watch I am 
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French [pause] I listen in French and I like French shows,” said Interviewee Y, a 
Tunisian born Muslim woman. 
Her sense of identity from being able to watch and understand French 
television is consistent with other studies that have found newcomers will have 
heightened attachment to a host culture when they identify with the host culture’s 
media (Hall, 1981; Hofstede, 1960). This increased usage of French media over time 
is also consistent with the results Kim (1977) found when examining the Korean 
community in and around Chicago.  However, some participants voiced concern over 
their children not using media from their parents’ native culture. Interviewee V, a 63-
year old Muslim woman from Morocco said:
Je veux mes enfants savior et regarder la television Arabe et lire les journals 
Arabes [pause] mais il n’existe pas en France. Ils sont difficile trouver. Il 
faissent lire les journals Françaises et regarder la television Français. Leurs 
habitudes ne me rendent pas heureux
I want my children to know and watch Arabic television and read Arabic 
Newspapers [pause] but these do not exist in France [pause] they are hard to 
find. They must read French newspapers and watch French television. Their 
habits do not make me happy. 
Another participant said, “my children know French cinema and television, 
but they do not know Algerian cinema, television or literature. I want them to know 
their history, and not forget it.” While Interviewee Q acknowledges her children 
know French media, she still expresses her desire for them to remember and not 
forget their native culture. Interviewee N, a 54 year-old Moroccan born Muslim 
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woman also discussed how her children have forgotten the culture of their parents and 
grandparents, through their media usage. “My children do not know Moroccan 
literature, or cinema. All they know is French, and this is a problem to me because 
they do not know their heritage now.” 
This dichotomy shows how when many newcomers to a culture, and their 
successive generations try to adapt to a dominant culture, their traditional values and 
beliefs can and often come in direct conflict with those of the more dominant culture 
(Croucher, 2005; Kramer, 2003). Another cultural practice that regularly comes into 
direct conflict with the values and beliefs of the dominant culture is parenting 
practices. 
Parenting and Marriage Practices
A large portion of the Muslims who were not born in France described how 
their parenting behaviors have changed since they immigrated to France. In a 
traditional Muslim family, the man is the head of the household, while the woman of 
the house is still a highly respected member of the family unit (Roald, 2001). 
Interviewee L, a Muslim man born in Algeria described how when he was a child he 
was taught by his mother and father to respect both male and female members of his 
family. “My father say to me I must respect [pause] honor my mother and him. My 
mother important person in family.” Interviewee A, a Muslim woman born in Algeria 
explained her mother and father also told her to respect both parents. “When I child 
my uh [pause] mother say father love us [pause] but father work and busy. My father 
also [pause] he uh [pause] say mother work hard at home [pause] she love us too. We 
need to honor her and him [pause] Prophet said it must be [pause] honor parents.”
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While these participants explained their socialization into the Muslim culture 
as including lessons into the familial honor structure, other participants expressed 
worry for the younger generation born in France. These participants equated a 
perceived decrease in respect for family with children in France growing up to be too 
French, or too Western by nature. Interviewee D, a Muslim woman born in Algeria 
said:
J'enseigne mes enfants en Algérie à respecter et honorer des parents. 
Aujourd'hui les enfants ne respectent pas ou n'honorent pas leurs parents. 
Mes petits-enfants [pause]  qu'ils ne parlent pas correctement à leur mère ou 
père. Ils pensent qu'ils sont des adultes quand ils sont des enfants. Où est le 
respect pour la famille et les parents aujourd'hui? Les enfants n’ apprendent 
pas l'honneur en France [pause] ils sont trop français [pause] trop 
Occidental.
I teach my children in Algeria to respect and to honor parents. Today children 
do not respect or honor their parents. My grandchildren [pause] they do not 
speak properly to their mother or father. They think they are adults when they 
are children. Where is the respect for family and parents today? Children not 
learn honor in France [pause] they too French [pause] too Western.
Another participant, Interviewee J, a Muslim born Tunisian woman echoed 
these aforementioned remarks and said, “it hard to protect children. They [pause] uh 
[pause] want to be like French children [pause] and they uh say what they want 
[pause] uh [pause] uh [pause] and my son has friends who do not respect their 
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mothers [pause] where is the honor?” These participants perceive the French culture 
as somehow taking away their children’s respect and honor for familial structures. 
When asked why they blamed the French culture, the answers were very 
similar. Interviewee A said, “children want freedom [pause] do not want parents say 
what they do or not do. French teens have a lot of freedom [pause] can uh do many 
things Muslim children cannot [pause] like marry without uh father or mother 
approval. Interviewee J added: 
the friends of my son [pause] they are French children [pause] they watch 
French television [pause] they have bad words to say [pause] the words on 
French television. They uh [pause] they uh also learn to do what want when 
they marry [pause] this not good [pause] it uh confuse many children and 
family.
Other participants also voiced similar sentiments when explaining why 
Muslim children born in France do not respect their parents: too much freedom for 
French children and the ability of French children to marry whomever they please. 
Overwhelmingly interviewees voiced concern over more and more Muslim children 
refusing to participate in arranged marriages. This shift from accepting or not voicing 
open opposition to arranged marriages represents a shift in Islam from a 
magic/mythic religion into having some perspectival tendencies. In many Muslim 
nations it is not uncommon to have arranged marriages for both male and female 
children. The importance of arranged marriages stems from the desire within the 
Muslim faith that the ideal relationship is between a man and woman in the bonds of 
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marriage. Yet, an increasing number of unmarried Muslims refuse to be part of 
arranged marriages. 
Interviewee B, a French born Muslim woman said:
I do not live in Muslim country [pause] I do not have to uh [pause] have 
arranged marriage [pause] I uh can uh [pause] marry the man I want. This is 
[pause] uh not something my parents like [pause] but I make choice [pause] I 
can make choice in France. Choice I cannot make in Muslim country.
Interviewee AC, a 40-year old French born Muslim male said, “J'ai un choix 
en France [pause]  que j'ai un choix pour marier qui je veux. Mes parents n'ont pas 
eu que [pause] ainsi je fais à un choix et ne pas marier qui les parents disent que je 
dois me marier.” “I have a choice in France [pause] I have a choice to marry who I 
want. My parents did not have that [pause] so I make a choice and not marry who 
parents say I have to marry.” 
Interviewee AF, a 37-year old Algerian born Muslim woman said, “I can 
marry and date man I want in France [pause] I not need to have permission or 
arranged marriage like parents [pause] permission and arranged marriage old tradition 
[pause] not new way to think [pause] not French way to think.” Interviewee AA, a 
29-year old French born Muslim male, further supported her sentiments. He said, 
“mes parents ont eu un mariage dispose [pause] qu'ils ne se sont pas mariés qui ils 
m'aiment [pause] marient qui j'aime [pause] est qui ce que les gens en France [pause] 
et je suis français.” “My parents had an arranged marriage [pause] they did not marry 
who they love [pause] I marry who I love [pause] that is what people in France do 
[pause] and I am French.” 
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While the second and successive generation of Muslims living in France do 
not support the tradition of arranged marriages, the first generation Muslim 
immigrants still hold this tradition in high regard. Interviewee T, a 63-year old 
Muslim male born in Algeria stated, “children today not want arranged marriages. 
They not think they work [pause] but they work, and it tradition to marry for family 
[pause] it not bad choice.” 
Similarly, Interviewee T, a 57-year old Muslim woman from Tunisia said, 
“ma fille a fait ne pas vouloir un mariage dispose [pause] mais à mes petits-enfants 
[pause] ils uh des mariages disposés, et ma fille me dit bien [pause] pour ne pas 
comprendre. Ils doivent se rappeler Coran et l'Islam comme important pour la vie.” 
“My daughter had an arranged marriage [pause] but my grandchildren [pause] they uh 
not want arranged marriages, and my daughter says ok [pause] I not understand. They 
need to remember Koran and Islam as important to life.” 
Interviewee AB, a 46-year old Muslim woman born in Morocco summed up 
the sentiments of first generation Muslim immigrants to France nicely. She said:
Je pense que les enfants aujourd'hui dans les enfants musulmans de la France 
[pause] et les jeunes adultes [pause] ils ne se rappellent pas l'Islam et Coran. 
La famille de respect de parole de Coran [pause] s'est chargée du marriage 
[pause] qu'est la manière de respecter une famille. Si jeunes les musulmans 
disent que je ne veux pas un mariage dispose [pause] qu'ils ne respectent pas 
leur père ou la mere [pause] ils respectent seulement eux-mêmes [pause] ceci 
est un mauvais problème avec de jeunes musulmans.
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I think children today in France [pause] Muslim children [pause] and young 
adults [pause] they do not remember Islam and the Koran. Koran say respect 
family [pause] arranged marriage [pause] that is the way to respect a family. 
When young Muslims say I do not want an arranged marriage [pause] they do 
not respect their father or mother [pause] they respect only themselves [pause] 
This is a bad problem with young Muslims.
Clearly there is a difference between how the first generation Muslim 
immigrant and successive generations view arranged marriages.  The overall 
sentiment of the younger generation of Muslims living in France do not hold to the 
tradition of arranged marriages, while the first generation of immigrants (the older 
Muslims) do hold to these traditions to be an important part of being a Muslim. This 
difference of opinion, or worldview is also evident in how first and successive 
generation Muslims regard the choice of what kind of clothing to wear in public.  
Clothing Choices
Noth (2000), Gebser (1984) and Hall (1977) all assert clothing is a powerful 
cultural and symbolic symbol for any culture. Thus, when the Koran prescribes 
Muslim women and men should wear clothing that is modest and does not draw 
unnecessary attention to their bodies, this prescription is culturally and symbolically 
significant. Since clothing is an important part of the Islamic faith, in many Muslim 
nations and traditional Muslim households it is not uncommon to see Muslim women 
wearing a hijab (whether full, headscarf or burqa), and a Muslim male man wearing a 
white or other light colored garment/robe. However, as Islam becomes more and 
more Westernized, as its followers immigrate in greater numbers to Western nations 
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and as new technology and new fashions are introduced to many Muslims, the 
standard Muslim fashion has become anything but standard. Roald (2001) described 
how an increasing number of Muslim women in Western nations are substituting 
traditional Muslim attire for more Western clothing such as slacks, jeans and skirts. 
This transition is generally well accepted within the young Muslim population, but 
strongly opposed within the older Muslim population. 
Younger Muslims, second or successive generations, equate the wearing of 
Western clothing with liberation and self-identification (perspectivalism). Interviewee 
B, a 32-year-old Muslim woman born in Paris said, “I not hijab or wear clothes that 
many Muslim women wear in Muslim countries. I [pause] uh [pause] think I am 
Western free woman who is also Muslim [pause] so I [pause] uh [pause] wear 
Western clothes. My favorite is jeans.”
Interviewee L, an Algerian born Muslim male discussed how he does not wear 
traditional clothing because of his job and his desire to be more like other French 
people. 
I need to wear what I like wear [pause] if I wear other clothes [pause] I uh 
[pause] not me. I also not allow to wear traditional clothes at work [pause] 
traditional clothes not good for work. People at work are French [pause] I 
want to look like them [pause] so I wear French [pause] or uh [pause] Western 
clothes.
Earlier in the interview, this participant expressed his desire to find a wife 
who wore traditional clothing, specifically the hijab. When asked why he needs to 
find a wife who hijabs, while he does not need to wear traditional clothing he said, “it 
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different for men [pause] men not have be modest [pause] we be men [pause] women 
need be modest [pause] need hijab.”
Another participant, Interviewee AE, a 28-year old French born Muslim 
woman agreed with his desire for self-identification, but disagreed with his assertion 
that only women need to wear traditional clothes. She said:
J'aime porter les vêtements occidentaux. Les vêtements occidentaux [pause] 
ils uh [pause] ils me font que sentir occidental [pause] je sens des musulmans 
et des Français. Je peux prendre ma décision dans la vie [pause] et ne pas 
faire quels vieux Musulmans [pause] quelle famille [pause] ou vieux livre dit 
je dois faire ou porter. Je suis libre un musulman. Si je veux au hijab du hijab 
[pause] si je ne veux pas au hijab du hijab [pause] pas. Des hommes [pause] 
ils ont le même bien choisi [pause] nous tout libres ici [pause] nous tous 
[pause] uh avoir des hommes de choix [pause] non seulement [pause] mais des 
femmes également avoir le choix.
I like to wear Western clothes. Western clothes [pause] they uh [pause] they 
make me feel Western [pause] I feel Muslim and French. I can make my 
decision in life [pause] and not do what old Muslims [pause] what family 
[pause] or old book says I must do or wear. I am free a Muslim. If I want to 
hijab I hijab [pause] if I do not want to hijab [pause] I not hijab. Men [pause] 
they have same choice [pause] we all free here [pause] we all [pause] uh have 
choice [pause] not only men [pause] but women also have choice.
This issue of whether to hijab or not will be examined extensively in the next 
chapter, which addresses the hijab as a form of identity and face negotiation in 
86
France. Aside from the issue of whether women should hijab or not, or if Muslims 
should follow Koranic traditions of modesty, participants also expressed that the older 
Muslim generation (first generation immigrants) do not understand the younger 
generation’s desire for individuality and self-identification. Interviewee A, said, “I 
want mother and I [pause] uh [pause] want father to understand [pause] to know that I 
good Muslim [pause] but I [pause] uh [pause] like Western clothes [pause] I like be 
individual [pause] I like them [pause] parents understand me [pause] but they not 
understand me [pause] it make me sad.” 
  First generation immigrants regularly voice opposition to their children’s and 
grandchildren’s wearing of Western clothes. Interviewee J, a Tunisian born Muslim 
woman said, “I not understand young Muslims [pause] they not like tradition now 
[pause] I like them wear good Muslim clothes [pause] but they not [pause] they uh 
[pause] wear Western [pause] American clothes.”
Clearly, the issue of what clothing is appropriate for Muslims is debated 
within the Muslim community or ummah. This debate represents a clash between 
those who want to culturally adapt to Western ways of dress (perspectivalism), and 
those who want to hold onto religious, historical and cultural traditions that are 
questioned in the Western culture (magic/mythic). This clash also reveals how many 
Muslims refuse to culturally adapt, and instead become further entrenched in 
tradition. The reluctance of these Muslims to culturally adapt (in numerous ways) to a 
more dominant French culture is not accounted for in Kim’s (1977) cultural 
adaptation framework. Therefore, the following section discusses some of the 
criticisms and potential weaknesses of Kim’s cultural adaptation framework. 
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Criticisms of Cultural Adaptation
When assessing the strengths and weaknesses of cultural adaptation theory, 
the strength of this theory lies in its ability to be easily understood and applied. The 
tenets behind the theory are easy to understand, have been adopted by many scholars, 
and in practice, some level of cultural adaptation produces a more cultured individual. 
According to Gudykunst and Kim (1997), an assimilative state creates “evolution” to 
“intercultural personhood,” which is also deemed being a “universal person” with a 
“transcultural identity” (p. 364).
However, a few of the logical propositions establishing this theory have been 
questioned and are still unresolved, including the absolute necessity for deculturized 
human beings and the lack of allowances for multiculturalism within the various 
assimilation stages. Scholars further contest three premises, or effects of assimilation: 
the promotion of self-hatred, the inherent acceptance of all individuals wishing to 
assimilate (host culture receptivity, and animosity toward adapters. Furthermore, this 
theory has rarely been tested outside of the United States, and rarely outside of Asian 
communities.
Deculturalization
A logical proposition of assimilation is the deculturing of individuals. In fact, 
according to Gudykunst and Kim, it is absolutely imperative individuals allow 
themselves to be deculturized. In essence, as Kramer (2003) points out, the ultimate 
goal under Gudykunst and Kim’s theory is “a totally deculturized human being” (p. 
6). Gudykunst and Kim (2003) assert cultural adaptation, which they refer to as 
assimilation in their 1997 and 2003 texts, creates the model minority, one that can fit 
88
into society. In practice, an immigrant who understands the surrounding culture and 
abandons their previous culture is mimicking the dominant culture to become as 
similar to the host culture as possible (Buenker & Ratner, 1992; Chun & Choi, 2003; 
Croucher, 2005; Gudykunst and Kim, 2003; Kramer, 2003; Oh, Koeske & Sales, 
2002).
Muslims in France discussed how native members of the French culture have 
mocked them for trying too hard to become and act French. Interviewee R, a 
Moroccan born Muslim male said, “when I learn French people laugh at me. They say 
I try be French [pause] but will not be French [pause] because I Muslim. People make 
fun [pause] laugh at my accent.”
Another participant, Interviewee F described how when she was learning 
French she was laughed at as well. She said:
People laughed at me, and I did not appreciate it. I am a well-educated woman 
from the United Kingdom and many people here in France said I was a dirty 
Muslim who could never be French [pause] why do they think or even say 
that? I want to be real French Muslim woman [pause] not pretend woman.
Interviewee S’s story is a bit different. He described how he was not criticized 
for learning French, but currently experiences difficulties from some native French 
over his love of French television. He said:
I love to watch French television. When I come here I not watch Arabic 
television [pause] only French television [pause] but people laugh at me 
[pause] people at work say I only watch television [pause] I watch the Farm 
[pause] to be French and like them [pause] but I do it because I like it [pause] 
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I love French television. I not like Arabic television now [pause] it not French 
[pause] it not good television.
Essentially deculturalization forces individuals to abandon their self-identity 
and become what Kramer (2000) calls robots, robots mocked for trying to be like the 
dominant culture. Kramer (2000) uses the metaphor of the robot to describe the 
“model minority” posited by Kim, an immigrant who will conform to any order 
without question. This robot lacks independent thought, or dialectical reasoning. Due 
to the irrationality of complete conformity without contestation, a “model minority” 
does not exist, just like a rational and analytical robot does not exist. Thus, 
newcomers are forced to mimic a dominant culture. This process of copying or 
mimicking the dominant culture is not easy, and it can cause personal stress and be 
detrimental to an individual’s self-identity. The detrimental effects to a person’s self-
identity are evidenced in the following interview excerpts. 
Interviewee A described her deculturation as “a difficult time for [pause] a 
time when I did not think I was French or Muslim. French people laugh at me for try 
act French [pause] I ask what am I? French [pause] Muslim [pause] Algerian [pause] 
all [pause] or uh not one.” 
Interviewee Q said she still does not know who she is, even though she has 
lived in France for 30 of her 47-years. She said:
I born in Algeria. I Algerian [pause] but when I try be French [pause] people 
say no [pause] French say you Algerian. But I want be French [pause] I want 
people here like me speak French [pause] and uh wear French clothes [pause] 
and [pause] uh eat French food. Today it hard [pause] like when I come here.
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Interviewee B explained how she does not think people in France will ever 
accept her as truly French. “I speak French and English. I intelligent woman [pause] I 
want to be French [pause] but when I speak French people laugh [pause] when I say I 
French people say I not French. If I not French [pause] what am I?”
Deculturalization leads to a decreased sense of self in many newcomers. 
Kramer (2003) argues Gudykunst and Kim still follow the thinking of Adler (1987) 
and claim:
the experience of stress consequent of encountering cultural difference as a 
“disease,” to be cured by adaptive development (the elimination of difference 
through assimilation). Such a decultured universal person will not only escape 
being maladjusted but “rise above the hidden forces of culture” and 
“overcome cultural parochialism” by “approaching the limit of many cultures 
and ultimately of humanity itself” (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, p. 366). 
By abandoning all previous cultural traits and habits, individuals are forced to 
become part of the dominant culture, and therefore attempting to function better in 
that culture, without the constraint of their previous cultural milieu clouding their 
judgment (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997: 2003). The creation of robots following a new 
culture without question destroys multiculturalism, minimizes individuality and gives 
the dominant culture overwhelming political and cultural power. As stated by Murphy 
and Esposito (2003):
One group has the power to demand that all others abandon their cultures. As 
part of this process, some are compelled to suppress their language and 
heritage and even alter their physical appearance. Those who reject this 
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process of inferiorization are ostracized from society (p. 36-37). 
Unfortunately many Muslim immigrants still try to culturally adapt, even 
though they will lose their culture. Ultimately, these Muslims and other minority 
groups choose to try and adapt, even though they may lose who they are and have no 
sense of self-identification because of hopes of elusive equality and “upward 
mobility” (Murphy & Esposito, 2003, p. 37). 
I contend deculturalization should not be an absolute proposition or ultimate 
goal within cultural adaptation, not only is it impossible, but it is morally unjust. 
Instead, individuals should have the ability to choose whether or not they want to be 
deculturized individuals, quasi-deculturized individuals, or not deculturized at all.  
Allowing individuals to choose whatever level of their previous culture they want to 
retain will enhance cultural adaptation/assimilation theory by making the theory more 
accepting and encompassing. The result of this deculturalization modification will 
assist cultural adaptation/assimilation theory in relating to more individuals and aid in 
the theory’s general acceptance. 
Multiculturalism in assimilation
Aside from deculturizing individuals, a key logical proposition of assimilation 
theory is the absence of multicultural backgrounds being brought into the process of 
cultural adaptation. Multiculturalism itself is a contested term, with various scholars 
and governments disagreeing on a practical definition. I choose to use a definition of 
multiculturalism from political science because cultural adaptation as advocated by 
Gudykunst and Kim (1997; 2003) inherently implies not only a social hierarchy, with 
the dominant culture dictating culture to immigrant groups, but the theory could also 
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serve as a theoretical argument behind governmental policies pertaining to culture, 
and citizenship. Guttmann (1993) defines multiculturalism as “the state of a society or 
the world containing many cultures that interact in some significant way with each 
other” (p. 171). 
The cultural adaptation/assimilation process does not make allowances for 
multicultural upbringings. This fact is evident in the enculturation and deculturation 
stages of cultural adaptation. In the enculturation stage, the development of children 
into a cultural milieu is clearly defined and outlined, but it does not effectively 
address the impact a multicultural upbringing has on children. Specifically, a 
multicultural background adds another variable, or “property of a thing that may be 
present in degree” (Dubin, 1978, p. 44). With the cultural mosaic of many nations in 
constant flux, and with more multicultural families developing, the enculturation 
stage of assimilation should address the socialization process of these children, who 
are enculturated into more than one culture at a time.
Furthermore, the deculturation stage, like enculturation, does not consider the 
variable of multiculturalism. Cultural adaptation assumes individuals will completely 
abandon their cultural norms in both private and public lives, and in turn adopt only 
one culture, the dominant culture. Newcomers must adapt entirely and have only one 
culture because according to Gudykunst and Kim (1997; 2003) individuals are 
incapable of learning one culture while at the same time maintaining another, a zero-
sum argument. Through their reasoning if a person learns one thing, they must 
unlearn another thing, this logic does not take into consideration the cognitive 
complexities of the human brain (Kramer & Ikeda, 2000). 
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Since, individuals are able to be cognitively complex, many will temporarily 
abandon or ignore certain cultural habits in public more than when in private, in an 
effort to fit into the dominant societal order. This practice of occasional/temporary 
public adaptation while maintaining traditional cultural practices is common within 
the Muslim-French community. In particular, many first and second-generation 
Muslim immigrants to France will speak French in public, and Arabic in private, wear 
Western clothes in public, traditional clothes in private, and negotiate familial 
relationships as they think French families do in public, but retain a traditional 
Islamic family hierarchy in private. 
Interviewee AD, a 47-year old Algerian born Muslim woman described how 
while she teaches the younger generation of women in her family to hijab and follow 
other Islamic traditions, she also teaches them they need to speak French in public 
and not Arabic, which is reserved for home use only. She explains this decision in the 
following exchange:
Interviewee AD: “Je suis le but de Koran [pause]  que je connais en France je 
dois parler français quand avec le public. J'enseigne la fille et les nièces don’t 
[pause] elles uh [pause] elles ont besoin pour savoir l'arabe pour la maison 
[pause] mais si français peuplez-près [pause] d'elles uh [pause] bon [pause] 
les le besoin d'uh de parler seulement français.
Croucher: Pourquoi ils doivent parler seulement français l'en public?
Interviewee AD: Les français [pause] ils [pause] ils aiment la langue 
française de mots [pause] et si la fille et les nièces parlent l'uh de la vie 
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[pause] de Français [pause] pas dur [pause] il plus facile [pause] les gens les 
acceptent davantage.
Interviewee AD: “I follow the Koran [pause] but I know in France I need to 
speak French when with the public. I teach daughter and nieces that [pause] 
they uh [pause] they need to know Arabic for home [pause] but when French 
people near [pause] they uh [pause] well [pause] they uh need to speak only 
French.”
Croucher: “Why do they need to only speak French in public?”
Interviewee AD: “French people [pause] they [pause] they like French words 
[pause] French language [pause] and if daughter and nieces speak French 
[pause] life [pause] it uh [pause] not hard [pause] it more easy [pause] people 
accept them more.”
An Algerian male concurred with Interviewee A when he asserted, 
I teach son [pause] Muslim women [pause] Muslim women they speak French 
When [pause] uh [pause] when speak in public. In home they speak Arabic 
[pause] many. No Arabic in public [pause] it show they not want be French 
[pause] no Arabic at home [pause] it uh show they uh not want be good 
Muslim.
Both of these participants exhibit a public and private self, dependent upon 
whether they are in public or not in public. As they attempt to negotiate these two 
identities or roles, they reveal how many Muslims will publicly appear to be 
culturally adapting in order to make life “easier” or to become more “French.” The 
act of acting one way in public and another in private demonstrates how many 
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newcomers are “passing” for members of the dominant culture (Rainwater-McClure, 
Reed & Kramer, 2003). This negotiation demonstrates the cognitive complexities of 
these individuals. While they have learned the French language, they are still able to 
retain their Arabic and to teach successive generations the same practice. Moreover, 
many Muslims in France will also temporarily wear more Western clothing in public 
and in private wear more traditional clothing.
Interviewee B further discussed her mother’s first visit to France. She 
described how she encouraged her mother to not hijab in public because of anti-
French sentiments toward the hijab (the visit took place in 1990, shortly after the first 
major controversy in a public school over the hijab/foulard in 1989). 
Interviewee B: I tell mother it not popular [pause] it not liked to wear hijab in 
public [pause] but wear at home [pause] We wear at home to be good 
Muslims [pause] but in public we [pause] uh choose be good French people. 
Croucher: How did she respond to that advice?
Interviewee B: She not like it [pause] she uh say I not good Muslim [pause] I 
uh must be good Muslim at home and with public people [pause] But I say I 
be both [pause] good Muslim and good French woman.
Croucher: So you do not hijab in public [pause] but do in private?
Interviewee B: Yes [pause] that true [pause] I hijab in home [pause] but in 
public I choose to not [pause] people not look at me with funny eyes [pause] 
life easier.
This participant clearly reveals the desire to retain native cultural habits, and 
the tensions caused by not being able to retain these habits. Many immigrants, as 
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Buenker and Ratner (1992) argue, do not fully abandon their culture. Instead these 
immigrants choose or attempt to adopt a multicultural being, as they “hold onto their 
culture in private, but play the role of the good immigrant in public” (p. 201). Thus, 
the individual becomes multicultural, an unattainable and unvalued status within 
cultural adaptation theory. Requiring individuals to abandon all cultural traits is 
flawed. Cultural adaptation/assimilation theory is a Cartesian dichotomy of either/or, 
either a person abandons who they are, or they must be unhappy or mentally and 
emotionally retarded. More and more individuals around the world are not only from 
bi or multicultural backgrounds, but these individuals are capable of cognitive 
complexity. Therefore, altering cultural adaptation to represent diversity will allow 
individuals to be multicultural when entering the process, remain multicultural or 
cognitively complex during all phases of cultural adaptation, ultimately abandon 
Kim’s theory of assimilation.
Self-Hatred 
Scholars have also argued the cultural adaptation process can foster self-
hatred because a person is told if they cannot or do not want to adapt that something 
is wrong with them and they lack the cognitive and emotional skills to “fit in” 
(Croucher, 2005). As Chun and Choi (2003) argue, the alteration process in which an 
individual adapts to or assimilates into a dominant culture is not easy: “to gain 
acceptance, many persons engage in both physical mutilation and cultural 
evisceration to hide their ethnicity” (p. 78). Persons engage in mutilation or 
evisceration because individuals who looks and acts differently from the norm, is 
deemed an outcast by the dominant culture and by themselves (Chun & Choi, 2003). 
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Many Asian immigrants have surgery to “correct” their eye sockets. Immigrants from 
African nations have been known to have skin augmentation surgery to lighten their 
skin in order to better fit into dominantly Caucasian cultures. Three participants in 
this research project discussed friends and family who have had skin augmentation 
performed to appear more “white.” 
Interviewee G, a 38 year-old Muslim woman born in Tunisia said, “mon ami 
[pause] son mari [pause] il emploie des produits chimiques et des médecins de choses 
[pause] pour faire son noir de peau moins [pause] pour se faire regarder plus comme 
les hommes et les femmes français [pause] pour regarder blanc.” “My friend [pause] 
her husband [pause] he uses things [pause] chemicals and doctors to make his skin 
less black [pause] to make himself look more like French men and women [pause] to 
uh look white.” 
Interviewee AB said:
J'ai beaucoup d'amis [pause] beaucoup d'amis qui uh [pause] qui font 
beaucoup de choses pour sembler blancs. Une femme elle porte le maquillage 
pour sembler blanche [pause] et elle teint ses cheveux pour être blonde. Uh 
[pause] que je pense qu'elle semble ridicule. Elle a des problèmes maintenant 
avec sa peau [pause] qu'il n'est pas bon maintenant. Elle ne semble pas 
tunisienne maintenant [pause]  elle ne semble pas musulmane maintenant
I have many friends [pause] many friends who uh [pause] who do many things 
to look white. One woman she wears makeup to look white [pause] and she 
dyes her hair to be blonde. I uh [pause] I think she looks ridiculous. She has 
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problems now with her skin [pause] it is not good now. She does not look 
Tunisian now [pause] she does not look Muslim now.
Interviewee C, a 29-year old Muslim male from Morocco said:
I know men who want be white. They uh [pause] they want look and be white. 
I know many who wear makeup in public [pause] who dress and see doctors 
to look and be white. It cost a lot of money for them look white.
Other participants discussed how they and others have experienced times in 
which they feel ashamed of their ethnicity, physical appearance, language, and other 
cultural traditions/habits (once again showing how some individuals are unable to 
assimilate). Interviewee D said: “Je souhaite que je ressemble des caucasiens [pause] 
mais je ne suis pas blanche, je suis noire [pause] et je n’aime pas le noire.” “I wish I 
look like Caucasian people [pause] white [pause] but I not white [pause] I black and I 
not like black.” 
Interviewee X said, “Il est plus facile en France si vous êtes blanc et [pause] 
si non musulman. Mais je ne suis pas blanche [pause] je suis musulman et je ne peux 
pas changer ces choses au sujet de moi [pause] qu'elles sont moi maintenant et pour 
toujours.”
“It’s easier in France if you are white and [pause] not Muslim. But I not white [pause] 
I am Muslim and I cannot change these things about me [pause] they are me now and 
forever.” 
Interviewee Y equated being North African with being less than human in 
France. She said, “si vous êtes le Maghreb [pause] si vous n'êtes pas français vous 
n'êtes pas un bon citoyen [pause] que vous n'êtes pas important [pause] je voulez 
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soyez important [pause] mais ne pouvez pas être important ou Français parce qu'il le 
Maghreb.” “If you Maghreb [pause] if you not French you not good citizen [pause] 
you not important [pause] I want be important [pause] but cannot be important or 
French because I Maghreb.” 
All of these individuals clearly express their remorse and frustration for being 
who they are, and not what they think they have to be in life. This remorse and 
frustration is not necessary, and this self-hatred is not healthy (Chun & Choi, 2003; 
Croucher, 2005). Within the logic of assimilation, the more a person assimilates the 
more they will internalize the dominant culture’s beliefs and values including the 
assertion that they are inferior. Therefore, the more “truly” assimilated an individual 
is, the more they will hate themselves. Ultimately, one of the primary goals of 
assimilation is happiness. Yet when individuals hate themselves for not being able to 
successfully assimilating, or are hated by others for trying to mimic the dominant 
culture, happiness is not fostered. Assimilationists would argue the newcomers are 
not trying hard enough to fit in, and that is why they have self-hatred, and not 
satisfaction. However, this is where the fourth criticism of assimilation comes in, the 
theory’s assumption that mankind is accepting of all individuals who want to be part 
of a dominant society. 
Ethnocentrism
Ethnocentrism, or the belief that ones culture is superior to another culture is 
not factored into cultural adaptation theory (Berry & Sam, 1997; Brodwin, 2003; 
Chun & Choi, 2003; Kramer 2000; Murphy & Esposito, 2003; Oh, Koeske & Sales, 
2003; Croucher, 2005). Assimilation assumes if individuals want to become part of a 
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culture, and hence mimic the culture, the dominant culture will accept their advances. 
However, as Kramer (2003) asserts persons trying to mimic the host culture may 
suffer a backlash, “an outsider can actually be rejected as a weirdo for acting and 
talking too much like the locals” (p. 5). 
Interviewee P, a 68 year-old Muslim woman born in Tunisia discussed this 
backlash. She described how many people said she was mocking the French culture 
when she tried to speak the French language, and when she tried to wear “more” 
French clothes. She said:
Les gens rient de moi [pause] qu'ils disent que je ne parle pas français bien 
[pause] je parle inexactement, et je dois m'arrêter. Quand je parle français 
[pause] ils disent que je me feins suis français, et je ne suis pas français et 
quand je feins ils deviens fou à moi. J'ai également des personnes folles à moi 
quand je porte les vêtements français. Ils disent que vous êtes musulman 
[pause] vous êtes noir [pause] pourquoi vous portez nos vêtements? Vous 
essayez soyez français [pause] mais vous n'êtes pas français.
People laugh at me [pause] they say I do not speak French well [pause] I 
speak incorrectly, and I must stop. When I speak French [pause] they say I 
pretend I am French, and I am not French and when I pretend they get mad at 
me. I also have people mad at me when I wear French clothes. They say you 
are Muslim [pause] you are black [pause] why do you wear our clothes? You 
try be French [pause] but you are not French.
Brodwin (2003) adds that some immigrants are called “unworthy,” “dirty,” 
“strange,” and “stupid” while trying to assimilate into dominant cultures. Interviewee 
G said, “Je m'appelle un Arabe sale par des personnes dans des rues. Ils ne m'aiment 
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pas parce que je ne suis pas français [pause] je suis musulman.” “I am called a dirty 
Arab by people in streets. They do not like me because I am not French [pause] I am 
Muslim.” Another participant, Interviewee T said, “Je connais beaucoup de 
musulmans [pause] comme moi qui s'appellent stupides et paresseux parce que nous 
sommes musulmans. Comment allons nous pour avoir l'égalité des droits quand nous 
nous appelons stupides et paresseux.” “I know many Muslims [pause] like me who 
are called stupid and lazy because we are Muslim. How are we to have equal rights 
when we are called stupid and lazy?”
Analyzing the attempts by many African-Americans’ to attain “model 
minority” status and breakthrough ethnocentrism, McIlwain and Johnson (2003) 
asserted:
Despite the growing social interaction between blacks and whites in the job 
market, college classroom, and bedrooms, many African Americans found 
that indeed what they were told they would gain was not completely realized. 
They found that even though the new criteria for attaining model minority 
status promoted by the motto “be like us [whites],” seemed easy to follow; in 
fact, many whites rejected their advances. Furthermore, blacks had to endure 
the resulting rejection not only by whites but also from members of their own 
in-group (p. 119).
 Ultimately, as much as many do not want to admit it, ethnocentrism is a 
pervasive problem in American and in other societies, such as France. Even after 
having skin augmentation surgery, and taking other steps to alter one’s physical 
appearance, some immigrants will never be accepted by the dominant culture, 
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because their skin is a different color, or their body looks different (Horowitz, 1992; 
Noiriel, 1992). 
Not only do many newcomers experience ethnocentrism while trying to 
culturally adapt, but many also feel the brunt of racism from their own in-group while 
trying to assimilate (Hing, 1997). The following two Muslim immigrants to France 
discuss the racism they have suffered at the hand of other Muslims. Interviewee V 
said, “Les personnes de musulmans [pause] rient de moi parce que je parle français 
que j'ai les amis français. J'ai les amis français [pause] que je parle français pour 
être français, mais je ne pas m'oublier suis également musulman.” “Muslim [pause] 
people laugh at me because I speak French I have French friends. I have French 
friends [pause] I speak French to be French, but I not forget I am also Muslim.” 
Another participant, Interviewee Z said:
Je sais beaucoup de musulmans qui disent ils me pensent ne suis pas 
musulman parce que je pas hijab [pause] qu'ils disent que je ne suis 
également pas un musulman parce que je parle français et anglais. Les gens 
disent que je travaille trop dur pour être français et j'oublie l'Islam, mais moi 
n'oublie pas l'Islam.
I know many Muslims who say they think I am not Muslim because I do not 
Hijab [pause] they say I am also not a Muslim because I speak French and 
English. People say I work too hard to be French and I forget Islam, but I do 
not forget Islam. 
These two individuals, and others interviewed for this project such as 
Interviewees A, C, F, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z, AB, AD and AF all feel as if they 
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have been mocked by the dominant culture for trying to become more French, while 
at the same time they have also experienced racism and taunting from other Muslim 
for trying to fit into the French culture, an “Oreo-effect” (Kramer, 2003) Clearly, their 
experiences demonstrate how the cultural adaptation process does not take 
ethnocentrism into consideration.  
After examining the detrimental effects of the cultural adaptation process on 
Muslim immigrants and residents of France, it is evident that total assimilation cannot 
and should not be an ultimate goal of cultural adaptation. While some level of cultural 
adaptation is necessary to function within a society, total assimilation is impossible 
and extremely detrimental to those who attempt it. Negative and violent community 
reactions to government sponsored forced cultural adaptation policies in numerous 
countries such as France, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Spain and Israel. 
Typically when a government, like the French government takes it upon itself 
to impose religious, linguistic and other cultural adaptation policies on a minority 
group, Rex (2000) argues the result will fall into one of four categories. First, some 
policies will result in the exclusion of immigrants in ghettos, or ethnic enclaves (e.g. 
Poland under Nazi control). Second, immigrant groups could be seen as a threat to 
societal order unless entirely assimilated (e.g. Russian peasants under Stalin). Third, 
society could be divided into two groups, those who are full citizens, and those who 
are denizens without political rights (e.g. Hmong in Southeast Asia). Fourth, as in the 
case of the United States before the Civil Rights Act was approved, multicultural 
policies could be regarded as a political process “which minorises minority groups 
and marks them for inferior treatment or for special forms of manipulation and 
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control” (p. 69). Immigrant populations do not normally support such government 
policies. 
Ultimately, the case study of French-Muslims and Muslim immigrants reveals 
all four of Rex’s categories. Due to economic reasons and discrimination Muslims 
have been in many cases delegated to ghettos. The right-wing political parties 
regularly paint the Muslim population as the root of social problems in France and 
calls for their full assimilation or removal in order to alleviate potential threats. Many 
Muslims are denied full rights as citizens, such as religious expression in public 
schools and in workplaces. Last, current policies such as Law 2004-228 inherently 
single out Muslims and to a lesser degree Jewish males (since many wear a 
yarmulkas) as needing to quit proselytizing in public schools and at work, even 
though this is not the reason these two groups wear any religious symbols to school or 
work. The ultimate effect of failed French-Muslim cultural adaptation is more than 
just self-hatred, and a poor standard of living. Those who are unable to successfully 
and completely adapt, the overwhelming majority, also experience confusion over 
their identity. However, when their sense of self is challenged, as was the case in the 
November 2005 riots, their identity becomes salient enough to lead many to riot in 
the streets of France. The following chapter examines identity further, by offering 
theoretical definitions of identity, identity formation and identity maintenance. Then, 
the chapter utilizes transcripts from interviews with Muslims in France to 
demonstrate the potential effects of cultural adaptation on identity. 
105
CHAPTER 5
Identity Negotiation and Maintenance
The following chapter defines identity, and applies the concept of identity 
negotiation to Muslims living in France. Specifically, this chapter details how the veil 
or hijab is intertwined with Muslim identity. The first section offers definitions of 
identity, and defines identity negotiation theory as posited by Ting-Toomey (1993). 
The second section applies the tenets of Ting-Toomey’s theory to transcripts from 
interviews conducted for this analysis. The final section of this chapter argues identity 
negotiation theory, and other communicative theories of identity maintenance or 
negotiation, are inadequate representations of identity or how an individual negotiates 
or attempts to control their identity as such theories do not recognize the importance 
of cultural variability; furthermore such theories do not recognize negotiation that 
takes place before interpersonal or intercultural communication. The last section 
incorporates Heidegger’s concept of dasein, as well as phenomenological 
consciousness to reveal the importance of the “pre-negotiated self” in understanding 
an individual’s attempts at controlling, not negotiating their identity. 
Identity
Identity, or an individual’s self concept is built on cultural, social and personal 
identities (Lustig & Koester, 2003). Hall (1992) asserts there are three approaches to 
the study of identity. The first approach coming from the Enlightenment period sees 
identity as a relatively fixed, and static sense of self. This sense of self is immune to 
outside influence. The second approach places emphasis on the social construction of 
reality or symbolic interactionsim. The third most recent approach views identity as 
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an open and constantly changing form of self. A fourth approach that needs to be 
added to this list comes from the Hermeneutic and Phenomenological schools of 
thought, that identity is a form of consciousness. A person is not always aware of 
his/her identity. It is not until his/her identity is challenged, that he/she becomes 
conscious of this unconscious perspective. This fourth school of thought will be 
detailed further in the end of this chapter. 
It is from the third approach that Ting-Toomey developed her identity 
negotiation theory. Ting-Toomey (1993) states identity is “the mosaic sense of self-
identification that incorporates the interplay of human, cultural, social and personal 
images as consciously or unconsciously experiences and enacted by the individual” 
(p. 74). Within this definition of identity, Ting-Toomey differentiates between 
human, cultural, social and personal images or identities. Cultural identity is an 
individual’s sense of belonging to a particular ethnic group or culture. Personal 
identity is a conglomeration of the personal differences that make each member of a 
culture unique (Triandis, 1989). 
Carbaugh (1996) explains that cultural identity stems from three different, and 
often complimentary idioms: biological identity, psychological identity, and cultural 
identity. Biological identity is best equated with a “blood quantum,” such as with 
Native American tribes, where an individual must have blood that contains a certain 
amount of Native American blood in order to be “part of the tribe” (Carbaugh, 1996). 
Psychological identity refers to an individual’s personal psychological traits. 
Carbaugh uses the example of someone being a bit neurotic, depressed or obsessive, 
and identifying himself/herself with film director Woody Allen. The third idiom for 
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Carbaugh is cultural/social identity. This idiom is where individuals identify 
themselves with a group based on shared habits, norms, rules or customs. All three of 
these idioms often overlap and can in some cases contradict one another on first 
analysis. However, the key to these three idioms is that each human being has a 
unique self-identification. 
A personal difference, the idea that each human is unique in his/her own way, 
yet also similar in many other ways, is similar to Heidegger’s concept of dasein. 
Heidegger (1969) defines dasein as being there, human being, or being human. The 
key word in all three of these definitions is “being.” He often spoke of the “dasein of 
man” or the being of man. This being (dasein) encompasses our tangible body, and 
our more abstract sense of self, the sense of self that can only be understood by the 
individual. This existence places us in our own minds and in turn aids in our 
placement of ourselves into the social world and in our development of a social 
identity. Overall, the place or time when being shows itself is Heidegger’s dasein. 
Social identity involves different connections individuals have to particular 
social groups within their culture. Ting-Toomey (1993) argues the negotiation of 
social identity is integral to effective intercultural communication competence. She 
states there are eight assumptions that make up her identity negotiation theory, or the 
effective negotiation “between two interactants in a novel communication episode” 
(p. 73). Gudykunst and Kim (2003) identify Ting-Toomey’s eight assumptions as: 
(1) everyone has multiple images concerning a sense of self; (2) cultural 
variability influences the sense of self; (3) self identification involves security 
and vulnerability; (4) identity boundary regulation motivates behavior; (5) 
108
identity boundary regulation involves a tension between inclusion and 
differentiation; (6) individuals try to balance self, other, and group 
memberships; (7) managing the inclusion-differentiation dialectic influences 
the coherent sense of self; and (8) a coherent sense of self influences 
individuals’ communication resourcefulness. (p. 121)
Ting-Toomey (1993) asserts these eight assumptions are all integral parts of 
the identity negotiation process. The first assumption is that humans carry multiple 
images of themselves, some of these images are articulated, and others are not (Ting-
Toomey, 1993). Articulated images of self are aspects of ourselves that we emphasize 
when our sense of self is challenged, or when we want to assert ourselves as a 
distinctly identifiable person. On the other side of the self-image continuum are 
unarticulated images, unconscious images or ways of living our daily lives and 
maintaining our self-identification. Unarticulated images generally are enculturated 
into young children during their socialization into their native cultural milieu. 
Turner (1987) states the process in which individuals maintain and frame their 
self-identification is shaped through communication, re-creating, affirming and 
enhancing our self-identification with others. Turner (1987) adds individuals can and 
often do have multiple selves, because of competing role demands, and societal 
norms. For example, an individualistic woman might have a different self when at 
home, as opposed to when she goes to a job with primarily collectivistic individuals. 
This dichotomy between collectivism and individualism makes up an integral part of 
the second assumption of the identity negotiation process, that cultural variability 
influences self-identification.
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As Geertz (1973) argues, whether discussing self-identification, or our 
particular worldview, the logic and meaning we attach to these processes are 
culturally bound. Essentially, culture serves as one of the, if not the most important 
influencer of how we evaluate our sense of self, and how we analytically differentiate 
between our private and public selves. One dimension of culture that has received a 
great deal of attention in intercultural communication research is the individualism 
and collectivism continuum. Numerous studies have discussed the cultural differences 
between a collectivistic and an individualistic culture, the following is a collection of 
only a few references (Goffman, 1963; Hall, 1980; Hofstede, 1980, Gallois, Giles, 
Jones, Cargile & Ota, 1995; Chang & Holt, 1997; Gudykunst & Kim, 1997; 
Gudykunst, 2004).
Individualism is the tendency of individuals to emphasize individual 
identities, rights and needs over group identities, rights or needs (Triandis, 1990). 
Hofstede (1991) conducted research on numerous nations around the world and 
identified the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the 
Netherlands cultures as ranking high on the individualistic side of the continuum. In 
an individualistic culture an autonomous self is emphasized by individuals (Ting-
Toomey, 1993). It is this autonomous self that governs how individuals think, feel 
and act in an individualistic culture. The independent self-construal of individuals in 
an individualistic culture leads to individuals seeing themselves as agents of their own 
actions (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
Collectivism on the other hand is the tendency of individuals to emphasize 
group identities, rights and needs over individual identities, rights and needs. In a 
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collectivistic culture what is best for the ingroup, or the group that shares the same 
values and beliefs as the individual, is best for the individual. Hofstede (1991) and 
Hall (1989) identified Columbia, Panama, Ecuador, China, Venezuela and Japan as 
collectivistic cultures.  Members of a collectivistic culture make decisions based on 
their connection within a group. Thus their identity is interconnected with their 
normally prescribed societal, familial or cultural role or status. This 
interconnectedness (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) is also known as an interdependent 
self-construal, where the self is dependent upon the norms and explicit and implicit 
expectations placed on an individual by his/her group. 
The third assumption postulated by Ting-Toomey (1993) is that “our self-
identifications involve both structure and process, and that while the structure of our 
self-identifications reinforces our sense of existential security, the change process of 
our self-identifications promotes existential vulnerability” (p. 81). Essentially, our 
sense of self-identification is intrinsically linked to our feelings of security and 
vulnerability. If individuals are secure in their sense of self, then their identification is 
stable; if they are insecure, their identification can become threatened and cause 
distress or even depression.
The fourth and fifth assumptions of identity negotiation pertain to how 
individuals are motivated to communicate in order to reinforce their identity 
securities or to reinforce identities through boundary regulation (Ting-Toomey, 
1993). These boundary regulations lead to the needs for inclusion or differentiation. 
The placement of boundaries around identities creates a zone of comfort or separation 
between the individual and in and outgroup members. In a collectivistic culture 
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boundary regulations are associated with loyalty and mutual face protection for the 
ingroup.
The sixth assumption states effective identity negotiation depends on how 
successfully an individual can negotiate the dichotomy between inclusion and 
differentiation, and between self and other. This balancing act, according to Ting-
Toomey (1993), represents how individuals must constantly negotiate their 
motivation for inclusion into or differentiation from the dominant culture. This 
negotiation is a difficult act, since inclusion and differentiation are not distinctly 
different processes in many cultures. In fact, in many cultures there is no difference at 
all between inclusion and differentiation (Gadamer, 2003). In regard to differentiation 
and inclusion Gadamer (2003) added:
[l]ife is defined by the fact that what is alive differentiates itself from the 
world in which it lives and with which it remains connected, and preserves 
itself in this differentiation. What is alive preserves itself by drawing into 
itself everything that is outside it. Everything that is alive nourishes itself on 
what is alien to it. The fundamental fact of being alive is assimilation. 
Differentiation, then, is at the same time non-differentiation. The alien is 
appropriated. (pp. 252)
The need for inclusion is similar in rational to Tajfel’s social identity theory 
and Brewer’s optimal distinctiveness theory. 
Tajfel (1978) defined social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-
concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or 
groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to the 
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membership” (p. 63).  Essentially, when an individual is part of a social network, 
whether in an individualistic or collectivistic culture, he/she will have a social identity 
that will reinforce his/her personal identity and increase his/her sense of inclusion in 
the surrounding culture. These groups become salient to an individual, and lead to a 
more positive self-identity for the individual. 
Similarly, Brewer (1991) argues social identity comes from the tension 
between human needs for validation and similarity. He states:
The idea that individuals need a certain level of both similarity to and 
differentiation from others is not novel. In general, these models assume that 
individuals meet these needs by maintaining some intermediate degree of 
similarity between the self and relevant others. Social identity can be viewed 
as a compromise between assimilation and differentiation from others, where 
the need for deindividuation is satisfied within in-groups, while the need for 
distinctiveness is met through intergroup comparisons…Instead of bipolar 
continuum of similarity-dissimilarity, needs for assimilation and 
differentiation are represented as opposing forces. (p. 477)
A balance between an individual’s need for differentiation and his/her need 
for inclusion is vital to successful social identity formation and negotiation. This 
balance is regulated by whether the individual is part of an individualistic or 
collectivistic culture, or has an independent or interdependent self-construal. 
Individualistic cultures emphasize the distinct differences between differentiation and 
inclusion, while collectivistic cultures focus more on how these two sides of this 
dichotomy can be complementary. For an independent self-construal, the balance 
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between inclusion and differentiation is one where an individual feels belonging to a 
group and independence from the group as well. An interdependent self-construal 
balance depends on feelings of group security and harmony (Ting-Toomey, 1993). 
Overall, the needs for inclusion and differentiation both serve important roles in 
maintaining an individual’s sense of coherence and self-worth. 
The seventh and eighth assumptions of identity negotiation theory assert an 
individual’s balancing of the inclusion differentiation dichotomy affects his/her sense 
of coherence and self-esteem. Thus, this balancing impacts one’s cognitive, affective, 
and behavioral resourcefulness. Coherence, according to Ting-Toomey (1993) and 
Antonovsky (1987), has three components: comprehensibility, manageability, and 
meaningfulness. Comprehensibility is the extent to which an individual sees his/her 
self-identification as making cognitive sense. Manageability is the feeling that 
sufficient resources are available for the individual to adequately maintain his/her 
self-identification. Meaningfulness, which Antonovsky states is the most important 
component, is the extent to which life and a person’s self-identification makes 
emotional sense. While there are going to be rough times in life, these times are still 
worth engaging in because a person’s sense of self is emotionally important and 
relevant.  
Self-esteem, according to Ting-Toomey (1993), is a cultural creation. As 
children we are all enculturated into what makes a “good” or a “bad” child. This 
enculturation develops in children the sense of self-esteem because we do not 
typically want to be the “bad” child. Furthermore, children are taught at a young age 
that they are important, that they are special and worthy of life. Thus, children, and all 
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individuals for that matter need self-esteem in order to understand and appreciate 
their place in society. Gadamer and Hegel would argue self-esteem is a form of 
consciousness that all individuals innately have, and because it is innate, they are not 
always conscious of its existence. Not only are individuals not always conscious of 
their self-esteem, but also self-esteem as studied in cross-cultural comparisons has 
been found to have different meanings dependent upon the culture(s). Self-esteem 
might be more of a folk belief, and less of a universal cultural norm (Sandel 
citations).
Ting-Toomey (1993) adds that a person’s sense of global self-esteem consists 
of personal and collective self-esteem. Personal self-esteem refers to our ability and 
habit of experiencing positive and negative emotions. Collective self-esteem relates 
more specifically to identity or identities that are tied into social membership in 
different social groups. 
The more effectively someone can negotiate the security and vulnerability 
dichotomy, as well as the inclusion-differentiation dichotomy, the more likely they 
are to have a heightened sense of self-worth. This heightened sense of self-worth will 
strengthen his/her identity and create a more positive sense of self. 
Along with the eight assumptions, Ting-Toomey outlines 20 propositions, all 
of which assist in explaining the identity negotiation process. These assumptions can 
be grouped into three main categories (a) those pertaining to self-identification, (b) 
those dealing with the security/vulnerability or inclusion-differentiation dichotomies, 
and (c) those examining resourcefulness of communication, affect, or behavior.
Four of the propositions (1, 2, 8, 9) pertain to self-identification. 
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Proposition 1:  “The more secure we are in self-identification, the more open 
we are to stranger interactions.” 
Proposition 2: “The more vulnerable we are in self-identification, the more 
anxiety we experience in stranger interactions.” 
Proposition 9: “The more secure we are in self-identification, the higher our 
global self-esteem.” 
All three of these propositions propose our security or vulnerability of self-
identification affects how we interact with others and view our selves. 
Five of the propositions (3, 4, 5, 6, 7) relate to two identification dichotomies, 
inclusion-differentiation and security-vulnerability. 
Proposition 3: “The higher our security need, the more vulnerable we feel in 
encountering strangers.” 
Proposition 4: “The higher our inclusion need, the more value we place on 
relational/ingroup membership boundaries.” 
Proposition 5: “The higher our differentiation need, the more distance we 
place between self and other, and/or ingroup and outgroup relationships. 
Proposition 6: “The more effective we are in managing the security-
vulnerability dialectic, the more resourceful we are in identity negotiation 
with others.” 
Proposition 7: “The more effective we are in managing the inclusion-
differentiation need, the more resourceful we are in identity negotiation with 
others.” 
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Collectively these propositions assert the more secure we are with our self, the 
more likely we are to feel self-assured, and more successful at negotiating our 
identities.
The remaining eleven propositions (10-20) all pertain to our communicative, 
affective, cognitive and behavioral resourcefulness.
Proposition 10: “The higher our personal self-esteem, the more resourceful we 
are in approaching strangers.”
Proposition 11: “The higher our membership esteem, the more resourceful we 
are in approaching strangers.”
Proposition 12: “The more motivated we are in approaching strangers, the 
more likely we seek out communication resources to deal with strangers.”
Proposition 13: “The greater our cognitive resourcefulness, the more effective 
we are in identity negotiation.”
Proposition 14: “The greater our affective resourcefulness, the more effective 
we are in identity negotiation.”
Proposition 15: “The greater our behavioral resourcefulness, the more 
effective we are in identity negotiation.”
Proposition 16: “The more diverse our communication resources, the more 
effective in interactive identity confirmation.”
Proposition 17: “The more diverse our communication resources, the more 
effective in identity coordination.”
Proposition 18: “The more diverse our communication resources, the more 
effective in interactive identity attunement.”
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Proposition 19: The more diverse our communication resources, the more 
flexible we are in co-creating interactive goals and relational contexts.”
Proposition 20: “The more diverse our communication resources, the more 
effective we are in developing mutual identity meanings and 
comprehensibility.”
Each of these abovementioned propositions will serve as a lens for analyzing 
interview transcripts that detail active and passive identity negotiation among 
Muslims in France. 
Ultimately identity negotiation theory asserts “the more secure individuals’ 
self-identifications are, the more they are open to interacting with members of other 
cultures” (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 121). Not only are individuals more apt to 
interact with members from other cultures, but also successful identity negotiation 
establishes and preserves ethnicity. While identity negotiation theory does include 
this argument, it does not take into consideration patriotism during a war for example. 
When a nation is at war, such as the US and the war on terror, ethnocentrism can be a 
very visible and pervasive byproduct of “secure individuals” not wanting to interact 
with members of other cultures. 
Ethnicity comes from the Greek ethnikos and the Latin ethnos, meaning a 
nation or race (Petersen, Novak & Gleason, 1980). There are many different ways to 
define ethnic and ethnicity, and each definition has some similar and unique elements. 
The following definitions are only a sampling of the many ways to define ethnicity. 
Ethnicity can be based on race, religion or national origin (Gorden, 1964). Ethnicity 
can be viewed as “those individuals who identity themselves as belonging to the same 
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ethnic category” (Giles & Johnson, 1981, p. 202). Gadamer (2003) states identity, or 
a sense of place in the world, which can be deemed ethnicity, understanding oneself 
in history. Blumer (1986) sees memories of a shared past and/or collective memory as 
the key elements of a person’s ethnicity. Ratcliffe (2004) states ethnicity can be 
regarded as either primordial (based on recognized facts of history) or as situational 
(dependent upon context). Petersen, Novak & Gleason (1980) assert ethnicity is a 
multifaceted concept that includes an individual’s race, language and region, all of 
which are integral to the formation and maintenance of an ethnic identity within an 
ethnic group. 
Yinger (1994) outlines three ingredients to defining ethnic groups:
(1) the group is perceived by others in the society to be different in some 
combination of the following traits: language, religions, race, or ancestral 
homeland with its related culture; (2) the members also perceive themselves to 
be different; and (3) they participate in shared activities built around their (real 
or mythical) common origin and culture. (p. 3-4). 
The difficulty in defining ethnicity with one succinct definition (this 
researcher does not think such a definition exists or should be postulated due to 
interpretation and context) also makes it difficult to succinctly define an ethnic group. 
While Yinger has three ingredients to an ethnic group, Fenton (1999) adds five 
categories that define an ethnic group: (1) urban minorities, (2) proto-nations or 
ethno-national groups, (3) ethnic groups in plural societies, (4) indigenous minorities, 
and (5) post-slavery minorities. Even these categories as argued by Ratcliffe (2004) 
oversimplify and stick individuals into only one category. Ultimately, for the 
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purposes of this research project, an ethnic group will be defined following the 
definitions set forth by Ratcliffe (2004) and Petersen, Novak and Gleason (1980), as a 
group of individuals who consider themselves to be part of the same group based on 
their feelings of unity based on their race, language and region. 
The importance of an individual’s identification with one, or multiple ethnic 
groups cannot be underestimated. Not only does ethnicity affect how people view 
themselves in regard to the surrounding culture (Gudykunst, 2001), it is also closely 
related to ethnolinguistic vitality (Van den Berg, 1992), media portrayal of 
international affairs (Rivenburgh, 2000), political acceptance of immigrants 
(Hargreaves, 1995) and immigrant acculturation (Gudykunst, 2001; Gudykunst & 
Kim, 2003; Kramer, 2003; Lustig & Koester, 2003; Padilla & Perez, 2003).  
However, while ethnic identity and relation to a specific ethnic group is important to 
many individuals, Tuan (1998) states ethnic identity does not always equal the 
maintenance of ethnic traditions. Many newcomers to a culture will maintain a level 
of ethnicity from their original culture, while still adopting ethnic traditions and 
practices from the new surrounding culture (Levine, 2004). 
French-Muslims identity negotiation and formation
I decided to use Ting-Toomey’s (1993) identity negotiation theory as a model 
for analyzing the identity negotiation and formation of Muslim immigrants in France. 
To facilitate this analysis, I used the six assumptions of identity negotiation theory, as 
posited by Ting-Toomey (1993).. 
The first assumption of Ting-Toomey’s identity negotiation theory is that all 
individuals carry different images of themselves, which can be articulated or 
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unarticulated (1993). Unarticulated images are ones that are unconscious to the 
individual, while articulated images are ones that come to our attention when called 
into question by others or by a communication event. This is when an individual 
forms their initial sense(s) of self-identification.
To explore the issue of articulated or unarticulated self-identification I asked 
the French-Muslim participants questions about their identification. I wanted to 
ascertain their sense of self-identification (if they had one), if that identity was 
expressed through the hijab (for women and men), if their identity had changed in the 
wake of recent anti-Muslim rhetoric, how they negotiated their identities in private 
and public, did they perceive a French identity as different from their own? To 
address these issues I started off a sequence of questions about identity with the same 
question in the majority of my interviews: “Do you have an identity or ethnicity and 
what is it?” I included both identity and ethnicity in this question because in the 
French culture and language the term identity does not have the exact same 
connotation as in the American culture and English language. The French language 
has the term ethnie to denote individuals bound by racial, cultural, and sentimental 
ties, a synonym for identity or self-identification.  
The following interview excerpts are the results of that initial question about 
ethnie. Each excerpt reveals how the concept of ethnie was first not very clear to 
many of the participants, since identity is generally unconscious (unarticulated) to 
most French people, since all people in France are “French,” and not a hyphenated 
identity. France does not keep official statistics of ethnic identification. In fact, the 
French census does not include a question about ethnicity, since all French people are 
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considered French under the guises of the law (Roy, 2005). Knowing this fact, further 
questioning was necessary to ascertain the participants’ sense of ethnie. After further 
questioning the participant stated their ethnie or identity was linked to where the 
individual was born, whether that person was born in France or not in France. 
Interviewee A said, “I not understand the question. What you mean? I born in Algeria 
[pause] I Algerian, that easy.” Interviewee AA said, “I not know [pause] I born in 
Paris, well I [think] I French.” Interviewee G said, “Je pense que je comprendre 
[pause] Je suis née en Tunis [pause] je suis Tunisienne” “I think I understand [pause] 
I was born in Tunis [pause] I am Tunisian.”
Each participant except Interviewee H did not immediately answer the 
question, since the other participants having grown up in either France or a North-
African nation have never been introduced to the concept of a conscious self-
identification. Unlike other participants, Interviewee H, who was born in Britain, said 
her identity was not linked to where she was born. Interviewee H said, “I am British, 
and I am Muslim. I am a British-Muslim woman.”  When the participants were 
further asked if their ethnie was at all linked to Islam or France (if they were not born 
in France), many participants elaborated on whom they think they are, and with 
which social, cultural or ethnic groups they see themselves relating to in France, their 
articulated self-identification.
Interviewee A said, “yes I born in Algeria [pause] but I also French woman. I 
also Muslim.” Interviewee AL, a 24-year-old male born in Tunisia said, “I many 
ethnie. I Muslim man born in Tunisia, and I now French citizen who work and uh 
[pause] live in France.” Interviewee AF said, “I born in Algeria [pause] I Algeria, and 
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I French [pause] and I Muslim. I many.” Interviewee S, a Libyan born male 
concurred and said, “I am France, and I am Libya [pause] and I am Islam. I many 
people in one.” Every single participant identified themselves with their nation of 
birth, where they live currently (they all live in France) and as Muslim. Thus their 
identification is multi-dimensional, deriving from their birthplace, current citizenship 
nation and their religion. 
The second assumption of Ting-Toomey’s (1993) identity negotiation theory 
is that cultural variability impacts the locus of self-identification. One of the key 
cultural variables as argued by Ting-Toomey is the individualism-collectivism 
continuum. Individualistic cultures typically encourage individual identity over group 
identity, while collectivistic cultures normally emphasize a “we” identity over an “I” 
identity (Hall, 1989; Gudykunst & Kim, 1997; 2003). 
France, unlike most Western nations generally follows a collectivistic mindset 
(Jandt, 2000; Croucher, 2005). Hofstede (1991) placed France in the middle of the 
individualism and collectivism continuum. The emphasis on “Frenchness,” the 
emphasis on all citizens following and upholding a French ideal and the staunch 
governmental disregard for ethnic differences reveals a tendency toward collectivism, 
as opposed to nations like the US and England that emphasize and encourage ethnic 
and cultural differences. France is an aggregate of individuals. Moreover, the Muslim 
faith, lends itself toward a more collectivistic mindset (Roy, 2005) because it 
encourages the importance of community and family more than the individual and 
personal achievement (Aslan, 2006). This difference between the French ideal and the 
Muslim community it the essence of racial conflicts between Muslim and non-
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Muslims in France. The Muslim community emphasizes family and community more 
than non-Muslim French. This emphasis also places great importance on the concepts 
of obligation and honor to family, concepts, which are more a part of the Muslim 
moral than non-Muslim.
In numerous interviews participants suggested their self-identification as 
linked to the identification of their family and community. For many of the Muslims 
in fact, they identified their family and community as France. Interviewee AL, from 
Tunisia said, “I [pause] and family, we French. We live in France [pause] and we uh 
speak French, so we uh [pause] we uh French who go to mosque and be Muslim.”  
Interviewee F, an Algerian woman described her sense of self as being given to her 
by her family and by the state. She said:
Je suis musulman [pause] mais [pause] mon père et ma mere [pause] nous 
sommes neés en Algérie et maintenant nous habitons à Paris. Nous sommes 
françaises mon père et la gouvernement ont dit parce que nous payons des 
impôts Donc [pause] nous sommes française.
I am Muslim [pause] but [pause] my father and mother [pause] we were born 
in Algeria and now we live in Paris. We are French my father and the 
government said because we pay taxes. So [pause] we are French.
Another participant, Interviewee AN a Moroccan born male further elaborated 
on how his family, like so many other Muslim immigrant families are French because 
they live and work in France. A key word in his discussion of his identity is the term 
“we.” In four sentences he used the word “we” to refer to his family and community 
six times. He said
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My family, we uh [pause] all come to France together. We uh [pause] live 
together, we all French together. Friend families like me, work and uh live in 
France. We work in France, so [pause] we work and buy things, we French.
Other participants further emphasized this “we” mentality, when answering a 
question about their personal ethnie, not the ethnie of their family.  Interviewee C 
said, “we live in Paris, family and me. We French family.” Interviewee T said, “nous 
sommes Français, ma famille et moi” “we are French, my family and me.” 
Interviewee M said, “nous avons une famille, et [pause] nous sommes Françaises 
maintenant parce que nous habitons en France” “we have a family, and we are 
French now because we live in France.” The “we” mentality of these Muslim 
immigrants to France reveals their connected selves. According to Ting-Toomey 
(1993) in a collectivistic culture an individual’s identity is linked to moral standards 
and norms of their social group, which is often their family. Collectivists see the 
nation as a great family (Japan and China); while France generally sees the state as 
the other (Croucher, 2005). 
Furthermore, collectivistic cultures generally reveal more of an interdependent 
self-construal than an independent self-construal. Markus and Kitayama (1991) state 
an interdependent self-construal includes: 
attentiveness and responsiveness to others that one either explicitly or 
implicitly assumes will be reciprocated by these others, as well as the willful 
management of one’s other-focused feelings and desires so as to maintain and 
further the reciprocal interpersonal relationship. One is conscious of where 
one belongs with respect to others and assumes a receptive stance toward 
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these others, continually adjusting and accommodating to these others in 
many aspects of behavior. (p. 246)
Therefore, our self-construal, particularly an interdependent construal of self 
affects how we process our self-view and how we interpret the self-presentations of 
those around us. In a Muslim community, like those in France, participants described 
how their self-identities are not only linked to their community (“we”) but also how 
they are conscious of where they belong in the community and how they adjust to 
please the community. Interviewee B, a Muslim woman who was born in France of 
Algerian parents said: 
I learn as child who I am. I uh [pause] learn from mother and from father that 
I live in France and I am French. I French today and do things to look French 
to family and community [pause] because that what community want of me. I 
change if community change, that life I think.
From a different perspective, that being a non-native born French citizen, 
Interviewee Q described how she taught her children to be like their community and 
family, which both continually strive to be French. She said:
I teach my children [pause] I teach my children they are French children. They 
do things to be like other Muslim children that live today in France. That 
important, it [pause] important that they be in community and look and be 
French. That [pause] who they be.
Overall, the collectivistic nature of the Muslim-French community greatly 
impacts their sense of self-identification. This group/community is more apt to refer 
to themselves within an ingroup by using “we” instead of “I.” The usage of “we” 
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reveals the interconnectedness of this community and the interdependent construals of 
self. Moreover, the more connected an individual is to their group/community, the 
more likely that person is to feel secure in their sense of self-identification. This sense 
of security is integral to Ting -Toomey’s third assumption. 
The third assumption of Ting-Toomey’s identity negotiation theory is that 
humans need security in their sense of self-identification. Furthermore, individuals 
regularly experience vulnerability in their sense of self-identification, especially when 
their self-identification security or sense of completeness is challenged. Too much 
security in self-identification can bring boredom, while not enough security can create 
depression and self-questioning. Individuals learn how to balance feelings of identity 
security and vulnerability from family and peer/support groups. Typically, at least as 
found within the Muslim-French community, Muslims did not learn they have a 
specific cultural, ethnic, social or personal identity that they should be proud of and 
that this identity should be differentiated from other social groups. This identity is 
found more on a subconscious level. Thus, many participants voiced concern and 
depression over not knowing how to negotiate the security/vulnerability dichotomy 
set forth by Ting-Toomey (1993). In fact, when French-Muslims were asked if they 
learned to defend or alter their identity based on threats or a sense of security, many 
said they had never been taught, by their family or peer/social group, how to manage 
such a task. 
In the following interaction, Interviewee AH and I discussed her ethnie and if 
she knew how to alter it or protect it from questioning or challenges. When asked if 
her family taught her about her ethnie she said, “we not talk about ethnie or who we 
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are when I child. We uh [pause] not talk of what we are.” I then asked her if she could 
be something other than French. She replied, “we French now and if I not said be 
French by people [pause] I not know what I be.” I then asked if she had ever been 
told she was not French, and she described one incident and how she reacted to it. She 
stated:
man at work say I dirty Muslim [pause] not French. I not say a thing to him 
after he speaked [pause] I not know why. I not understand what he say. I not 
know what to do. How I not be French woman? I uh [pause] I live in France. 
Yes [pause] I born in Algeria, but [pause] I French now, family [pause] we 
French now we live in France [pause] that correct I think?
From this interview it is clear that this woman did not have the cognitive or 
emotional resourcefulness to respond to this attack against her identity. She did not 
say anything in response to his statements and instead was confused by his assertion. 
In the end of the statement she even questioned her identity by saying “that correct I 
think?” Clearly, she had not been taught the skills to respond to identity vulnerability, 
and she is not alone.   
Interviewee B, who was born in France to Tunisian parents discussed how a 
few months before our interview in the summer of 2005 she was told in a store by a 
friend that she was more Tunisian than French. She said: 
I shop and on phone I say to friend I and [pause] other French people think 
same about issue in newspaper. French Catholic friend in front me [pause] she 
said where you born? I [pause] say France. She said [pause] where were your 
parents born? [pause] I say Tunis. She said you Tunisian not French, you only 
128
French citizen, but I more French than you are, that what people think she 
said. I not understand why she say that to me. I always think I French. After 
we talk at store, I uh [pause] think maybe I not French [pause] maybe I 
Tunisian. But I born in France. I not understand that, it hard today to 
understand that.
Interviewee AA expressed a similar story. His girlfriend’s father told him that 
he was Libyan, and not a “real” French person. He said:
her father [pause] he say to me I Libyan because my mother and my father, 
they born in Libya and come to France after married. I explain I born in 
France and I never go to Libya. He say you Muslim from Libya not French for 
my daughter. I not understand [pause] what he mean I not French? I think I 
French, but he older man than me, maybe he correct, [pause] I not know.   
In both of these examples, the participants voice how vulnerable their 
identities are, because they both question who they are after a communicative event. 
Both participants said they think they are French and that the person questioning them 
might be correct in questioning whom they think they are. In both of these cases the 
interviewees did not respond to the other individual, nor did they leave the 
communicative event with a more secure sense of self. The inverse happened, they 
left with a more vulnerable self-identification. However, not only is the security of an 
identity questioned in one on one interaction, but many of the interviewees expressed 
times when they have felt as if their sense of self-identification has been challenged 
by French media or politicians. 
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Three of the interviewees discussed how they, the Muslim community, have 
been called not French, and a problem for “true” French people. Interviewee C said: 
I do not like it when there is election in France. Politicians on right [pause] 
they uh say there is Muslim problem. That we Muslims, that we uh not 
French, we different. I not like and I uh not understand what they say. I citizen 
of France, I uh [pause] vote, what they think I not French?”
Another participant, Interviewee R said political rhetoric is increasingly anti-
Muslim and more exclusionary of Muslims from French culture. He said: 
Ce n'est pas bon aujourd'hui. Beaucoup de politiciens, [pause] ils disent que 
les musulmans ne sont pas les vrais français et les musulmans sont un 
problème à l'état. Je ne comprends pas ceci, [pause] nous travaille dur, 
[pause] votons-nous, [pause] payons-nous des impôts, mais [pause] ne 
sommes-nous pas français? Veulent-ils que les musulmans ne soient-ils pas 
avec des chrétiens? Veulent-ils avoir des musulmans séparé d'autres? Je suis
très confus.
It is not good today. Many politicians, [pause] they say Muslims are not real 
French people and Muslims are a problem to the state. I not understand this, 
[pause] we work hard, [pause] we vote, [pause] we pay taxes, but [pause] we 
are not French? Do they want Muslims to not be with Christians? Do they 
want to have Muslim separate from other people? I am very confused.
These Muslims clearly see that some politicians want to exclude them from 
the perceived “true” French populace. However, in the midst of this rhetorical 
exclusion and differentiation, these Muslims are unsure of how to react and how to 
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defend their self-identification. Unfortunately, political rhetoric is not the only form 
of exclusion taking place, participants asserted media coverage of the European 
Union referendum and stories related to Muslims are slanted to exclude Muslims and 
deny their sense of self-identification.
Interviewee AB described how media coverage of the European Union 
referendum in France has focused too much on the potential entry of Turkey into the 
European Union and the growing Muslim population in France. She said: 
les nouvelles en France, ils disent que la France a trop de musulmans et si la 
Turquie entre dans l'union européenne là sera plus de musulmans ici et les 
musulmans ne sont pas le vrai français. Les nouvelles indiquent également les 
travaux de Français de prise de musulmans. Je ne comprends pas ces 
arguments. Nous sommes les vrais français et nous aimons la France. Mais, 
peut-être ils ont correct, peut-être nous ne sont pas de vrais Français s'ils ne 
nous acceptent pas.
The news in France, they say France has too many Muslims and if Turkey 
enters the European Union there will be more Muslims here and the Muslims 
are not real French people. The news also says Muslims take French jobs. I 
not understand these arguments. We are real French people and we love 
France. But, maybe they are right, maybe we are not real French if they do not 
accept us.
Interviewee AJ said he is tired of news commentators reporting only negative 
things about the Muslim community. This male Muslim who lives in Clichy-sous-
Bois, where riots broke-out in October 2005 said:
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when I watch television, reporters on television, they uh [pause] only talk 
about bad things in Muslim world. Only talk about crime, not about good. One 
reporter, he said [pause] Muslims are problem to real French citizens. My 
family say we French but maybe we not French. Maybe [pause] it best 
Muslims not be here [pause] I not know answer.
Interviewee H, who was born in Britain said the French media paints the 
Muslim population as the enemy in order to sensationalize the news and to make 
viewers feel as if they are the chosen French people. She stated:
I do not like French news [pause] or media. They like to say Muslims are the 
root of all of the social problems in France. It is easy to do, [pause] because 
most of France agrees with them. When the media says the Muslim “visitors” 
[pause] are the reason we have unemployment and crime they uh [pause] 
make non-Muslim French people feel happier because they [pause] are the 
supposed “chosen” people. It makes me very angry, but I know who I am, I 
was taught to be proud I am Muslim [pause] and I am proud I am a Muslim 
woman. 
She further added that she learned how to deal with challenges to her identity 
as a child in London and commented on how most Muslim in France do not know 
how to defend their identity. She said, “many other Muslims here do not understand 
Muslim pride, [pause] because they have fallen into a [pause] trap of being French. I 
know I will never be French, [pause] but most Muslims can’t just accept that [pause] 
and give up.” Her upbringing in Great Britain and not in France or a North African 
nation sets this woman apart from the rest of the participants. She grew up in an 
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individualistic nation, not a collectivistic nation, or a nation with collectivistic 
tendencies like France.
The lack of resourcefulness in responding to challenges to identity is not 
stupidity on the part of the Muslim population. It is instead a byproduct of their 
identity being more of a subconscious entity, and less of a conscious phenomenon, at 
least until challenged. When identity or ethnie is something that is taken for granted 
and not thought about consciously it is easy to not develop appropriate coping 
mechanisms for dealing with identity challenges, similar to Freud’s concept of 
maladjustment. Yet, many Muslims in this community used our discussions to bring 
to consciousness their sense of self-identification and to differentiate themselves from 
the non-Muslim French population. 
The act of using communication to reinforce secure identities and to reduce 
vulnerability over an identity is the fifth, sixth, and seventh assumptions of Ting-
Toomey’s (1993) identity negotiation theory. Ting Toomey asserts individuals 
partake in communication to also inadvertently identify boundary regulations, which 
reveals their conscious and subconscious sense(s) of self-identification. Boundary 
regulations bring forth certain communicative behaviors that enhance an individual’s 
need for inclusion or their need for differentiation. Boundaries are both visible and 
invisible zones that can protect from or encourage outside influence, and or reinforce 
internal influences within the individual. For example, the seeking or not seeking of 
affirmation from others is a boundary, and so is choosing or not choosing to follow 
social norms set forth by an ingroup.
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For members of an individualistic culture, boundaries are likely to be 
associated with individual traits, habits, norms or attributes. For members of 
collectivistic cultures boundaries are typically associated with loyalty to an ingroup, 
mutual face protection and ingroup commitment (Ting-Toomey, 1993). Moreover, the 
dichotomy between inclusion and differentiation depends on a balance between self, 
other and group membership. Thus, an individual in negotiation whether they want 
more inclusion or differentiation must determine which is more important at any 
given moment, the self, the other or their group membership. 
The overwhelming majority of the Muslims interviewed for this project 
expressed a desire to be included as part of the French culture. They also discussed 
how they want to retain some level of difference from the French culture. A physical 
symbol that embodies this desire for inclusion and differentiation is the Islamic hijab. 
Muslims want to integrate, which unlike how Gudykunst and Kim (1997; 2003) 
equate with self-extinction or homogenization, integration retains differences so there 
is something to integrate (Kramer & Ikeda, 2000). As previously discussed, the act of 
hijab, or veiling has questionable historic precedence, is a highly debated issue within 
the Muslim community, and is a clear, visual representation of the cultural clash 
taking place between Christian France and its Muslim immigrant population 
(Croucher, 2005). Many of the women interviewed for this project hijab: out of the 27 
women interviewed 23 hijab, while the remaining four did not decide to stop hijab 
until after they attended at least one semester of college/university. 
Both the women who hijab and those who do not asserted the hijab is an 
important part of who they are. The hijab symbolically includes the Muslim women 
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who wear it into Muslim culture while at the same time differentiates them from 
French-Christian culture. Those Muslim women who choose not to hijab are also 
differentiated from traditional Muslim culture. Moreover, the hijab for many Muslim 
women interviewed for this project, can be used as a fashion accessory that they 
perceive as assisting in their inclusion into what they see as a “hip” and “trendy” 
French culture. However, a recent ban against the wearing of the hijab in French 
public schools has brought the hijab under the political, judicial, religious and cultural 
microscope of scrutiny. The following excerpts from interviews conducted with 
French-Muslim women and men reveal the importance and precariousness of the 
hijab as a representation of Islam. Furthermore the following section is divided into 
three sections, the veil as integral to Muslim female security and identity, the hijab as 
a way to publicly show “Muslimness,” and the hijab as controversy as indicative of 
the conflict between Christianity and Islam.
For many of the Muslim men and women the hijab is important for Muslim 
female security and identity. For women who hijab, the hijab offers security from the 
outside world. This security also protects their sense of self-identification because 
they do not feel as if their self-identification is ever challenged. Interviewee I said: 
The veil [pause] or the act of hijab is a way to protect women from the outside 
world [pause] and it also is way for women to protect themselves from other 
people who could dishonor them. It uh [pause] make women safer. 
The concept of security from the outside world while wearing the hijab was 
further explained by Interviewee AF who said:
When I hijab [pause] I in public feel safe. I feel [pause] like people only see 
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[pause] people only see what I want them to see. I am free to walk, and 
people, people they uh [pause] move for me to walk and I not worry people 
stare at my body because [pause] I hijab.
Other female participants called the hijab a “shield” (Interviewees A, B, D, P, 
Q, T, V, AD). Interviewee B said, “quand j’hijab, j’ai un bouclier” “when I hijab I 
have a shield.” Interviewee Q said “I am shielded, protected when I hijab, I am 
free to be [pause] woman in public with hijab.” 
Other female participants equated the hijab with a “shroud of protection” 
(Interviewees F, G, J, Y, AF). Interviewee J said, “I have shroud in public. I uh 
[pause] have protection from men, people and world with hijab.” Interviewee F said, 
“j’ai une monture de la protection comme Jesus Christ avec le hijab” “I have a 
shroud of protection like Jesus Christ with the hijab.” The fact that this participant 
includes Jesus Christ in her description is probably a reference to the shroud of Turin, 
the cloth in which Christ was wrapped in after his crucifixion. Essentially this 
interviewee is asserting the hijab protects her like the shroud protected the body of 
Christ before his resurrection as told in a Biblical tale. I assume this interviewee was 
trying to relate the hijab to a reference point that most Caucasian-Americans or 
French will understand, that being the tales of the Christian Bible.
Even males discussed the power of the hijab to protect and shield Muslim 
women. Interviewee C said, “I think hijab make city safer [pause] it make city better 
for women.” Interviewee R concurred and stated “I feel good when wife wear [pause] 
hijab because [pause] men not see all her and she not need feel unsafe in public or on 
the street.” Interviewee AI said “my daughter and granddaughters they hijab and 
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[pause] I uh think that good because [pause] people not look or question daughter or 
granddaughters in public with hijab.”
While many Muslims perceive the hijab as protecting them from the outside 
world, and protecting them from scrutiny, this protection also weakens their ability to 
respond to threats against their identity. Thus, when their identity is challenged, they 
do not have the resourcefulness to respond to the challenge(s). This failure to develop 
an effective response is similar to individuals not being inoculated against the flu or 
other viruses. When an individual receives an inoculation they receive a weakened 
form of a virus, in order to encourage their immune system to develop antibodies to 
the virus. Without this inoculation a person will generally become more ill when they 
contract the virus. It is the same with the hijab and defending our self-identification. 
When an individual is not prepared for this ideological dialogue/battle, the 
consequences will more than likely be greater than if they were prepared beforehand.
A few participants addressed this point, of not teaching French Muslims a 
conscious self-identity as children. Unlike perspectival cultures, which are 
encouraged to “find” themselves, magic and mythic cultures (like Islam) are not 
encouraged to “find” themselves. There is not need to do this. It is not within a magic 
or mythic lexicon. Thus identity crises do not generally exist. They said they are now 
beginning to remind and reinforce in their children and younger family members that 
they should be proud of their Muslim heritage, an effect of interaction with 
perspectival culture. This emphasis on increased Muslim pride is a new phenomenon 
in France, and will be discussed further at the end of this chapter. Interviewee AF 
said, “I teach family [pause] that it good to be Muslim man or Muslim woman. We 
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need be proud [pause] happy we Muslim. Follow Islam and [pause] be proud.” 
Interviewee C said, “I teach children to be proud Muslims [pause] to uh [pause] 
follow Prophet and not be ashamed.” I asked one participant why some members of 
the Muslim community in France have begun to teach their children to be proud of 
their Muslim heritage and he responded: 
[W]e need be proud today [pause] Islam not safe in France. Many French 
people, they uh [pause] not trust Muslims. They uh [pause] think all Muslims 
[pause] all Muslims terrorists. We not all terrorists, not many Muslim 
terrorists. We need be happy to be Muslim now to be together [pause] more 
now because we need together now community.
One way in which the Muslim community in France has begun to show their 
togetherness is through the public wearing and supporting of the hijab in response to 
Law 2004-228. The hijab is an evident, and highly symbolic representation of Islam 
(El Saadawi, 1980).  This symbol of Islam, which did not appear in the Muslim 
ummah (community) until approximately 627 C.E., is considered a defining element 
of modern and historical Islam (Aslan, 2005). For many women in France, and 
throughout the world for that matter (Nashat & Tucker, 1998; Hawkins, 2003), the act 
of hijab or veiling identifies or labels a woman as Muslim to the rest of the world. 
Throughout my interviews with men and women in France, all asserted the hijab is 
Islam, and thus helps them be Muslim because the veil to this particular population
represents the becoming of Muhammad’s wife and becoming a mother of the ummah, 
a very magic symbol. The act of putting on and taking off a hijab is not contingent, 
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but rather a transformative process, a difference French non-Muslims do not 
understand.
Initially, men and women voiced how the act of hijab helps women become 
the wife of Muhammad. In fact, Aslan (2005) described how donning the veil or 
darabat al-hijab is a synonym for “becoming Muhammad’s wife.” Interviewee AB 
described this process of becoming Muhammad’s wife. She said,  “quand je porte 
mon hijab j'exécute un acte que les épouses de Muhammad ont exécuté. Je deviens 
son épouse sur terre” “When I wear my hijab I act like the wives of Muhammad 
acted. I become his wife on Earth.” 
Numerous other women also detailed how the hijab brings them closer to 
Muhammad. Their feelings of closeness and connection with Muhammad is detailed 
by Interviewee B said: 
[W]hen I hijab I feel good. I feel [pause] near Prophet. I know I can remove 
hijab, but [pause] when I wear I show other people that I with him. I teach 
daughter to do same thing [pause] to show love for Prophet and hijab.
Interviewee J equated her wearing of the hijab with the wearing of a wedding 
ring. She said:
it custom [pause] it normal for women and men to wear ring after they 
married. I wear hijab, it [pause] like ring with Prophet. I not have ring from 
Prophet. I uh [pause] have ring from husband. Hijab uh [pause] say I respect, 
that I uh [pause] follow his word.” 
Interviewee L discussed how the closeness she feels to the Prophet is a 
beautiful way to live her life. She said:
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I love husband and I love Prophet. I uh [pause] not think I have choose one as 
more or other. They uh [pause] different. But I say when I hijab that I uh 
[pause] beautiful woman and I uh modest and [pause] safe woman. Hijab is 
beauty it uh [pause] beautiful relationship.
Interviewee S described how he thinks his wife has more than one husband, 
him and the Prophet. He said:
I have wife choose to hijab [pause] or no hijab. She say yes to hijab [pause] 
and people know she Muslim and [pause] know she respect Prophet and she 
his wife here. She part of [pause] many wives here. I love her and Prophet 
love her also.
Another male, Interviewee AL added that not only does the hijab represent a 
connection with the Prophet; but also when a woman does not hijab she is empty of 
the Prophet’s love. He said, “when woman hijab [pause] she be with Prophet. When 
she not hijab [pause] she not with Prophet. She not have love of Prophet. She uh 
[pause] have space with nothing in it for Prophet love.”
Aside from the hijab representing the becoming of the Prophet’s wife, 
participants also said it represents their transformation from a woman into a mother 
within the umma, or Muslim community. Interviewee G said: 
Quand je porte un hijab je suis l'épouse de Muhammad et je suis une 
mère à ma communauté. Les femmes vertueux hijab et seulement une femme 
vertueuse devraient être une mère. Donc, un hijab m'aide à montrer ma vertu 
et à être un bon exemple pour ma communauté.
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When I wear a hijab I am the wife of Muhammad and I am a mother to my 
community. Virtuous women hijab and only a virtuous woman should be a 
mother. So, a hijab helps me show my virtue and be a good example for my 
community.
A male participant, Interviewee AN further elaborated on this point and said 
he is appreciative when he sees a woman in the umma who hijabs and feels very torn 
and angry at women who do not. He describes his anger and frustration: 
I respect women to make decision. But when I have children [pause] I want 
my children to learn and watch women [pause] who hijab and not women who 
not hijab. Hijab show honor [pause] and respect for community. No hijab 
[pause] it uh not show respect and love.
The hijab has become more than a representation of a woman’s devotion to 
the Prophet Muhammad, or her commitment to her community. For many men and 
women in the Muslim community, and outside of the Muslim community, the hijab 
has become a symbol of the growing conflict between Islam and Christianity. For 
many Muslims it represents a way of life, and a symbol that shows their religion. To 
many non-Muslims in France it represents the disintegration of traditional French 
cultural values and norms. The following excerpts from Muslims and from non-
Muslims all explicate this cultural divide, or cultural misunderstanding between 
Muslim and Christian France.
Interviewee J said the hijab is a very controversial symbol in France and she 
said it is increasingly evident that the non-Muslim population dislikes the Muslim 
population. She said:
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People in France [pause] they not like Muslims today. People in France 
[pause] they not understand hijab. They see hijab [pause] they think Islam bad 
and we not develop like they do [pause] like we not good like them. They say 
Christians better than Muslims. I think it [pause] hijab is a thing of Islam 
people see and hate.
Interviewee AM, when he described a recent incident in a French hotel where 
he was refused service because his wife wore a hijab, further stated these sentiments. 
He said:
Je rendais visite à ma famille à Dijon et un garçon à l'hôtel n'aiderait pas 
mon épouse et moi. Il a aidé d'autres. Je lui ai demandé pourquoi il nous a 
ignorés et il a dit que je ne sers pas les musulmans sales. Si vous voulez le 
service enlevez son hijab et agissez français
I was visiting family in Dijon and a clerk at the hotel would not help my wife 
and me. He helped other people. I asked him why he ignored us and he said I 
do not serve dirty Muslims. If you want service remove her hijab and act 
French.
Other Muslim interviewees voiced similar stories and described similar 
feelings. In particular, Interviewee V discussed how her daughter and grand daughters 
are not allowed to practice their religion in school because of anti-Muslim feelings. 
She said: 
Ma fille et mes filles grandes ils ont beaucoup de problèmes en France 
aujourd'hui. Ils ne peuvent pas porter le hijab au travail ou à l'école. Ils ont 
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des règles à l'école et au bureau contre le hijab parce que les français 
n'aiment pas le hijab et n'aiment pas l'Islam.
My daughter and my grand daughters they have many problems in France 
today. They cannot wear the hijab at work or in school. They have rules in 
school and at the office against the hijab because French people do not like the 
hijab and do not like Islam.
Interviewee Q claimed the anti-hijab feelings of many French people are 
based on misunderstood stories and history. She said:
[M]any people in France not understand hijab. They [pause] uh think hijab 
bad [pause] but it not bad. It part of history and women choose to wear it. It 
uh [pause] not something French people understand [pause] so they say it bad 
and hate Muslim women who hijab.
Other Muslim women also used similar language. Interviewee A said the 
French population is “confused.” Interviewee H said many French non-Muslims are 
“simply racist and attack what they don’t understand.” Interviewee Q added “French 
think hijab oppress Muslim women [pause] but French people oppress also and 
oppress and not understand.” 
Overall, most in the Muslim community equated policies against the hijab 
such as the 2004 ban on wearing religious symbols in schools, and other private 
regulations as results of not wanting to understand Muslim culture, an expression of 
French perspectival modernity. On the other hand, non-Muslim French citizens said 
the recent passage of anti-hijab policies and anti-Muslim rhetoric has nothing to do 
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with a lack of understanding, just a desire for Muslims to identify with the French 
nation. Interviewee AP said: 
Je comprends ce qu'est le hijab et pourquoi les femmes musulmanes le 
portent. Je veux que les femmes musulmanes soient françaises, elles habitent 
en France, elles doivent agir plus françaises, et ce des moyens qu'elles doivent 
ne porter pas un hijab et n’être plus modernes
I understand what the hijab is and why Muslim women wear it. I want Muslim 
women to be French, they live in France, they need to act more French, and 
that means they need to not wear a hijab and be more modern.
Interviewee AS concurred with Interviewee AP and said he does not like 
hijabs because they are bringing religion into public eyes and forcing religion on 
others. He said, “nous sommes un pays séculaire et quand les musulmans hijab ils ne 
sont pas séculaire. Ils doivent apprendre que la France est un pays séculaire et ne 
pas un pays religieux” “we are a secular nation and when Muslims hijab they are not 
secular. They must learn France is a secular nation and not a religious nation.” 
Other non-Muslim participants further emphasized the importance of 
secularism. Interviewee AW said “France is secular and Muslims are not, it is simple. 
Muslims must [pause] follow French culture and laws. Interviewee AQ said: 
La France est un pays séculaire, et a été séculaire depuis la révolution. 
Pourquoi les musulmans la pensent-ils est-ils nécessaire pour porter les 
vêtements religieux dans les écoles et au travail? Le Koran n'indique pas vous 
devez hijab, il indique que vous devez être modeste. Les femmes peuvent être 
modestes sans hijab.
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France is a secular nation, and has been secular since the revolution. Why do 
Muslims think it is necessary to wear religious clothes in schools and at work? 
The Koran does not say you must hijab, it says you must be modest. Women 
can be modest without the hijab. 
One participant, Interviewee AU, a French journalist who writes about 
minority issues in France and also researches immigrant groups for Le Monde (the 
French newspaper with the largest global circulation) said many Muslim and non-
Muslim French do not understand the real issues under debate. He said, “we are 
secular here and [pause] that is France. Muslims can be Muslims but it is not 
necessary to wear religious clothes in public schools. School is a location to learn 
[pause] and not a location to be religious.”
He further discussed how while many non-Muslims do not understand Islam, 
that many Muslims themselves do not fully understand why women hijab. He said:
I know many Muslims who say I hijab because Koran says I must hijab. But 
[pause] it does not say women must hijab. It says women need to be modest. 
[pause] I also know non-Muslim French citizens [pause] who do think the 
hijab is forced on women and [pause] that women are militant when they 
hijab. This is not true. There are many [pause] misunderstandings and [pause] 
confusions.
In response to these critics’ responses about the hijab bringing religion into 
the classroom, Muslims asserted the hijab does not force religion onto other people. 
The hijab allows their women to follow their heart and be a “good” follower of Islam. 
Interviewee Q said:
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Hijab not make other people [pause] want be Muslim. We not want new 
people to be Muslim [pause] when girl wears hijab in school [pause] or 
woman hijabs at work. These girls and women [pause] they hijab to be good 
Muslims. We know France not like religion [pause] but we follow Koran and 
love Prophet.
Interviewee AN added:
when Muslim women hijab they not hurt people. They [pause] show love and 
[pause] show respect for Prophet. Why [pause] do French people not 
understand that? Hijab not [pause] symbol of [pause] war, it [pause] symbol 
of peace [pause] and symbol of love and Muslim people.
I read this comment about the hijab being a symbol of love, peace and Islam
to a non-Muslim participant. Interviewee AV responded with the following statement.
Si le hijab est un symbole de l'amour, de la paix et de l'Islam [pause] pourquoi 
je vois toujours les femmes musulmanes avec [pause]  un hijab protestant 
contre le gouvernement? Pourquoi est-ce que  [pause]  je vois une 
photographie de l'les femmes musulmanes avec un hijab à la télévision après 
qu'un bâtiment soit détruit par une bom ? Si l'Islam n'est pas commandé en 
France  [pause] qu'il détruira la France et nous devons commencer à la 
commander tôt.
If the hijab is a symbol of love, peace and Islam [pause] then why do I always 
see Muslim women [pause] with a hijab protesting against the government? 
Why do I see the photograph of a Muslim woman with a hijab on television 
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after a building is destroyed by a bomb? If Islam is not controlled in France it 
will destroy France [pause] and we must start controlling it early.
The assertion that France must control the spread of Islam early, in the 
schools, or else face further terrorist attacks and Muslim protests illustrates the 
conflict over Christianity and Islam, which is represented visually by the hijab. This 
idolic symbol is Islam and not only represents this struggle, but also as previously 
argued, it represents an attempt by many Muslim women to follow the Prophet 
Muhammad and rediscover their unconscious Muslim identity. It is the rediscovery, 
or the formation of a Muslim identity that the following section focuses on. 
Specifically, the following section of this chapter asserts Ting-Toomey’s identity 
negotiation theory does not take two important factors into consideration: religion, 
and her framework assumes a conscious identity, when often an identity can be 
presumed unconscious.
Critique of Identity Negotiation Theory
Religion is negated
Within the framework set forth by Ting-Toomey (1993) she does not 
specifically address the impact of religion. Granted she asserts cultural variables can 
play a role in how an individual negotiates culture, but not all cultures “negotiate” 
culture, at least not in the way Ting-Toomey advances. Dependent upon the religion 
of the culture, or of the individual the negotiation of identity can differ substantially. 
In some religions (mainly Christianity in the Western world) many followers do not 
emphasize their religion as their main identification; instead their ethnic or national 
allegiance is emphasized as the main identification (Hargreaves, 1995). 
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The emphasis on national identification instead of religious identification in 
France has historical precedence. France, before the French Revolution was gripped 
by numerous religious struggles such as the 100 year war, and persecution of 
religious groups such as the Huguenots. Moreover, in the years leading up to, during 
and after the French Revolution of the 18th century, religious power was considered 
something to fear and to take away. Numerous edicts, such as the confiscation and 
sale of church lands in 1790 (Carlyle, 2002) and the clergy’s oath of allegiance to the 
French Republic in 1790 (Jones, 1994), revealed the French populace’s rejection of 
religious control and influence. Into the 21st century, there is still a distinction and 
separation between church and state laîcité; the French government does not officially 
recognize any religion, it only recognizes religious groups that promote religion while 
not disrupting civil order. Therefore, it is understandable that in France, a person’s 
religion, while it may be important to an individual, is not something the state tracks 
or even recognizes as an important aspect of public or self- identification. 
In the United States this emphasis on ethnic, national and religious identities 
is emphasized more because an individual routinely has to delineate their identity on 
questionnaires, census reports, job applications, admissions papers and countless 
other documents. Furthermore, the US, unlike France, does not have a modern history 
of secularism, and the separation between church and state is not as delineated as in 
France. 
It is also common within the field of social science research to negate the 
potential impacts of religion and to instead lump religion into other “cultural 
variables” such as individualism/collectivism, masculinity/feminity or 
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independent/interdependent self-construals for example (Kramer, 2002). However, 
religion is more important than such “cultural variables” since it is in most cultures a 
building block of civilization and holds a sacred or “magic” power over individuals 
(Gebser, 1980). 
Articles addressing various theories such as identity negotiation theory (Ting-
Toomey, 1993), cultural adaptation theory (Kim 1977, 2000), face-saving (Oetzel, 
Ting-Toomey, Masumoto, Yokochi, Pan, Takai, & Wilcox, 2001) and countless 
others do not take religion and consider it an important variable; it is ignored. 
Religion cannot be ignored when analyzing intercultural/cross-cultural 
communication. As Geertz (1973) posited, religion is an important factor that must be 
discussed and analyzed because it can greatly alter how one culture functions when 
compared to another culture. 
Consider Islam and Christianity. In most Christian nations (the United States, 
Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Australia, Canada, Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico), 
Christians primarily identify themselves as members of their ethnic or national 
culture (Croucher, 2005). However, in most Muslim nations (Indonesia, Morocco, 
Algeria, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia) or in Muslim communities like those in 
France, individual identification is usually intrinsically linked to an individual’s 
religion. This is not to say individuals in predominantly Christian nations do not 
identify with their religion at all, but instead their primary identification is usually not 
religious. Therefore, research needs to address the potential effects of religion on how 
one group functions in contact or in conflict with another group. If scholars, 
politicians and citizens knew the facts, understood the religious significance of the 
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hijab or the Jewish yarmulka, or could predict the potential ramifications of a ban on 
such symbols, maybe such bans would not be passed so easily, or the responses to 
such a ban would be better understood. Ultimately, the impact of religion must be 
addressed. In this study, numerous participants identified themselves by their religion 
first, and then their nationality. Saying things such as “I am Muslim and I am French” 
or “I am a Muslim-French woman or man.” This identification is strong, and no 
matter how often these Muslims hear comments like: “you need to be more French,” 
“you are French and then Muslim,” or “you can not be French because you are 
Muslim,” they will not give up their allegiance to Islam. In particular in the wake of 
the rise in anti-Muslim rhetoric after September 11th, and in the aftermath of the 2004 
ban on wearing religious symbols, this community feels their religion is under attack. 
As long as they perceive their religion as under attack the more pronounced their 
sense of Muslimness will become and the more apt to be anti-French this group will 
also become.
Conscious identity assumed
The concept of religion being perceived as under attack brings to light a 
second critique of Ting-Toomey’s identity negotiation theory (1993), the presumption 
that all individuals have the lexicon or ability to articulate their identity. Identity 
negotiation says all individuals negotiate an identity on a daily basis. However, when 
I started this study I found that discovering an individual’s identity was not an easy 
task in France. France, unlike the United States does not include ethnicity on its 
census, and French citizens are not used to filling out numerous forms with their 
ethnic identification included. This practice is similar across the European Union, 
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where ethnic differences are not emphasized by national or supernational 
governments, like the EU and its member states (Helsinki Federation, 2005). 
However, for immigrant groups in these nations they unconsciously or consciously, 
do not identify primarily with solely their nation of citizenship (Hargreaves, 1995). 
Many immigrants in fact acknowledge their religion as very important to their way of 
life (Silverstein, 2004).  
Thus, when I went to France I had to find a new way to understand and 
explain identity, that being ethnie. Ethnie is more closely synonymous with the 
American ideal of ethnicity or national affiliation. It does not translate directly into a 
person’s identity. Therefore, when I would ask individuals their ethnie I would 
always get “French.” When I would dig deeper and ask with which social group do 
you identity, they would then begin to expand their sense of ethnie into a more 
Western idea of identity. 
Essentially, participants have an identity, but like the work of Lutz’ (1988) 
work on Micronesia and emotion, they lack the same words used in the United States 
or other Western nations to express the concept. It wasn’t until I, the researcher, 
explained to them in Western terms that they had an “identity” in Western terms that 
they gained the words to articulate that identity within a Western framework. I, and 
other researchers like Lutz, Kulick (1998), and even Philipsen (1992) offered them 
the means to fit within an ethnocentric Western theoretical paradigm. In essence, 
while these individuals did have a sense of self it was not until I challenged it that 
they consciously began to think about it. 
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This concept of consciousness is similar to phenomenology (Kramer, 1997). 
The following example explains the essence of phenomenology, this example was 
provided by an adviser of this project, Dr. Eric Mark Kramer. An individual can be 
standing in front of a stained glass window and not even see the window or the snow 
falling outside the window until someone hits the window with a snowball. After the 
snowball hits the window the window and the snow are evident because of the sudden 
impact and the new conglomeration of snow and stained glass visible to the person 
looking at the window. 
This example is similar to Bakhtin’s “surplus of vision.” Bakhtin asserts that 
in everyday experience our attempts to make meaning of the world encounter 
difficulties, especially in relation to remote or obscure phenomena (Morson & 
Emerson, 1999). The problem is that in trying to bestow meaning on the world around 
us we cannot envision ourselves from outside it; in order to do so we need another 
perspective in addition to our own. In other words, we have a unique perspective on 
the world, but cannot see the other, while the other can perceive things that we cannot 
see ourselves. So a kind of co-participation is required to see the social totality. 
Bakhtin links this process of reciprocity to the status of being truly human, since this 
arrangement facilitates a relationship of dialogue that benefits both parties. However, 
modernity precludes this development, since in scientific rationality we relate to the 
other, a subject, as an object; this leads to an impoverishment of human relations. 
Bakhtin calls this phenomenon a “surplus of vision” (Holquist, 1990). In the case of 
the interviews, I the researcher brought the issues of identity into the conversation and 
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gave them meaning. The giving of meaning aided the Muslim participants in seeing 
their “identity” through a new lens.
The Muslim participants in this study had an identity (typically Muslim) but 
were unaware of its strength or cogent existence until that identity was explored by an 
outsider (the researcher), challenged (by anti-Muslim rhetoric or the 2004 ban on the 
hijab and other religious symbols), or emphasized by a fundamentalist Islamic leader 
(which has not extensively happened in France as much as in other nations like Iran, 
Afghanistan and the Palestinian Authority). These events or individuals brought their 
identity from the subconscious and into their consciousness. Thus, when analyzing 
Ting-Toomey’s identity negotiation theory, researchers need to be careful of two false 
assumptions or disruptions. First, not all individuals are able to articulate their 
identity in the same way as prescribed by social scientific theories. Their identities 
may be multi-leveled or unidimensional. Yet, their sense(s) of who they are, are still 
vital and important to their lives and should not be dismissed. Second, researchers 
need to keep in mind that when exploring issues of identity that right or wrong, the 
researcher will impact the thought process of the research subject. By asking 
questions about identity and providing individuals with the lexicon to describe an 
identity in Western terms, the researcher is affecting the consciousness of the 
participant. Hopefully this impact is not significant, but it is something researchers 
should be aware of for future reference. 
This chapter discussed the concept of identity and applied it to Muslims living 
in France. It first offered a discussion of Ting-Toomey’s (1993) theory identity 
negotiation. Second it applied this theory to interviews conducted with Muslims to 
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ascertain how Muslims identify themselves in France. Third, it revealed that the act of 
hijab, or wearing a veil is a contentious issue filled with issues about what is and is 
not French or Muslim and that the hijab represents the growing conflict between 
Christianity and Islam. Last, this chapter provided two critiques of identity 
negotiation theory; the first critique was that this theory negates the potentially 
profound impact of religion on identity negotiation; the second critique was that 
identity negotiation theory assumes individuals have the consciousness and ability to 
articulate their identity in Western terms. Ultimately, the Muslim faith poses an 
interesting dilemma for social scientists trying to study identity. If the religion is 
ignored, the research will probably not be as in-depth and not truly grasp the 
important issues. 
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CHAPTER 6
Community Alteration from Pressures to Conform
This chapter synthesizes the concepts of cultural adaptation and identity 
negotiation with research in language ideology and argues all three of these 
phenomena are working together to alter the perceived and physical space of the 
Muslim ummah, or community. As pressures to conform to the dominant non-Muslim 
French culture mount on the Muslim ummahs, community members perceive their 
religious, political, cultural, linguistic, economic and social comfort zones as 
shrinking. The hijab and “Islam” have become more than just religious acts or 
traditions or words. Instead, these terms and practices have become ideological and 
part of a political and cultural discourse that privileges one group (non-Muslim 
France) over another (Muslims in France). 
To facilitate an analysis of this phenomenon, the following chapter is divided 
into five sections. The first section reiterates an earlier discussion on the symbolic 
power and ideological power of the hijab. The second section provides a review of 
literature on language ideology and expands this research past language to include 
symbolic or non-verbal ideologies. The third section examines the importance of 
space as a semiotic and intercultural phenomenon. The fourth section illustrates how 
Muslims and non-Muslims in France perceive their respective community as 
changing because of pressures to conform. For the Muslim ummahs this pressure to 
conform comes from the dominant culture. For the dominant French culture, non-
Muslim French participants assert they have had to increase pressures to conform on 
the Muslim community to protect the integrity of “Frenchness.” The fifth section 
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offers a model of this process. This model draws upon intercultural research and 
research on systems theory. Moreover, this final section will argue for and illustrate 
this model’s cross-communal or cross-cultural applicability. 
Hijab
Earlier in this study, the historical and religious significance of the hijab was 
explained. This historical analysis revealed how the hijab predates Islam, and has 
been a symbol of many cultures around the world (the Hittites, the Assyrians, the 
Jews and the Christians). Furthermore, the historical analysis of this symbol of Islam 
discussed how the hijab is intertwined with ideology, political, religious, and sexual. 
Politically, the hijab has been an issue of political debate, oppression and/or liberation 
in numerous countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, 
France, Belgium, Russia, and the United States (Abdo, 2002; Brooks, 2002; Burns, 
2003; Goodwin, 1995; Kaplan, 2002; Kapuscinski, 2002; Mernissi, 1987; Parshall & 
Parshall, 2001; Roald, 2001; Smith, 2003; Vollmann, 2002). Religiously, the hijab 
does not have an established doctrine. Within Islam some imams, or teachers, assert 
the Koran mandates the hijab, while other imams point to the Koran and argue it does 
not explicitly say a woman must wear a veil (Caner, 2003). Sexually, the hijab is both 
a symbol of female oppression and female liberation, all dependent upon a person’s 
worldview (Croucher, 2005). Chapter five of this analysis revealed that many Muslim 
women in France view the hijab as a form of liberation, and as a way to defend their 
Muslim identity and self. Ultimately, this hijab is an important symbol of Islam that is 
laced with ideology. As a symbol of the Muslim religion its significance should be 
explored, and I will explore this significance further as a language ideology. A 
language ideology perspective is appropriate for this analysis because (1) a language 
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ideology perspective pays attention to ideologies in and outside of a community, (2) 
ideologies are contentious issues that have been well-addressed b language ideology 
research, and (3) a language ideology perspective can bring forth counter discourses 
to a dominant ideology.
Language Ideology
The concept of a language ideology is multifaceted. Various scholars have 
examined the concept, and defined it slightly differently. Silverstein (1979) defined a 
language ideology as a set of “beliefs about language articulated by users as a 
rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use” (p. 193). 
Irvine (1989) asserted a language ideology is a “cultural system of ideas about social 
and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political 
interests” (p. 255). When analyzing both of these definitions of a language ideology, 
there are a few key ideas that need to be examined: speakers’ beliefs about language 
use, perceived language structure and use, social and linguistic relationships, and 
moral and political interests. Thus, the following examines these key concepts to gain 
a better understanding of what constitutes a language ideology. Specifically, this 
section has the following sub-sections: (1) an examination of the relationship between 
ideology and language use, (2) an analysis of how language ideology impacts 
language use and structure, (3) an overview of some key studies in the field of 
language ideology research, and (4) a discussion of how language ideology research 
and philosophy can and should be expanded to include non-verbal and/or symbolic 
ideologies. 
Ideology and language use
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French philosopher Destutt de Tracy coined the term “ideology” to explain the 
“science of ideas” and “conquest” taken by Napoleon, and subsequent leaders. 
Napoleon disregarded this term and considered it trite and of little importance 
(Woolard, 1998). Later scholars such as Marx and Thompson associated ideology 
with power, as “a direct link to inhabitable positions of power – social, political, 
economic. Ideology is seen as ideas, discourse, or signifying practices in the service 
of the struggle to acquire or maintain power” (Woolard, 1998, p. 7). Ideology can be 
“our” or “theirs,” signifying the importance of how ideology is regarded and to what 
ideology individual’s will fall under the control of in life. 
When an ideology, may it be political, economic, social, cultural, legal or any 
other kind innately comes in contact with language(s), decisions are made as to what 
kind of language to use, how to use the language, what structure the language should 
follow, and what prestige should be afforded to the language and its users. If a 
language is in the political, cultural and economic minority, that language will carry 
less esteem (Kroskrity, 2000) and thus be regarded by the dominant society as less 
than the language used by the dominant group. This process is clearly evident by 
looking at the concept of indexicality. 
Whenever a text is created, that text can be a verbal code such as a word, a 
non-verbal code such as a semiotic symbol or a form of media, interpretation takes 
place (Carroll, 1956). Individuals who produce, and individuals who receive the text 
to a certain extent interpret the text differently (Barthes, 1972). For example, the text 
“feminist.” This concept has multiple interpretations, all dependent upon the actors, 
and context. A “feminist” will be interpreted as a much different phenomenon on a 
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US Naval submarine, than it would be interpreted in a university sorority house. A 
Naval submarine, an all male ship, will look at a “feminist” through entirely 
masculine eyes and interpret it from a masculine perspective, of masculinity over 
femininity, thus giving males an ideological edge over women. On the other hand, in 
a sorority house at a university, which is made up entirely of women, the term 
“feminist” will probably take on a more favorable interpretation. Therefore when the 
women in the sorority index, or point to a woman dressed in everyday street clothes 
protesting discriminatory policies, it is not surprising they may call that woman a 
“feminist.” Thus, indexing that woman and also referring to her wit a positive 
interpretation of what it means to be a “feminist.” However, when the men who work 
on the submarine see the same woman they will probably not point to her and call her 
a “feminist,” because she is not the epitome of what these kinds of men perceive as a 
“feminist.” 
Boas (1911) asserts the purpose of a researcher is to examine this relationship 
between language use and user, since an individual cannot understand their own 
language use. Language ideology scholars have debunked this philosophy and instead 
focused on how a group can indeed understand their own language and the 
surrounding ideologies. 
In the case of my master’s research in Montréal, Canada, I observed language 
ideology at work. Chinese shopkeepers in the Quartier Chinois, Montréal’s 
Chinatown are in the midst of a linguistic battle. Since the 1977 passage of a 
linguistic mandate in Québec stating the supremacy of the French language over all 
other languages, these shopkeepers have been battling with the provincial government 
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to maintain their usage of Mandarin, and other dialects such as Hakka. In the province 
of Québec, the French language carries more power, and thus has an ideological edge 
over other languages Croucher, 2003). However, in this small community, the 
shopkeepers are attempting to maintain their ethnic identity and historical language at 
the expense of the dominant culture and language. Therefore, their (shopkeeper) 
choice of what language to speak at work is a direct representation of language 
ideology at work. 
Impact of language ideology on language use and structure
To combat and also to facilitate language ideologies, individual groups create 
ideological representations of linguistic terms. These representations exemplify 
linguistic differences. Kroskrity (2000) explains how iconization involves the 
“transformation of the sign relationship between linguistic features (or varieties) and 
the social images with which they are linked” (p. 37). In the process of iconization, 
linguistic terms that represent a specific group come to be a direct representation of 
that group. For example, using the term “feminist,” it indexes a social group, and 
dependent upon what group in which the term “feminist” is uttered, the term will 
have a different connotation. This is similar to Richards’s (1936) concept of referent. 
Individuals who respect feminism will look fondly upon a “feminist.” While those 
who do not like feminism will think of a flannel wearing, boot wearing woman who 
does not shave her armpits.
The second semiotic process of ideological representation is fractal recursivity 
(1998). Fractal recursivity involves the creation of subcategories for different 
linguistic terms or social groups. Within one outgroup there are numerous ways to 
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describe that group, and these representations will all come from one original 
description, and like a crystal in the sun, refract the linguistic terms into different 
terms with different connotations.
The final semiotic process of ideological representation is erasure. This is 
essentially the eradication of a linguistic variety. For example, Native American 
languages such as Cherokee have virtually been erased from the vernacular of many 
individuals with Native American heritage. Since the days of “Manifest Destiny,” 
these native languages have been erased when these people have been assimilated 
into the dominant cultural milieu.
Language ideology in practice
Three studies in particular added to the foundation of this research project. 
The first study is Silverstein’s (1985) examination of the Quaker’s in 1600s, and their 
linguistic shift from the use of  “thou” to the use of “you.” This shift Silverstein 
argues occurred because the egalitarian Quakers were in a struggle with the 
hierarchical British, and the British did not want to follow their linguistic practices, 
and thus the dominant culture began to use “you” instead of “thou.” Thus, Silverstein 
says, “thou” fell out of practical use. This study is important to this current project 
because it reveals the significance of how a community’s language use can change 
because of outside influence and pressure stemming from ideological bases, such as 
politics and economics.
The second major work in language ideology pertinent to this study is 
Kulick’s (1998) examination of tribal life and anger in Papua New Guinea. Kulick 
found that the language individuals use can hide intent, especially if they are 
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encountered with someone from an outgroup. Second, he found that anger is looked 
down upon, because of historical and cultural reasons. For example, villagers 
consider anger dangerous, in fact deaths are linked in part to past arguments had by 
the deceased and the living. The link between anger and death represents the 
magic/mythic nature (Gebser) of the Taiap speakers. Third, he stated language also 
included semiotic symbols, and non-verbal communication. Fourth, he said Papua 
New Guinea is in the midst of a language shift from the vernacular Taiap to the more 
“sophisticated” and accepted Tok Pisin. The Taiap speakers are associated with 
paganism and more magical forms of religion, since they are a magic/mythic culture. 
However, as the economy of Papua New Guinea develops, the multitude of different 
dialects are assimilating to Tok Pisin to have an economic chance at success, and in 
turn Christianity. His research shows how for ideological reasons, primarily 
economic, political, and religious, the Taiap language is dying, while Tok Pisin is 
becoming the lingua franca and the official language of Papua New Guinea. 
This example is similar to the Muslim and non-Muslim populations in France. 
As many Muslim-French from non-French speaking nations find they must adapt in 
order to become economically viable and politically active, they have begun to adapt 
to French culture and began to use French as their primary language. While many are 
still holding on to their native tongues (Croucher, 2005), many others are adopting 
(by force in some cases) to the dominant discourse because it has become a lingua 
franca and a requirement for many to achieve employment.    
A third language ideology study that helps in an understanding of this current 
project is Jane Hill’s (1998) examination of the Mexicano-Indian culture. She 
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analyzed verbs such as honor and found that these terms differ in tribes dependent on 
the outside influences. Hill found that dependent upon who is in the interaction, an 
ingroup or outgroup member, the language use would change. As the use of 
Mexicano as a language decreases as more and more users age and become deceased, 
the younger generation predominantly speaks Spanish. Hill found that some elders in 
the community regard the younger generation as having less respect and nostalgia for 
the past, because they are being taught and speaking Spanish and not Mexicano to 
one another and to their elders. Therefore, the use of Mexicano is seen as a way to 
look back on the past with nostalgia. The issue of nostalgia is also important when 
considering those who practice nostalgia, and those who participate in a counter 
discourse. Senior men, and middle-aged men who work outside the community are 
more apt to look back on the “old” days with nostalgia, while the women in the 
community do not have nostalgia for the “old” days. Poor men who do not look 
fondly upon the past also share the counter discourse of the women. 
A counter discourse is a collection of arguments or a dialogue that takes 
specific aspects of a dominant, or politically salient discourse and exposes “them to 
explicit contradiction and, in the most interesting cases, parody” (Hill, 1998, p. 76). 
The issue of a counter discourse and how it develops is important when trying to 
understand the debate over the hijab and Muslim adaptation in France. While the 
dominant culture perceives the hijab as unnecessary and as a form of oppression that 
must be removed from the public eye, the Muslim community (the counter-discourse) 
views it as a sacred and historic symbol if Islam.  
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Language ideology is “a mediating link between social forms and forms of 
talk” (Woolard, 1998, p. 3). Whether it is Silverstein studying the you/thou 
dichotomy, or Hill studying honor in Mexicano-Indian cultures, the consistent 
element across all language ideology studies is the link a form of talk shares with the 
social/political, economic and other forms underlying the communication process.
Non-verbal and/or symbolic ideology
Aside from the emphases on language as a verbal code that can be intertwined 
with ideological weight, language can and should also be designated and studied as 
non-verbal or symbolic communication. Carroll (1956) asserts in his analysis of the 
writings of Whorf that Whorf argued language is more than verbal symbols that 
identify objects or processes; but language also constitutes non-verbal symbols and 
semiotic processes (Carroll, 1956). For example, the drawing of symbols in Mayan 
hieroglyphs, while not verbal, or symbolic representations of verbal linguistic forms. 
Saussure (1972) further added that language takes many forms including visual 
symbols and tangible items. Barthes (1964) expanded Saussure’s definition to include 
the importance of usage and matter in explaining the need, purpose and structure of a 
language. 
The referential and symbolic/semiotic nature and power of language is not 
limited to verbal codes; this same power and nature can include anything from (just to 
name a few) music (Back, 1995), campaigns (Heng, 1999), literature (Thiong’o, 
1986), and clothing (Barthes, 1972; Noth, 1990). A linguistic ideology perspective
does not include all of the dimensions of a language, as it does not pay attention to 
communicative and non-linguistic non-verbal symbols. I assert the additions of non-
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verbal symbols (such as cultural artifacts) into the same framework used by language 
ideology scholars will enhance the scholarship of language ideology research by 
allowing it to include under represented communicative forms, such as music, 
literature, and particularly clothing. In the case of France’s 2004 ban on the wearing 
of overtly religious symbols in French public schools, members of the Muslim and 
non-Muslim community have responded differently; however both have asserted the 
ban is ideological in nature and laced with elements of power, equality and 
difference. Therefore, I will examine the perceived ideologies behind the passage of 
the 2004 ban on the wearing of overtly religious symbols in public schools from a 
language ideology perspective. This analysis includes descriptions of the law and its 
rationale(s) from Muslims and non-Muslims, along with an analysis of how this 
ideological debate is framing the conflict between “Christian France” and “Muslim 
France.”
Space
Along with the symbolic and ideological significance of the hijab and Islam, 
the spatial significance of the hijab and the Muslim community should also be 
addressed. Hall (1959; 1966) asserted space or proxemics to be an important facet of 
human existence and comfort. In regard to a person’s perceived space, Hall and 
Goffman (1963) identified five different kinds of space: visual, auditory, olfactory, 
thermal and haptic (tactile) space. Casey (1996) from a phenomenological perspective 
and drawing on the works of Husserl, adds the concept of “sensation” as another form 
of space, one that does not include sensory signals, but is something individuals 
165
“begin with.” As members of a community we feel we have a place or a space that is 
our own, even though we may not be able to describe it or physically touch it. 
Casey (1996) further adds “there is no knowing or sensing a place except by 
being in that place, and to be in a place is to be in a position to perceive it” (p. 18). 
Since you must be in a place to perceive it, a place cannot be universal; it is cultural, 
regional, or historical. Thus, in order to describe a place or a space, an individual 
must experience it, must be a part of the phenomenon and understand the culture 
surrounding and within the space. Philipsen (1991) found this when he explored 
Teamsterville. Teamsterville is a blue-collar working community in Chicago. 
Philipsen found that as Chicago grew and as the younger generation began to leave 
the community in order to locate better employment and opportunities, that older 
members of the community felt as though their community was shrinking. Members 
of the community described their space as becoming smaller and less secure as the 
community began to change with the times. 
In the case of the hijab, as detailed in chapter five of this study, many Muslim 
women and men perceive it as a protection from the outside world, a physical barrier 
protecting their space. While many non-Muslims asserted the hijab physically 
separated the women from advancement into French culture. Either way, whether 
supporting or not supporting the hijab, its ability to designate a specific place for a 
Muslim and non-Muslim is a given fact. 
Moreover, the conglomeration of the hijab and other Islamic symbols and 
traditions signifies a specific place for the Muslims community, an ummah that can 
be both a real and or as Anderson would call it an imagined community (1990). The 
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following section takes these issues of space and ideology and reveals and analyzes 
the perceptions and comments of non-Muslims in response to the perceived or 
realistic existence of Muslim communities or ummahs in France.
French-Muslim and non-Muslim French perceptions
Throughout my interviews with participants in France (Muslim and non-
Muslim) three common themes emerged when discussing their respective 
community’s response(s) to the 2004 ban on the wearing of overtly religious symbols 
in French public schools: (1) Law 2004-228 and others like it protect France from 
losing its sense of cultural identity from the growing Muslim population, (2) the 
Muslim ummahs are shrinking under pressures to conform like law 2004-228, and (3) 
laws such as 2004-228 lead to increased political, economic and cultural opportunity 
for Muslims. The following three sections provide interview examples that illustrate 
these arguments. 
Pressure to conform protects France
Following and acting French in order to protect French culture is an argument 
many non-Muslims posed during interviews. Each non-Muslim participant voiced 
support for French cultural/linguistic policies and pressures for minority adaptation 
because they all deemed such policies as protections of French culture and society. 
Interviewee AY described how minority groups, such as Muslims, need to learn how 
to become French and to abandon demands for special privileges. She said:
Je ne comprends pas des musulmans. Les musulmans [pause] pensent qu'ils 
sont différents et [pause] ils veulent des privilèges spéciaux. Je ne pense pas 
que n'importe quel groupe devrait avoir des droits spéciaux dans une société 
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[pause] comme la France. Notre gouvernement [pause] passe des lois pour 
protéger la France et [pause] la communauté musulmane doit s'adapter en 
France.
I do not understand Muslims. Muslims [pause] think they are different [pause] 
and they want special privileges. I do not think any group should have special 
rights in a society [pause] like France. Our government [pause] passes laws to 
protect France and [pause] the Muslim community needs to adapt to France.
Interviewee AZ further elaborated on the need for France to pass legislation to 
protect its distinct culture. He said: “Il est important que la France protège sa culture 
[pause] et la France ne devrait pas permettre à des groupes de minorité de changer 
sa culture. S'il est nécessaire de passer des lois pour protéger notre culture, [pause] 
c’est d’accord” “It is important that France protects its culture [pause] and France 
should not allow minority groups to change its culture. If it is necessary to pass laws 
to protect our culture, [pause] that’s ok.”
Another participant, Interviewee AQ said legal restrictions against minority 
groups such as Law 2004-228 and other pressures put on minority groups to act more 
French are justified because such laws and pressures ensure the future of France and 
its culture. He said:
I want my children to live in a France that is French, [pause] and not 
something different. If France does [pause] not protect its culture [pause] we 
will become like other countries that are not pure now [pause] countries that 
have many problems and do not [pause] have one idea of what they are as 
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people. My children and [pause] my grand children must be French and not 
like minorities.
Interviewee AQ clearly asserts his desire for his children to live in what he 
deems a “French” France. When he states a “French” France is “pure” and a France 
with minority influences has “problems” and will not be “pure” he is demonstrating a 
sentiment shared by many other non-Muslim French participants, racism against 
Muslims in France. 
Another non-Muslim participant also said if France does not pass some 
cultural protection policies that terrorist sentiment will increase in France among the 
Muslim community. Interviewee AV said: 
The French government must protect the French people from terrorism. To 
protect the French people from things like terrorism [pause] the government 
must stop Muslims and other groups from [pause] hurting France. All people 
in France must be French and not something different or [pause] we will see 
more terrorism on the French streets. France [pause] it need to control 
Muslims and watch Muslims.
Watching and controlling the Muslim population is a second important reason 
advocated by non-Muslims for legal restrictions ad pressures on minority groups such 
as Muslims. Numerous non-Muslims stated the French government needs to institute 
more legal and covert control/monitoring of the Muslim population. Interviewee AQ 
said:
I think government [pause] needs to have more laws that permit government 
to watch Muslims. I [pause] want to know what they do in the mosques. 
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Maybe they say bad things [pause] maybe they plan bad things. I do not know. 
I think government and people need to know. We [pause] need to know what 
they do and say. 
Interviewee AA1 added the law banning the wearing of religious symbols in 
French schools like the hijab teaches Muslims their place in French culture. She said:
When France passed the law [pause] it was to say we are France and not a 
Muslim nation. Muslims here [pause] must do what is good for France and 
this law [pause] will make them not very strong and it will [pause] be easier to 
stop them from [pause] changing France. And it will be easier [pause] to 
watch the French.
Overall the non-Muslims interviewed for this project shared a few common 
arguments in regard to their perceptions and feelings about the Muslim population in 
France. Many of these men and women equated being Muslim with not being French, 
and specifically used language such as “us” and “them” to differentiate themselves 
from the Muslim immigrant population. Moreover many members of the non-Muslim 
group also equated being a Muslim with being a supporter of terrorism and suggested 
the best way to protect France is to “control” or “watch” the Muslims. Their 
sentiments have become the dominant discourse in France when it comes to a 
“Muslim problem.” These sentiments have been further reinforced by far- right 
National Front politicians like Le Pen (Perrineau, 2000).
Ummahs shrinking under pressures to conform
In response to Law 2004-228 and others like it, which shrink the importance, 
and physical space belonging to the Muslim ummahs, many Muslims interviewed for 
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this study voiced a counter-discourse, or a discourse that points out contradictions or 
flaws within the dominant discourse. One of the imams interviewed for this project, 
Interviewee AJ, described a communal sense of the ummah losing importance within 
the larger French culture. He said:
It is now happening [pause] in community that many Muslims [pause] many 
Muslims think community not important to French people now. Law like this 
[2004-228] say Muslims need to be [pause] need to be controlled when in 
public. Before such law [pause] it normal to walk in public with woman in 
hijab. Now [pause] people not feel as comfortable, they uh [pause] prefer to 
remain home or close to home, not far from home now. They not comfortable 
or [pause] not happy in public now outside ummah.
His description of Muslims in his ummah as not feeling comfortable outside 
of their own community is similar to another imam in another city in France, more 
than 200 miles away. Interviewee AI said:
I know many Muslims [pause] many Muslims who say it not good to be in 
public now. They uh [pause] not think it safe outside ummah. Many Muslims 
they think people outside ummah look at them and not like them. Many 
Muslims think [pause] France want them to be French and not Muslim in 
public. They now think it better to stay close to home [pause] to be true 
Muslims.
Imams weren’t the only Muslims who voiced these concerns, of not feeling 
safe outside of the ummah. Interviewee A, a Muslim woman said, “Je ne veux pas 
laisser ma communauté parce que les français veulent que je reste dans ma 
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communauté. Ils ont des lois qui sont anti-Musulmans et je ne pense pas que c'est sûr 
extérieur de la communauté” “I do not want to leave my community because French 
people want me to stay in my community. They have laws that are anti-Muslim and I 
do not think it is safe outside of the community.” 
Interviewee AF described a recent trip to another part of Paris than her 
ummah. She discussed how she was very uncomfortable and the other Muslim 
women she was with at the time said it would be best for them to return home as soon 
as possible. She said:
We go to other place in Paris and I not like it. I think [pause] people there look 
at me and friends. We hijab in Paris and one woman [pause] she say other 
thing to her friend about hijab we wear. She say it [pause] ugly and it stupid 
and we [pause] stupid because we hijab. I say to friends we need go home 
now. Normally I strong woman but not when there [pause] I not at home there 
in Paris.
This sense of insecurity is similar to the experiences Philipsen described in his 
analysis of young boys in Teamsterville. Philipsen (1992) found that when young 
boys in Teamsterville are on their “turf” they feel comfortable and are more secure in 
themselves than when they leave their “turf.” When the boys were taken to a different 
part of town, their verbal and non-verbal practices changed and revealed their 
insecurities in this new area, which was someone else’s “turf.” However, what is 
different between what Philipsen found and French Muslims is that the young boys in 
Teamsterville did not perceive themselves as legally unprotected outside of their 
community; they did not think Philipsen could protect them from unfamiliar boys or 
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men. In France, the Muslim community, in particular first-generation immigrants feel 
increasingly threatened not by strange boys whose “turf” they are violating, but by a 
French legal system set up to “punish their religion.” 
Interviewee Q said, “when I leave ummah I not protect from French law. Law 
say I not good like French Christian. I worry a man or woman will take my hijab off 
me.”  Interviewee I said, “I afraid for women who leave ummah because laws not 
good for Muslim women in France now. I think Muslims women need stay close to 
home now, it not safe outside community.” Interviewee N equated the recent string of 
“anti-Muslim legislation” to racism and said Muslim ummahs will close themselves 
to French influence if racism and such policies continue. She said:
People in France racist [pause] they not like Muslims. We uh [pause] are not 
bad people. I now say to children and grand children [pause] not to have 
French friends, and to not read French papers or uh [pause] not to watch 
French television. Muslims must be Muslim now [pause] and not be with 
France. Keep French out [pause] out of ummahs. 
In this passage she not only accuses the French people and government of being 
racist, but also suggests purposeful Muslim exclusion from mainstream French 
culture. By rejecting French media and not participating in interpersonal relationships 
with non-Muslim French she recommends increased Muslim solidarity and a closing 
of the ummahs to outside French influence. She is not alone in her suggestion. 
Interviewee S said:
It is time now [pause] it time now for Muslims to be Muslims and to not be 
French. Muslims should buy things [pause] you know things at stores [pause] 
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from Muslims and not French. Not sell things to French in our markets 
[pause] and not to talk to French now. 
Interviewee AN concurred and further suggested Muslims should stop 
marrying the “French.” He said, “I think if France not like Muslims [pause] have laws 
not for Muslims [pause] Muslims need not to marry French people. Keep my blood 
and Muslim blood different and not French.” Interviewees D, M, N, P, W, X, AB, and 
AI agreed with AN and all encouraged keeping Muslim blood “pure” and “clean” of 
“French” blood.
Within these three passages two interesting elements emerged, the desire for 
these individuals to linguistically separate themselves from the rest of France, and the 
concept of blood purity. By saying we should not be French or sell things to French 
people they are differentiating themselves from non-Muslim French culture, without 
calling the non-Muslim population anything but “French.” Furthermore, by 
suggesting Muslims should not marry and/or breed with “French” in order to keep 
Muslim blood pure, this particular Muslim male is advocating a biological separation 
from the Muslim ummahs and the non-Muslim French community. Blood is an 
important element of culture, since it is considered an essence of a person’s being 
(Gebser, 1984). In fact in many nations or in many groups blood is a vital 
requirement for membership. In Germany for example an immigrant cannot become a 
full German citizen unless they are born in Germany and at least one of their parents 
moved to Germany before the age of 14 and has a residence permit (Gannon, 2004). 
In the Jewish faith status within the community is linked to the individual’s mothers 
side. In Native-American tribes membership, and in many cases state benefits are 
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contingent upon an individual being able to show a certain percent of their blood is 
from a specific tribe (Dixon, 1995). By advocating the biological, economic, political 
and cultural seclusion from “French” culture because of external pressures to conform 
and perceived racism, the Muslim ummahs are attempting to close their communities 
to outside influence, which is a common characteristic of a counter-discourse.
Increased opportunity
While many of the Muslims advocated this seclusion in response to perceived 
pressures to conform, other Muslims, particularly the younger generation said recent 
French laws and acts are meant to expand their economic and political opportunities.  
Interviewee AL said the French government and people are trying to make it easier 
for Muslims to adapt to French culture by removing some obstacles to adaptation. He 
said:
I think [pause] Muslim women need choice to hijab or not to hijab. Many men 
not give choice to women in family. Many men [pause] they say you must or 
not hijab. Law in school good. It say to girls [pause] you have choice. This 
make easier for girls [pause] make easier for girls to become French and get 
good job when school finished.
Interviewee AA, who was born in France, agreed with Interviewee AL and 
argued the new law against the hijab (2004-228) provides young girls with a choice 
and this choice will help them gain independence sooner in France. He said:
I think law let girls choose. What bad with choice? They hijab at home and 
not at home. When they [pause] learn to choose it easier for girls to be 
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independent and not dependent on family for many years. They have better 
job and go to better school.
While Interviewee H, who was born in Great Britain agrees with Interviewees 
AA and AL and asserts new policies offer partial choices, she says the biggest benefit 
is also a disadvantage for the French Muslim population. She described how laws 
now offer a choice but make them abandon a part of their religion and go against their 
family in many cases. She added:
it is a double-edged sword. They can become more French, but they risk 
losing part of their Islamic life. Yes they will [pause] get a better job if they 
are more French [pause] but at what cost? At the cost of Islam? [pause] at the 
cost of the family? It does give opportunities but [pause] it takes away a lot as 
well. But think about it, [pause] if you were Muslim and were told France 
would let you be French if you stop wearing a veil, [pause] many young 
people would make that decision.  
In her discussion of the decision facing many young Muslim parents and young 
school children, she emphasized the perceived opportunities or benefits from losing 
the hijab in school. She also alluded to the rewards as being less than worthy, because 
in her opinion France has to let someone be French. The French government does 
have the power to determine citizenship requirements, but if a person is born in 
France, he/she is French by birth, and they may also be Muslim or some other 
ethnicity as well. Yet, recent legislation is perceived by many young Muslims as a 
chance to become more French and to have increased economic and political 
opportunity. Interviewees A, C, AG, and AO all added to the “opportunity” 
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discussion. Interviewee A added, “we live in France [pause] we should be French and 
do what people do in France [pause] and follow French ideas and rules I think to help 
France.”
Muslims interviewed for this study clearly disagree with the dominant 
discourse set forth by the majority of the French populace. The Muslims asserted they 
live in a state of fear, where they are afraid to go out in public because of potential 
reprisals for simply being a Muslim. Furthermore, this counter discourse also points 
out how the Muslim population knows they are not welcomed in France and that the 
French people are “racist” and that the Muslim population must keep the French “out 
of ummahs.”
Interestingly, shortly after the October 2005 riots, the French government 
passed legislation that made it easier for the French police to get warrants to search 
and to place cameras in mosques. The rationale behind this law, and other Patriot Act 
like rules approved after the riots was to increase the government’s ability to 
watch/monitor the Muslim population (Graff, 2005). Ultimately, the non-Muslim 
population in France and the Muslim population are at an impasse. Members of the 
Muslim communities throughout France perceive the dominant French culture as 
conspiring to eliminate Islam from France. While members of the non-Muslim 
dominant French culture perceive the best way to deal with the “Muslim problem” is 
to place pressures to conform on Muslim communities. In essence, the mounting 
pressures to conform placed upon the Muslim ummahs and the resistance and 
animosity from the Muslim ummahs have come together in a process of community 
alteration. The following section discusses this community alteration by applying a 
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systems perspective. This perspective is applied to both Muslim ummahs throughout 
France, and to show cross-cultural applicability to Chinese shopkeepers in Montreal, 
Canada.  
Model of community alteration
In many of the Muslim ummahs throughout France, a relationship is perceived 
between their language and culture, and the surrounding cultural milieu, and its 
politics, economics and other factors. This relationship has also been discovered and 
examined in the Quartier Chinois of Montreal (Croucher, 2003; Croucher 2005; 
2006). The connection between cultural symbols and language of communication and 
the language of communication or cultural habits/norms prescribed by the 
government is confusing and improper to many French Muslims and Chinese 
shopkeepers.
Hymes (1974) argues an ethnographer must analyze the entire system in 
which the communication is taking place. This entails looking at all of the other 
elements of the communication, the components of the communicative event, the 
relations among components, the capacity and state of components, the openness of 
the system, community/organizational subgroups, and the feedback the organization 
gets from the outside (Harris, 2002). Analyzing all of these elements together to gain 
a better understanding of the communicative acts taking place in Montreal and in 
France reveals that the manner in which the minority community talks about 
pressures to conform is integral to communal identification. Essentially, the linguistic 
laws placed on the immigrant population inhabiting the Quartier Chinois (Chinese, 
Laotian, Hmong, Korean and Vietnamese) define their communal living space, and 
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thus their linguistic space; while laws in place in France and rising racism against 
Muslims defines the limits of the Muslim ummahs. 
Ultimately, the borders of the Quartier Chinois and Muslim ummahs in 
France are becoming both blurred and more solidified at the same time, linked to 
generation and economic success. Shopkeepers voiced concern over younger 
generations giving up their mother tongues, and adopting French or English in some 
cases as their first language of communication (Croucher, 2003). Many of the 
shopkeepers argued their linguistic community is shrinking, while younger 
generations in the Quartier Chinois  argue their linguistic community is expanding 
outside of the Quartier Chinois.
In France, on one hand, many first-generation Muslim immigrants talked 
about their children forgetting a Muslim heritage, and becoming more French than 
Muslim. Second and successive generation Muslims, on the other hand, assert they 
are adapting to French culture because the adaptation is inevitable and the adaptation 
leads to greater political, cultural and economic success (Croucher, 2005). Younger 
Muslims perceive themselves as having a choice as to where and how they live. 
Instead of having to live the same life as their parents, and in the same space as their 
parents, many within the younger generation see themselves as being able to choose 
their future and what their religious or cultural space will be. This means that some of 
the younger Muslim population will leave their learned Muslim space, and join the 
dominant cultural space. 
Blu (1996) discusses how a community can have blurred boundaries, 
boundaries not officially set forth on a map, but boundaries that are more symbolic or 
metaphorical. These boundaries can be based on numerous factors such as, to name 
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only a few, language, culture, and group affiliation (Houser & Ham, 2004). In the 
case of the first generation shopkeepers in Montreal and first generation Muslim 
immigrants in France, they recognize their communities have boundaries.  
Approximately 15-20 years ago the only languages spoken in Montreal’s Quartier
were immigrant languages like Mandarin and Korean for example. However, as 
linguistic laws have become more solidified, political pressure mounted, economic 
demands grown, and as children of the first generation immigrants have grown and 
been educated in the Québécois system, the Quartier has lost much of its linguistic 
comfort for first generation immigrants. Similarly, in France approximately 10-15 
years ago more children understood Arabic and attended Mosque on a regular basis. 
Now Mosque attendance is down, and Arabic fluency has plummeted among second 
and successive generations (Croucher, 2006).
On the other hand, the children and grandchildren of the first generation 
immigrants assert their linguistic and ethnic comfort zone is expanding outside of the 
prescribed boundaries of their community, and into the dominant cultural milieu. A 
son of one of the shopkeepers described how his Canadian education and job have 
opened up opportunities for him economically. “I work for big company here in 
Montreal. If I still lived in the Quartier I would not have my job, or be part of the 
Canadian culture” he said. When asked if he was only part of the Canadian culture he 
responded, “I am in the middle, I am both Canadian or Québécois and Chinese, but I 
don’t speak Mandarin, that’s all. I still love my culture, but knowing French allows 
me to be in both cultures at the same time.” Four other children of shopkeepers I 
interviewed agreed with Zi, and said knowing French expanded their zone of 
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linguistic comfort. Their imagined community, to use a phrase from Anderson (1991) 
expands outside the Quartier Chinois, and into the Québécois community/culture. 
Second and successive generation Muslim immigrants also explained how 
they see their chances for opportunity expanding as they become more and more 
French. One participant, Interviewee AG who went to a French university said, “I 
speak English and French, [pause] people know I am Muslim. But I am French first. I 
do not speak Arabic now. [pause] It is not necessary for me now. I have more in life 
than Islam.” This Muslim and others express their desire for “cultural independence 
and self-determination,” which is something France and its fear of “a Europe of 
tribes” will not tolerate (Blommaert & Verschueren, 1998). 
I argue when a community has set boundaries, those boundaries may remain 
the same under external pressure to conform (linguistic, cultural economic, and 
political) but the imagined boundaries may shrink. The community can experience 
feelings of isolation, which can lead to a reconceptualizing of the community itself 
(Amit, 2002; Dawson, 2002; Kempny, 2002) The perceived boundaries of the 
community may metaphorically shrink for older residents of the community. Yet, as 
the imagined community shrinks, the same external pressures will open up the 
borders of the imagined community of younger generations linked to the original 
ethnic community.
Furthermore, drawing on the work of Giles, Bourhis and Taylor (1977), if an 
ethnic group has minimal social status, a small demographic presence, and little 
institutional support, that group will have weakened ethnolinguistic vitality, and 
therefore a greater chance of perceiving their linguistic comfort zone as shrinking. 
That group will also be more apt to adapt to the dominant culture or develop more 
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pride in their ethnic group, as a form of cultural resistance (Khalaf, 2001). I have 
included a preliminary diagram of this process. (see Appendix B) This diagram 
cannot grasp all of the variables taking place in this process of community alteration; 
instead it serves as a snapshot of what is currently taking place in two distinct ethnic 
communities, in two distinctly different nations on two different continents.
Ultimately, as external pressures to conform to the dominant cultures have 
mounted in Montreal and in France, the first generation of immigrants have 
responded through resentment, and through fear of losing their ethnic identity, while 
their children have in many cases embraced the dominant culture, or in some cases 
retaliated against the dominant culture into a form of “Asian or Muslim pride.” 
Clearly, the issue of how these two groups adapt to either Canadian or French culture 
is an important issue, since their rate of immigration continues to increases in both 
nations (Croucher, 2005; 2006). An understanding of the effects of pressures to 
conform, even if the minority group could misunderstand those “pressures,” is 
imperative to explaining how and why some immigrants will and will not or can and 
cannot adapt to a dominant culture. If the treatment and subsequent response of a 
minority community (counter discourse) is not recognized and explored, more riots 
and other acts of violence or tension could develop in nations that have competing 
discourses over racial/ethnic relations. 
CHAPTER 7
Discussion 
The following chapter draws conclusions and analyses from this research 
project. The first section addresses the research questions posed in the introductory 
chapter. The second section examines the results of this study to extrapolate two 
conclusions developing from this study. The first conclusion discusses the changing 
nature of Islam as a global religion and asserts the importance and influence of 
religion on French-Muslim cultural adaptation and French-Muslim and non-Muslim 
cultural interaction cannot be understated. This argument further asserts religion is a 
fundamental cultural issue that is mistakenly ignored by communication scholars. The 
second conclusion describes the current state of cultural integration in France and 
argues cultural adaptation is failing and a new, form of cultural integration and/or 
fusion is emerging. 
Research Questions
The first research question of this study asked: What does the hijab mean to 
Muslims in France? As illustrated in chapter five of this project, the hijab carries 
many meanings for Muslims in France. To some of the Muslims interviewed for this 
project, the hijab represents the religion of Islam. For other Muslims it symbolizes a 
holy, almost matrimonial bond between a woman and the Prophet Muhammad. 
Moreover, some participants asserted the hijab is a way for Muslim women to protect 
themselves from outsiders who might “take away their modesty” and make them less 
comfortable in public. Still, other Muslims voiced opposition to the hijab, and called 
it a symbol of masculine oppression, and advocated women having a choice as to 
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whether they should wear the hijab or not. Ultimately, this analysis reveals that the 
hijab is multi-dimensional, and that it does not have one set interpretation within this 
particular population. 
The second research question asked: Has the meaning of the hijab changed for 
Muslim wearers and Muslim non-wearers of the hijab since the French ban was 
approved? In addressing this issue, many of the participants in this study stated they 
think more about the purpose and meaning of the hijab since Law 2004-228 was 
passed. Participants argued this law and perceived mounting anti-Muslim rhetoric and 
racism has led to a development in “Muslim pride.” Within this sense of “Muslim 
pride” many Muslims asserted they wear or support the hijab because it is a Muslim 
tradition that runs counter to French secularism and reinforces a Muslim identity in 
France. Thus, for many of the Muslim men and women interviewed during this 
project, the meaning of the hijab has indeed intensified in the wake of the passage of 
Law 2004-228.
The third research question related to the issue of the hijab and identity. This 
question addressed: Do Muslim wearers and Muslim non-wearers of the hijab deem 
the hijab to be a representation of their self-identity? As examined in chapter five, 
many individuals within the Muslim community said they did not have a strong or 
vocalized self-identity, at least not until their religion and culture were placed under 
“attack” by French secularism and legal policies. Many of the participants said after 
Law 2004-228 was passed that they began to look at themselves in the mirror and 
realize that they were indeed different from the rest of the French culture. While this 
group also stated they were always considered different and treated differently, since 
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Law 2004-228 was passed they have had a common reason to unite as a Muslim 
community. Uniting in protest to Law 2004-228 and arguing their Muslim selves 
cannot and should not be excluded from French society brought forth a mainly 
subconscious, and unarticulated self-identity. Therefore, the hijab has become a 
visible and tangible way for the Muslim-French community to exclude or to include 
themselves with the French or Muslim communities. 
Research question four addressed the issue of laîcité and asked: Do Muslim 
immigrants in France believe the hijab can co-exist with the French concept of laîcité, 
or a separation of church and state? In this case, the hijab served as a symbol for 
Muslim immigrant adaptation into a secular French state. Within chapter four 
Muslims discussed how they do not feel welcomed in France because they are 
different from the French ideal of a citizen. These immigrants look different, many 
come from North Africa, and they practice a religion very different from the 
dominant religion in France, Christianity. Due to the religious difference between the 
Muslim population and the dominant French culture, the participants in this 
population at least, asserted they currently, and will continue to find it difficult to co-
exist with the French concept of laîcité, because their religion is the key differing 
factor for their group. These immigrants argue it is impossible to exist in France 
without the influence of Islam. However, they feel pressured to abandon their religion 
because too much religious affiliation and reliance, they perceive, is considered a 
weakness and incompatible with French cultural beliefs and norms. Overall, this 
group claims laws and policies such as Law 2004-228 are a direct attack on Islam and 
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an attempt by the French government and people to eradicate Islam from the French 
hexagon, a metaphor for the French state.
The argument that Law 2004-228 is an attack against Islam is the response 
many Muslims gave to research question five: What reasons do Muslims and non-
Muslims attribute to the passage of Law 2004-228? The overwhelming majority of 
the Muslims interviewed for this project argued the law is a direct, not covert, attempt 
by the French government and people to remove the influence and presence of Islam 
within France. Participants called the policy “racist” and directly targeted “toward the 
Muslim people.” Some Muslims even went as far to say that France does not want the 
Muslim population and that Law 2004-228 was an attempt to push them out of 
France, or to make them leave the country voluntary for increased religious freedom. 
Non-Muslims, on the other hand, disagreed with the Muslims to an extent, but 
also reinforced some of the suspicions voiced by Muslims. A few non-Muslims said 
Law 2004-228 was written to protect secularism, and that it removes all religious 
symbols, including Jewish and Christian symbols. However, other non-Muslim 
French said Law 2004-228 is an attack against the Muslim population, and this group 
provided numerous justifications. First, some non-Muslims said Islam is associated 
with terrorism. Second, some participants said Muslims must abandon the religion of 
Islam and become culturally French. Third, non-Muslim participants argued Law 
2004-228 and others like it would protect the “purity” of the French race and culture. 
These three arguments were also used by non-Muslims when addressing research 
question six.
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Research question six asked: Do the majority of Muslims successfully adapt 
to the French culture? The answer to this question, at least from this study and this 
researcher’s perspective, is no. The overwhelming majority of Muslims in France do 
not successfully adapt to French culture for a multitude of reasons illustrated in 
chapter four. To reiterate these reasons, the failed adaptation is due to Muslim 
reluctance or inability, and host culture receptivity. 
First of all, many Muslims are reluctant to fully adapt to French culture 
because they perceive this adaptation involving an erasure of their Islamic heritage 
and culture. Thus, many within the Muslim community attempt to retain their Muslim 
heritage while also mimicking the dominant cultural milieu. This concept of 
mimicking has been further addressed in other research (Kramer, 2003; Croucher, 
2005; 2006). Many members of the Muslim community also perceive themselves as 
unable to adapt to French culture. Many of the participants interviewed for this study 
stated they do not know what they are expected to do in order to be French, are too 
old to fully learn the language and cultures, and are not welcomed when trying to 
adapt to French culture. A few of the participants said they are not welcomed in 
French culture and must remain on the outside looking in. Members of the host 
culture, non-Muslim French, also described the issue of host culture receptivity. 
Every non-Muslim French person interviewed for this study said the Muslim 
population must act more French, but each person also said France will not accept 
their advances. Non-Muslims said the Muslim population is “too different” to become 
French, they look different, eat different foods, and practice a different religion. One 
participant said he would never consider a Muslim to be a French citizen (Interviewee 
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AA1). Clearly, if the Muslim population does not have the willingness and/or ability 
to adapt to French culture, and if the French culture will not accept their adaptation 
advances then Muslim cultural adaptation will be generally unsuccessful in France. 
Instead of adapting and becoming part of the French culture, many members of the 
Muslim community are emphasizing the importance of their Muslim communities or 
ummahs, and withdrawing from mainstream French culture. The result of this 
withdraw signals a closing of the Muslim community from the rest of France, which 
will most likely lead to isolationism and increased cultural misunderstandings. 
After analyzing the results of the six research questions, and examining the 
common trends that emerged within chapters four, five and six, there are three 
conclusions that develop from this work. The first conclusion examines the concept 
of Frenchness, and asserts Muslims and non-Muslims in France are in the midst of an 
identity transition. The second is that religion as a cultural variable is an important 
variable that should not be ignored. Specifically in regard to the Muslim faith, 
religion is the most important cultural factor. Furthermore, Islam is in the midst of a 
transformation, from a magic religion to a mythic religion in response to 
aperspectival cultural pressures. The third conclusion pertains to the failure of 
French-Muslims to culturally adapt to the French culture. In particular, this 
conclusion argues what is happening in France is a conglomeration between forced 
compliance and cultural fusion. This conclusion also illustrates the reasons behind 
non-Muslim-French refusals to allow Muslims to become culturally French. 
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Conclusions
French Identity Crisis
France is in the midst of an identity crisis. France has a strong sense of 
“nation” that goes all the way back to the French Revolution when the modern day 
French state was established (Carlyle, 1995). Since the fall of the French monarchy 
the idea of a French “nation” has been synonymous with French identity (Hargreaves, 
1995).  However, that identity has been splintered in recent years as France 
experiences a rapid influx in immigration from nations that are predominantly non-
Western, and non-Christian. With this influx, French Christians are afraid of losing 
their French culture and identity to encroaching minority populations (ethnic and 
religious). Minority populations on the other hand, especially the Muslim populations 
from North Africa and Turkey, want to retain part of their Muslim self, while also 
becoming and participating in French culture (Croucher, 2005). 
Muslims in France are in the midst of an identity crisis that not only pertains 
to their religion, and nation of birth, but also to their concept of sexuality, freedom, 
expression and the family. Gaspard (1995) conducted interviews with young Muslim 
girls and found that their ideas of what it means to be a Muslim woman are changing. 
Girls described how they were torn between their Muslim sense of self, and their 
ability to be a modern French girl. Women interviewed for this project expressed 
similar sentiments. Interviewee J said: 
I can be Muslim woman in France [pause] and I also [pause] I want to be 
French. I think it possible [pause] but I want be modern French woman and 
also modern Muslim woman too at same time. I want [pause] Muslim family 
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and French family.
French-Christians on the other hand are not in a conflict over their sexuality, 
freedom, expression or family. Instead, they are in a growing conflict over their ideal 
French culture changing under the saturation of minority populations. Interviewee 
AF1 said: 
I think France must protect France. It [pause] good for France to have 
different people [pause] but France need protect France. We different but my 
children [pause] they must not have be not French. French children need be 
French and not French and other things also. If France become not French 
[pause] there be many problems [pause] many problems in France. France 
Christian nation and [pause] it need be Christian nation. 
This issue of religion is an important factor in the cultural conflict-taking 
place in France. As the French Muslim population grows in France, and becomes the 
second largest religious group in France, religion has become a fundamental and 
controversial issue of cultural debate (Croucher, 2005). Religion as a fundamental 
cultural variable cannot be under estimated. 
Religion as a Cultural Variable
As previously mentioned (in chapter five) religion is an important cultural 
variable that most communication scholars ignore, or mistakenly lump with other, 
less influential cultural variables such as masculinity/femininity, 
individualism/collectivism or patriarchal/matriarchal. Since the majority of social 
scientific communication research comes out of 1960s and 1970s psychological 
research many of the same tenets as psychology are followed. Thus, it is not 
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surprising that the overwhelming majority of studies in intercultural or cross-cultural 
communication ignore religion (this critique focuses on these two areas of 
communication only, while other areas of study in communication such as 
interpersonal, organizational and political communication also generally neglect the 
potential effects of religion). 
The following is a list of 25 important (meaning often cited) studies in 
intercultural and cross-cultural communication. This is not a complete or an 
exhaustive list; it is not intended to be a complete or an exhaustive list of the 
“important” intercultural pieces, it serves as a snapshot of the inattention of 
communication scholars when it comes to addressing religion and how it impacts 
various communicative processes. This list includes original theoretical works on 
theories from anxiety/uncertainty management to identity negotiation to cultural 
adaptation; this list also includes synopses of the discipline of intercultural and cross-
cultural communication: (Anderson, 1991; Berry & Kim, 1987; Carbaugh, 1996; 
Cupach & Imahori, 1993; Geertz, 1973; Giles, Bourhis & Taylor, 1977; Goffman, 
1967; Gudykunst, 1995; 2001; Gudykunst & Kim, 1997; 2003; Gudykunst & Lee, 
2003; Hall, 1989; Hofstede, 1980; Kim, 1976; 1988; 2000; 2003; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Oetzel, Ting-Toomey, Masumoto, Yokochi, Pan, Takai & Wilcox, 
2001; Philipsen, 1992; Tajfel, 1978; Ting-Toomey, 1993; Trubisky, Ting-Toomey & 
Lin, 1991; Wiseman & Horn, 1995). 
What these studies, and others demonstrate is that for more than forty years 
intercultural and cross-cultural communication research has yet to explore the 
potential effects of religion on communicative events or acts. Such an exploration 
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could reveal astounding results. In this particular study, religion was deemed to be the 
most important and in most cases the determining factor as to whether the Muslim 
immigrant would be able to fit into the French cultural ideal. While religion is a part 
of a person’s culture, this study reveals that a person’s religion influences how they 
interpret cultural artifacts, rationalize political acts and this study demonstrates how a 
person’s religion affects their self-identification (social identity theory) and the way 
in which they attempt or reject cultural adaptation. It would be prudent for other 
studies to at least explore religion, and to learn about the religion and its potential 
impacts on a population. 
While doing this research I not only learned how Muslims and non-Muslims 
differ culturally, communicatively or religiously, I also learned a great deal about 
Islam: where the religion came from, its current status and where it is heading in the 
future. Discovering that Islam is transforming from a primarily magic to a more 
mythic religion aided in analyzing the interactions between Muslims and non-
Muslims because this transformation offered a further grounding for comparison. The 
following section describes this transformation of Islam and explains why an 
understanding of this transformation is essential to the examination and analysis of 
this study’s findings.   
Changing Nature of Islam from Magic to Mythic Religion
In the preface of his 2004 book, Olivier Roy states: “globalised Islam refers to 
the way in which the relationship of Muslims to Islam is reshaped by globalization, 
westernization and the impact of living as a minority” (p. ix). Islam has indeed gone 
global, and as of 2001, the global Muslim population was approximately 1.2 billion 
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adherents around the world (CIA Factbook, 2006). In the wake of Muslim expansion, 
Islam increasingly encounters Western governments and ideologies. The issue of 
modernity within Islam, and the adaptation of Islam into a more Western/useable 
religion is a paramount concern among Muslim scholars and adherents (Kassim, 
2005). Muslim teachers and followers are in the midst of a religious transformation, 
from a traditional Islam (focusing entirely on the Koran) into a modern form of Islam 
that adapts to its respective Western culture/nation. This transformation is taking 
place in how Muslims interpret the holy scriptures of the Koran, in how Muslims 
around the world interact with the dominant cultures in which they find themselves to 
be a minority, and in the decreasing emphasis on Arabic as the language of Islam.
A major transformation-taking place within Islam is an alteration in the 
emphasis and interpretation of Koranic verses. As many Muslims begin to identify 
more with their nation of residence, and identify with Islam on a mainly religious and 
not cultural level (Roy, 2004), their interpretation of Koranic verses has become more 
“Western.” Roy (2004) provides the example of divorce. Within the Koran a man is 
justified in divorcing a wife (polygamy is not forbidden but encouraged in the Koran 
if a person is a traditionalist). However, in many mosques around the world imams, or 
holy teachers are beginning to tell their fellow Muslims that divorce is a sin, and 
something that should be avoided. The adoption of the Judeo-Christian doctrine 
against divorce is a direct result of Muslim communities living as minorities within 
Western cultures. 
Moreover, the language used when addressing female issues within Islam has 
also taken on a “Western” rhetoric. Kassim (2005) asserts phrases such as “equal 
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rights,” and “social relations” are a direct result of the Westernization of Islam. As 
Islam has become increasingly globalized, the educational level of many Muslim 
women has increased, and “awareness of women’s rights and their role in the Muslim 
societies” has also increased (Kassim, 2005, p. 108). Kassim adds, “women’s roles 
are not confined to the traditional sphere of religious observances . . . Now they enter 
into the sphere of social relations . . . and have relatively more impact in the social 
aspects than they used to in the past” (2005, p. 108). The increasing role and 
importance of women within Islam is not only a result of the globalization of Islam, 
but also a result of more Muslim men interpreting the Koranic verses on women to be 
what modernist Islamic imams would call “supportive” of women’s rights. In fact, 
Stowasser (1994) argues that out of the three major global religions, Christianity, 
Judaism, and Islam, Islam by its holy book is the most supportive and liberating 
toward women. However, traditionalist Muslim scholars and imams have been using 
archaic interpretations of the Koran to subjugate women since the death of the 
Prophet Muhammad. 
A second transformation taking place within Islam is the increased focus on 
successful and complementary negotiation and co-existence with other religions, 
especially Christianity. While there are still sects of Islam, and splinter groups like Al 
Qaeda who call for the destruction of the West, Roy (2004) argues the overwhelming 
majority of Muslims do not follow this doctrine. Instead the overwhelming majority 
of Muslims have learned (or improved) how to co-exist with the West. Roy (2004) 
asserts the majority of Muslims around the world live as minorities in non-Muslim 
nations. The existence of large groups of Muslims in non-Muslims nations 
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necessitates the co-existence and cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims. 
Nourallah (2002) states the average Muslim in the 21st century has learned or will 
have to learn how to forget religious differences in everyday interactions with the 
West, and to avoid the calling of Westerners “infidels.” Unfortunately, in the wake of 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, this same group of global Muslims living 
as minorities have been forced to minimize their profile. Unlike other religious 
minority groups such as Jews, or ethnic minority groups like African-Americans in 
the United States, Muslims are unable to politically or economically unite behind a 
common cause. Their union according to Roy (2004) would be seen as a danger to 
most nations, and will cause unrest because a unified Muslim community in a 
Western nation will bring forth ideas of terrorism, jihad and Osama bin Laden. Thus, 
even though Muslims have learned how to peacefully co-exist as a minority group in 
Western nations, they have been recently forced to keep a low profile.      
A third kind of transformation taking place in Islam is the separation between 
an understanding of Arabic, and being a Muslim. The Koran was originally written in 
Arabic, and for centuries an individual had to be able to write and read Arabic in 
order to read the Koran, since translations were viewed as blasphemous. However, in 
the 20th century the Koran was translated into virtually every major language. The 
translation of the Koran was a profoundly important event because it took Islam from 
a magic into a mythic religion. A religion that is magic (Gebser, 1984) is one in 
which the speaking of the words in the original language can bring the words to life. 
For example, speaking the name Muhammad in Arabic can bring Muhammad 
(metaphysically) to the event, or saying or drawing the symbol for the word “eagle” 
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in a Native American magic religion can concoct an eagle. Therefore, when the 
Koran was translated from Arabic into other languages, this act tore down the magical 
nature of Islam and placed it into a mythical period. The main difference is that in a 
mythical religion saying a word will not mean the word can come to life, it means the 
word is still important but it is separate from the act of speaking or writing it. Thus, 
when a person still says Muhammad they are speaking of the Holy Prophet and must 
be respectful, but the uttering of his name will not bring him to the physical presence 
of the speaker/writer. 
In essence, translating the Koran has had a similar effect to the printing and 
subsequent translation of the Christian Bible. Before the printing of the first Christian 
Bible by Gutenberg in the 1450s, the only way a Christian in the Roman Catholic 
West could learn and be a Christian was to attend Mass. During the Mass, the only 
person who knew the verses of the Bible, and could speak or write the language of the 
Bible (Latin) was the priest. The priest would speak the words in the Bible, while the 
parishioners faced the opposite direction, because they were not divine or holy 
enough to witness the transformation of the priest into a vehicle for God. The 
speaking of the words in the Bible elevated the priest as a vehicle for God. However, 
after the Bible was printed and later translated into German, English, and Greek in the 
1490s and early 1500s the transformation from magic to mythic religion began. No 
longer was a priest the only one who could read or understand the Holy Scripture, but 
after the printing and translating, anyone who could afford a Bible, or read would 
participate as well. This participation transitioned Christianity from a magic religion 
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to what it is today, a mythic religion where the word of God in the Bible is still 
sacred, but open to interpretation, translation, scrutiny and individual experience. 
One caveat must be posed however; Islam has not completely transitioned into 
a mythic religion. The February 2006 printing of cartoon depicting the Prophet 
Muhammad by a Danish newspaper is an example that caused riots, protests and 
violence in numerous Middle Eastern nations and Muslim countries. Within the 
Islamic faith it is forbidden to depict the Prophet Muhammad in any likeness. The 
reaction of many Muslims to these cartoons reveals the magical power of Muhammad 
as a figure. Muslims did not see his depiction as editorial commentary or free press, 
but instead as a direct representation of the Prophet, which was dishonored through 
humor. The reaction of the Muslim world to these cartoons was swift and severe, and 
the response left many in the Western world scratching their heads and asking, “What 
happened?” The failure of many Westerners to understand why drawing Muhammad 
would cause such an uproar reveals the conflict between magic, mythic and 
perspectival cultures. The West, which is a mainly perspectival culture (Gebser, 1984; 
Kramer, 2003; Croucher, 2005), cannot relate or understand how this image would 
cause distress among a magic/mythic culture.
Clearly, Islam is in a transition period, whether it is a post 9/11 transition, or a 
natural transition as more and more Muslims interact with the West. What must be 
understood is that this transition must be studied, observed and analyzed. 
Communication scholars stand at an optimal point to conduct this work. 
Communication research examines how individuals communicate with the world and 
society around them. There is currently a religious, cultural, political and social 
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transformation-taking place in Islam that will forever impact how Muslims 
communicate with one another, and how they communicate with other religions such 
as Christianity (meaning Western nations and cultures). This research study is one 
step in this analysis; by analyzing how the hijab is transforming for many Muslims 
there is a tangible example of communicative change and alteration. This change 
warranted analysis.      
Failure of French Cultural Integration
A second conclusion stemming from this analysis is that France and its 
Muslim and non-Muslim populations are in the midst of failed cultural integration. 
Instead of the Muslim population overwhelmingly adopting French culture, many are 
resisting and blaming French racism and lack of French acceptance for their failed 
integration. What I assert is happening is that French covert and overt anti-
Muslimism is coming forth in everyday and political rhetoric in response to numerous 
historical and current events in France and throughout the world. As the collective 
subconscious emerges against the Muslim population, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult for Muslims and non-Muslims in France to co-exist and become one nation. 
To facilitate this argument I will first discuss how adaptation never worked in 
France. Then I will illustrate how in response to failed cultural adaptation the French 
government is enacting institutional instruments to force cultural adaptation. Next, I 
will examine the hermeneutic horizon that is taking place in France, how specific 
historical and current events reinforce pre-conceived French prejudices and fuel anti-
French Islamicism. 
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Adaptation Never Worked in France
Initially, it is imperative to realize that the majority of Muslim immigrants to 
France have not successfully adapted to the French culture. In fact, most Muslim 
immigrants, and even second and third-generation Muslim immigrants born in France 
exist in a state of limbo, where they are not fully French, and are not fully Muslim 
(Roy, 2004; Croucher, 2005). As previously discussed, the Muslim population in 
France has experienced difficulties adapting to French culture primarily because of 
their religion and skin color. Interviewee H stated: “because my skin is darker I do 
not think I will ever become fully French. Too many French people think that [pause] 
you must be white to be French, and Muslims are not white normally.”
Since the Muslim population looks different, typically with darker skin, and 
are not Christian, Jewish or secularists, they have never been truly welcomed in 
France. Moreover, the Muslim community in France has also demanded recognition 
for Islam, which is something not tolerated or even expected in a secular France 
(Gaspard, 1995). 
What has happened, instead of the Muslim community adapting to French 
culture, the majority of the Muslim community has learned how to mimic the French 
culture. Interviewee I said: “I learn what I need do to have people think I French. I 
[pause] need to be French when in public but Muslim when home.” Kramer (2003) 
discusses this process when he asserts many newcomers to a culture will not fully 
adapt to the culture, but will instead mimic the dominant culture in an effort to “fit 
in.” Overall, the Muslim-French population is stuck between wanting to be 
considered a French citizen, while at the same time wanting to retain their native 
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cultural traits, which is deemed unworthy and unacceptable with the cultural 
adaptation framework as set forth by Gudykunst and Kim (1997; 2003). 
Institutional Adaptation
In response to failed Muslim cultural adaptation, or assimilation, the French 
state has begun a policy of institutional cultural adaptation. Institutional adaptation is 
when a government places laws and creeds in place to force a minority group to 
become more like the dominant group. Looking through the annals of history, there 
are many examples of institutional forced cultural adaptation, or attempts by the 
dominant culture to make the minority cultures become or appear more like the 
dominant culture, or to eradicate the minority culture(s) all together: all captured 
subjects of the Roman empire were considered Roman and required to volunteer for 
military service, Peter the Great required that all men in Russia shave off their beards 
in order to appear more European, Mao Tse-Tung mandated all Chinese citizens read 
his red book and vow allegiance, and even worship him, the British government 
mandated English education and training in India during its occupation, and most 
recently France passed legislation outlawing the hijab and other religious symbols in 
public schools and in government buildings. 
While these examples run the gamut from extreme cases to more mild 
instances of institutional adaptation or eradication, each does reveal how a dominant 
group through government means can force a minority group to act like the dominant 
group, at least in public. In each of the cases, individuals acted one way in public, and 
another way in private. This is happening in France. Many Muslims are publicly 
removing their hijabs, in order to function in French society, but re-veiling when they 
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are in the confines of their homes. Not only were such stories revealed in Gaspard 
(1995) but also in this study. Interviewee AG described how: “I have one me at home 
and [pause] another me when I not at home.” This dual reality, of mimicking the 
French when in public and being “more” Muslim in private is common among 
immigrant groups (Kramer, 2003). One thing that each of the aforementioned cases 
has in common, while each is very different and unique, is that each new piece of 
legislation or restriction stemmed from a deep-seated, pre-conceived prejudice against 
a minority group.  
Hermeneutic Horizon 
Europe has had difficulties accepting Islam since the Crusades. When 
European royalty went to liberate Jerusalem they took the flag of Christianity to a 
Muslim world and fought against Islam in the name of Christianity. Since then, 
Christian Europe and the Muslim world have been at odds (Tholfsen, 1984). During 
the 20th century, with the increasing number of Muslims immigrating to Europe, and 
with the global rise of Islam, Europe has had to live with Islam within its borders on a 
daily basis. This co-existence has not always been peaceful. 
What I intend to argue with the following examples of historical events is that 
these events collectively added to a pre-conceived prejudice within Christian Europe 
against Islam. Each event not only added to the pre-conceived prejudices, but these 
events collectively have given many individuals in Christian Europe self-validation 
for their prejudices. This list is not completely exhaustive, since it is only a snapshot 
of certain events, particularly events within Europe, and within the past fifty years. I 
have chosen this time frame because this is when a large portion of the voting public 
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in France was either in formative years, or their parents were in their formative years; 
and since it is the voting public, which enacts institutional cultural adaptation, it is 
necessary to understand why the voting public acts in one manner over another. 
Over the past fifty years Europe and the world have seen the rapid expansion 
of telecommunications. With the development of telecommunications news events 
happen, and a moment later they are available for public consumption. The 
advancements in telecommunications (television, cable, phone, internet) has brought 
analysis and potential ammunition to pre-conceived anti-Muslim prejudices because 
events are now immediately transmitted to the public, where an image is seen and an 
image made. The following five events that involve Islam in one way or another have 
stuck with the French consciousness. I have chosen to exclude the 2005 riots because 
those were described in greater detail earlier in this analysis; however, these riots did 
and will continue to have a lasting impact on French Muslim and non-Muslim 
relations. 
From 1954 to 1962 France was engaged in the Algerian War of independence. 
The former French department in Africa demanded independence from France and a 
war broke out that cost somewhere between 300,000 and 1.5 million lives (numbers 
are estimates because the Algerian and French governments both report a different 
number of casualties). Throughout the war, French citizens read about Algerians 
attacking and killing French troops, and even saw pictures of the war in Le Monde. 
These images still resonate long after the end of the war and Algerian independence 
in 1962. Silverstein (2004) asserts French people will not forget the Algerian War, 
and continue to hold this war against Algerians and other Muslims. He adds that the 
202
Algerian Civil War gave the French another reason to hate Muslims. The following 
picture is an image that was printed in the June 19, 1956 image of Le Monde. 
QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (LZW) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
 
Another event that took place in Europe that still resonates with many 
individuals is the 1972 Olympics massacre in Munich. Eight members of Black 
September kidnapped eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team. The eleven 
Israelis died in a botched rescue attempt at the Munich airport when the kidnappers 
detonated grenades and shot the hostages (Morris, 2001). This event was televised 
around the world. Even in France, the loss of the Israeli athletes was a tremendous 
loss, since their death represented one of the most violent (at that time) terrorist acts 
on European soil (Reeve, 2001), and thrust the Palestinian cause into the limelight, a 
cause that has mistakenly been linked to Islam without a complete understanding of 
either Islam or the Palestinian cause (Morris, 2001). For the members of Black 
September the kidnapping was in response to the unlawful incarceration of 
approximately 230 Palestinians into Israeli jails. The following image was broadcast 
on television networks around the world on September 5, 1972. 
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QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (LZW) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
 
A third event that offered self-validation for anti-Muslim prejudice was a 
collection of terrorist attacks from 1973 to 1985, all planned or perpetrated by “Carlos 
the Jackal,” or Ilich Ramirez Sanchez. The “Jackal” terrorized France for more than a 
decade: during that time he bombed three French newspapers took airline passengers 
hostage, attempted to destroy two El-Al flights leaving Paris airports and he led an 
attack on an OPEC meeting in Vienna (Follain, 1988). With each terrorist attack, and 
with each attack being covered by the French media. The “Jackal” validated the pre-
conceived prejudices against Islam and epitomized what many Christians in Europe 
considered the “terrorist-Muslim” (Follain, 1988). The following image is of one 
explosion perpetrated by “Carlos the Jackal” in November of 1979.
QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (LZW) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
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 A fourth event was the December 21, 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 
over Lockerbie, Scotland. This event further emphasized the ruthlessness of 
international terrorism. The bombing brought down Pan Am: images of the destroyed 
jumbo jet in the city of Lockerbie were broadcast around the world, and these images 
made people in other countries like France feel remorse for the loss and anger toward 
the bombers, who were thought to be of Muslim origin (Sheridan and Kenning, 
1993). During the investigation into the crash, investigators identified two Libyans as 
responsible for the bombing, confirming the link between terrorism and Islam. One 
bomber was convicted; a member of Libyan intelligence, and the other was acquitted. 
The following image is of the cockpit of Pan Am flight 103.
QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (LZW) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
 
A fifth, and the final event I will discuss is the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001. Terrorists brought down four planes on September 11, one in a 
Pennsylvania field, another crashed into the Pentagon and two planes were flown into 
the World Trade Center in New York City. The World Trade Center was completely 
destroyed, and the Pentagon suffered immense damage. In total, 2986 people died in 
the attacks, including the 19 hijackers. This was the worst terrorist attack ever on US 
soil. All of the hijackers were of Middle Eastern descent, and practicing Muslims 
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following the orders of al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden. The following image was 
aired on CNN on September 11, 2001.
QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (LZW) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
 
In the wake of these attacks, Islam was put under global attack (Roy, 2004). 
Crimes against Muslims throughout the world increased (Helsinki Federation, 2005). 
Nations like France, Germany and the United Kingdom immediately passed anti-
terror legislation, which froze bank accounts of potential al-Qaeda operatives, and 
these nations soon afterwards passed legislation, similar to the United States’ Patriot 
Act (Hamilton, 2002). The attacks of September 11, 2001 affected how Europeans 
look at terrorism and the Muslim world. It is not uncommon to hear average 
individuals calling Muslims terrorists (Roy, 2004); this was also illustrated in this 
analysis by interviews with non-Muslim French citizens. Interviewee AX said: 
“Muslims are dangerous. Many Muslims [pause] support terrorism. Look at the 
United States. You have September 11, all Muslim men.”
These images serve as snapshots for pre-conceived prejudices that were 
validated for holders of these prejudices. These events reinforced subconscious and 
conscious suspicions that were already powerful with the added impetus. Law 2004-
228, and the 2005 acts taken by the French government in response to the 2005 riots 
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all exemplify how when validated, and realized, prejudices can become law and racial 
inequality and misunderstanding legalized and sanctioned. So the question must be 
posed, what’s next? 
Dialogue for a “Communicative Society”
France and its Muslim and non-Muslim populations must become what 
Habermas calls a “communicative society” (Habermas, 1973). In order to achieve this 
end, the dominant and minority cultures must create public spheres where members 
of all groups can voice their opinions and concerns. These programs (television, 
radio, internet, print) must be in good faith, and genuine debate and not sound bytes 
should be the goal in order to flush out the true heart of the matter for a peaceful co-
existence to emerge. 
Dialogue must take place. This dialogue can take the form of informal 
conversations at numerous locations such as train stations, or cafés, during television 
or radio programs, via web blogs, in editorial columns, or through other public 
locales. Muslims need to dialogue with the Jewish-French population and realize they 
are facing a similar situation.  Mosques have been destroyed in France and throughout 
Europe, and synagogues have also been bombed and destroyed too; both groups are 
minorities in dominant cultures. Muslims must also dialogue with non-Muslim 
Christians in France, since these two groups (Muslims and non-Muslims) are the 
main two groups in conflict. The Non-Muslim French Christian population needs to 
dialogue among itself about what they really want in France. Throughout this analysis 
non-Muslims stated they did not want Muslims at all in France. Other individuals 
share these sentiments, while others disagree. France needs to determine if it is 
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willing and able to accept Muslims into the “French ideal.” One interviewee put it 
best when she said: 
I [pause] think we must see that France is not one people. France [pause] is 
something we uh all have. Example [pause] we all think Marianne important, 
you ask me earlier about her. Marianne is France, and uh [pause] Marianne is 
me also. We live together. We uh [pause] we uh all need talk to other people. 
This research project is now officially part of this needed dialogue. I realize 
that some individuals will read this dissertation and disagree with the conclusions and 
arguments I have made. That is expected and acceptable. An argument should 
develop debate and encourage discussion (Foss, 2004). My argument is one 
representation of a social reality, a social reality I encountered and observed in 
France. There are going to be competing realities, that is a given (Habermas, 1973). 
However, this particular social reality, this study is now part of the dialogue over 
French and Muslim co-existence; debate about it will foster more debate and in turn 
hopefully encourage further dialogue and consensus.    
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Appendix A
Pseudonym Age            Gender Native Languages
Country Spoken
Interviewee A 29 Female Algeria French/English
Interviewee B 32 Female France French/English
Interviewee C 29 Male Morocco English/Arabic
Interviewee D 57 Female Algeria French/Arabic
Interviewee E 44 Female Algeria French/Arabic 
Interviewee F 36 Female Algeria French
Interviewee G 38 Female Tunisia French
Interviewee H 37 Female Britain English/French
Interviewee I 45 Female Algeria English/French
Interviewee J 39 Female Tunisia English/French
Interviewee K 43 Female Algeria English/Arabic
Interviewee L 29 Male Algeria English/French
Interviewee M 49 Female Algeria French/Arabic
Interviewee N 54 Female Morocco English/Arabic 
Interviewee O 40 Female Algeria French/Arabic
Interviewee P 68 Female Tunisia French/Arabic
Interviewee Q 47 Female Algeria English/French
Interviewee R 29 Male Morocco English/French
Interviewee S 37 Male Libya English/French
Interviewee T 57 Female Tunisia French/Arabic
Interviewee U 39 Female Egypt Arabic/French
Interviewee V 63 Female Morocco French/Arabic
Interviewee W 62 Male Tunisia French/Arabic
Interviewee X 47 Female Libya French/Arabic
Interviewee Y 37 Female Tunisia French/Arabic
Interviewee Z 39 Male Tunisia French/Arabic
Interviewee AA 29 Male France French/English
Interviewee AB 46 Female Morocco French/Arabic
Interviewee AC 40 Male France French/German
Interviewee AD 47 Female Algeria French
Interviewee AE 28 Female France French
Interviewee AF 37 Female Algeria English/Arabic
Interviewee AG 21 Female Algeria English/French
Interviewee AH 38 Female Algeria English/French
Interviewee AI 52 Male Algeria English/French
Interviewee AJ 41 Male Tunisia English/French
Interviewee AK 31 Female Algeria French/English
Interviewee AL 24 Male Tunisia English/French
Interviewee AM 41 Male Tunisia French/Arabic
Interviewee AN 20 Male Morocco English/Arabic
Interviewee AO 18 Male Algeria French/Arabic
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Interviewee AP 23 Male French French/English
Interviewee AQ 29 Male French French/English
Interviewee AR 33 Female French French/English
Interviewee AS 43 Male French French/English
Interviewee AT 39 Female French French/English
Interviewee AU 42 Male French French/English
Interviewee AV 36 Male French French/English
Interviewee AW 51 Male French French
Interviewee AX 27 Male French French/English
Interviewee AY 47 Male French French/English
Interviewee AZ 35 Male French French
Interviewee AAI 26 Male French French/English
Interviewee AB1 19 Male French French/English
Interviewee AC1 47 Female French French/English
Interviewee AD1 63 Female French French/English
Interviewee AE1 64 Male French French/English
Interviewee AF1 59 Male French French/English
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Appendix B
Effect of Pressure to Conform to a Dominant Culture on an Ethnic Community 
1st Generation 
Immigrant
Cultural, 
Economic, 
Political and 
Religious 
Comfort Zone
ETHNIC ENCLAVE – PRESCRIBED 
BY STATE/DOMINANT CULTURE
Pressures to
Conform
DOMINANT CULTURE
2nd and Successive 
Generations
2nd and Successive 
Generations
1st generation: elders feel their comfort zone shrinks. 2nd and successive generations 
conform more to the dominant culture; thus their comfort zone may expand or they 
will develop “nationalistic-like” sentiments for community. 
